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ABSTRACT
The thesis describes a model of regulatory independence based on the 
maxim isation of certain characteristics and  minimisation of others.
The detailed regulation of accounting in the UK has, since 1970 been 
carried out in the private sector. The fact that this has been allowed to 
continue w ould imply that the governm ent is prepared to accept this as 
the status quo, despite the constitutional anomaly of n on -governm en ta l 
rule-making. The regulation of accounting is not m erely technical, bu t has 
economic consequences which stretch beyond the capital m arket.
One of the m ain justifications for regulatory activity being perform ed 
outside of governm ent is that of bringing about independent action. From  
a review of the theory and practice of regulatory agencies, several key 
characteristics emerge which it is argued, impact upon  the independence 
of agencies. These characteristics may be grouped under the follow ing 
headings: motives for agency creation, agency tasks, structure and m ethod  
of operating.
In order to examine the impact of these characteristics on agencies two 
m ain  approaches are used, both based upon the regulators and their 
regulatory environm ent. Firstly general characteristics of accounting 
regulatory bodies are examined. Secondly, where specific processes are 
being studied, the developm ent of two accounting standards. S tatem ents 
of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP's) 20 and 22 are used.
From  these particular cases it emerges that the regulators appear to have  
been influenced in their actions by those companies w ho w ould be affected 
by their pronouncem ents. The role of the governm ent in the process is 
also significant in that they appear to attem pt to influence the outcom e of 
accounting standards in the same way as other participants in the process. 
The model that is developed is then  com pared w ith  general 
independence-influencing theories of regulatory agencies, such as agency
capture, iron triangle and agency life-cycle. It is concluded that the 
maxim isation of the 'independence model' is difficult to achieve, given 
the inherent pressures affecting the individual characteristics.
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PLAN OF THE THESIS
This thesis represents a study into the structures and processes of private  
sector accounting regulation in the UK, concentrating prim arily on the  
Accounting Standards Committee. Drawing on theories m ainly developed 
in the contexts of political and adm inistrative science, it attem pts to 
identify those factors which im pact upon the independence of private  
sector regulators. Each of the factors identified is tested against e ither 
perm anent characteristics of the regulatory body concerned or examples of 
incidences of regulatory pronouncem ents. The paucity of research in the  
UK on this subject could lead to this thesis being seen as a pilot study, 
pointing the way to future research on the subject.
Chapter 1 commences w ith an introduction to the institu tional structure 
of private sector accounting regulatory bodies in the UK, tracing their 
developm ent from 1969 to date. The public policy elem ent of accounting 
regulation is then explained by reference to the economic consequences of 
accounting. Finally, the chapter looks at the problem of decision-m aking 
outside of the State. Characteristics of regulatory agencies are identified in  
Chapter 2 from a study of the literature on regulatory agencies, m uch of 
which emanates from the US. From this study, certain characteristics are 
show n to be significant factors which may impact on the independence of 
regulatory agencies. Those factors will be examined in the following five 
chapters with a view to indicating their relevance to regulatory 
independence.
Chapter 3 takes the first of these characteristics, the m otives for agency 
creation and examines it in the context of the developm ent of two UK 
Accounting Standards. Chapter 4 takes a similar approach, looking at 
agency tasks both in general and as applied to the same two A ccounting 
Standards. Chapter 5 takes a m ore general approach, looking at funding  
and personnel structures over time within each of the three UK 
accounting regulatory bodies. The corresponding US bodies are also 
included in order to achieve a w ider perspective on these factors. The 
general approach is continued in Chapter 6 which examines accountability 
as a factor best evidenced through general characteristics rather th an  
specific pronouncem ents.
Chapter 7 returns to the developm ent of the two standards to illustrate 
both the process adopted by regulators and to exam ine certain of the
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external influences on accounting standards. As an actor closely in v o lv ed  
in the process, the governm ent's relationship w ith  the regulators is 
significant. This relationship is examined in Chapter 8 in order to identify 
the influence that governm ent may have on regulatory outcomes. In the  
final chapter, the findings of this study are then related to overall theories 
of regulatory agency behaviour such as agency capture, agency life cycle 
and iron triangle theories.
My contribution to accounting knowledge through this study is 
sum m arised through a reflection on the individual factors and the ir 
applicability to the developm ent of a model of regulatory independence. 
Finally, areas for further research into the accounting regulatory process 
arising from this study are indicated.
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CHAPTER 1
ACCOUNTING REGULATION AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
This chapter commences by looking at the origins of private sector 
accounting regulation in the UK, briefly tracing the in stitu tiona l 
developm ents from 1969 onw ards and examining the background to these 
changes. The significance of the work of the regulators is explained by the 
economic consequences of accounting, whereby regulatory decisions affect 
m atters of welfare, behaviour and distribution. Because of these effects, 
accounting regulation may be seen as a form of public policy-making and 
therefore subject to political processes, despite taking place outside the 
public dom ain. The problems of the exercise of power outside of the state 
is exam ined in the final section.
In  The Beginning
In the UK, the first accounting standard was issued in 1971 by the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC). Prior to this, betw een 
1942 and 1969 a series of twenty nine recommendations had been issued by 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW )\ 
Up until that time, the Institute's Council had,
'...stood aloof from its members' accounting and auditing activities, 
never having published a booklet of guidance statement in the 
technical field.' (Zeff 1972 p. 7)
The origin of these initial pronouncem ents was the Taxation and 
Financial Relations Committee of the ICAEW, which is described by Zeff 
(1972) as exceeding its original purpose in seeking and gaining the 
approval of the Council to draw  up drafts of accounting principles.^ 
W hilst adm itting  that no hard  evidence was available, he (Zeff) noted that
 ^ These were termed Recommendations on Accounting Principles
 ^ Its' object was to consider matters affecting taxation and the financial relationship of the 
business community with the Inland Revenue. It was later named the Taxation and 
Research Committee and in 1984 was again re-named, this time the Technical Advisory 
Committee to avoid confusion with the newly formed Research Committee.
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'informed observers attest to the effectiveness of the R ecom m endations' 
(p. 22). Howitt (1966) describes how  the substance of some of the earliest 
Recommendations issued up until 1944, found its' way into the report of 
the Committee on Company Law Am endm ent and eventually into the  
Companies Act 1948. There were however many critics of the accounting 
choices contained w ithin the Recommendations (see Chambers, 1965; 
Zeff, 1971), w ith Leach (1981) also noting that they did little to help the 
auditor to persuade his client to use best accounting practice. However the  
flexibility allowed in these Recommendations was the price of the  
'widespread compliance' described by Edwards (1989 p. 245).^
In addition to the problem of the alternative approaches allowed by the 
Recommendations, these early attem pts at regulation had no m andatory 
status, they also took a long time to produce and there was no consultation 
w ith interested parties (Taylor & Turley, 1986). The latter two problem s 
were a result of the procedures for the developm ent of a 
Recom mendation which m eant that the matter was considered by a 
committee of the Council (of the ICAEW) and finally by the Council itself, 
which m eant that;
'By this time some 300 chartered accountants m ight have 
contributed to the preparation of the document in one w ay or 
another'. (Howitt 1966 pp. 103/104)
Despite the existence of a Disciplinary Committee w ithin the ICAEW, the  
lack of a structure for enforcement of standards has been com m ented o n  
by Sharp (1971), who noted that
'..it has been rare indeed for any form of technical lapse (as 
opposed to failure to carry out a duty) to be a matter for disciplinary 
procedure' (p. 242)
N otwithstanding the shortcomings of the series of R ecom m endations, 
Edwards (1989) describes the popular view of accounting in the m id 1960's 
as providing a 'reliable statem ent of a company's financial position' (p. 
145). In the event, this view turned out to be short-lived.
 ^ Although the Economist of 3.6.68 did acknowledge that during the lifetime of the 
Recommendations, the guidelines were becoming progressively more detailed.
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The Change
A lthough the Recommendations appear to have been well established and 
generally accepted (if not adhered to), events were to arise in the latter 
part of the 1960's which m eant that a fundam ental change was to occur. 
Taylor and Turley (1986) describe the GEC-AEI take-over in 1968 as the 
m ajor catalyst for change, but this had followed by some years the 
unexpected collapse of Rolls Razor despite the the professional press 
accepting that 'The accounts of Rolls Razor Ltd follow m odem  practice 
and are m ore inform ative than  most.' (Accountancy, 1964 p. 729). 
Elsewhere, accounting figures were described as relatively true ra ther 
than  absolutely true' (The Economist, 1968). The Leasco-Pergammon affair 
in 1969 again brought strong criticism of the accounting profession from  
the press w ho attacked accountants^ reliance on 'integrity and com m on- 
sense, guided by occasional statem ents issued by the various professional 
institu tions ' (The Economist, 1969 pp. 43/44). The same article continued  
by using Pergam m on as an example of 'the dangerously h it and m iss 
m ethods by which company accounts get audited by auditors'.
Pressure appears to have been growing on the ICAEW during this period 
to instigate some form of change. Renshall (1992) considered a m ajo r 
factor behind the creation of the ASSC to be the complaint to the President 
by Sir Frank Kearton, the head of Courtaulds, one of the m ost active of UK 
com pany acquirers, that 'his com pany had been constantly disappointed 
after an acquisition to find that the biddee's audited accounts were not to 
be relied on.' The open attack in the national press by Professor Stam p 
(The Times, 1969), although attracting a bitter response from  R onald 
Leach, then  President of the ICAEW, also served to ferm ent the  
atm osphere of criticism of accounting.
The final im petus for change m ay not have been simply the m o u n tin g  
pressure caused by failures of accounting and the adverse public criticism, 
bu t the fear of governm ent in tervention  in the detailed regulation of 
accounting (Bromwich, 1981; Taylor & Turley, 1986). Following the 
Pergam m on-Leasco affair, this had  been openly suggested as a possible 
cure '..the accountancy profession will seriously have to consider w he ther 
m ore of its 'best practice' rules should not be written into the C om panies 
Act' (The Economist, 1969 pp. 43/44). The danger of g overnm en t 
in terven tion  was thought by some to be imminent. Ken Sharp (who
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served two term s on the ASC, totalling 11 years) w riting in the  
professional press, felt that, 'had the Institute not acted it is probable that 
legislation w ould have been introduced w ith  unseem ly haste' (1971 p. 
242)'*. In the event, the Institute did act swiftly, setting up  the A ccounting 
Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) in December 1969.
The First Standard Setters
The ASSC came into life w ith the publication of a 'S tatem ent of Intent o n  
Accounting Standards in the 1970's', by the Council of the ICAEW (1969). 
This Statem ent included aims which were a) to narrow  the areas of 
difference and variety in accounting practice and b) to recom m end the  
disclosure of accounting bases and departures from definitive standards. 
Initially, the ASSC worked under the ultim ate authority of the Council of 
the ICAEW w hich was nam ed in its constitution as the governing body. 
This constitution rem ained as the basis for all constitutions from 1970 to 
1976, am endm ents being those relating to m em bership. Initially, the 
President of the ICAEW appointed Committee mem bers w ith two places 
being reserved for Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) members^. The 
Association of Certified Accountants (ACCA) and the Institute of Cost and 
M anagem ent Accountants (ICMA) joined in 1971, and the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) in 1976.
As a com m ittee of the ICAEW, the ASSC was served by various o ther 
Institute Com mittees such as the Parliam entary and Law Com m ittee, the 
Technical Com m ittee and the Technical and Research Com mittee. This 
was w ritten into the constitution of the ASSC. Non-accountancy body 
m em bers were how ever specifically excluded from m em bership at that 
tim e.
The First Reform
In 1970, the governing bodies of the professional accounting institutes had 
formed the Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies (CCAB). In
 ^ This was not an isolated opinion. For other contemporary views see Robson, 1991. 
' The Scottish representation was soon increased to 3.
15
February of 1976, the ASSC was re-constituted as a committee of the CCAB 
and the word 'steering' was dropped from the title. The fundam ental aim s 
of the ASC were no different from that of the ASSC and did not alter 
throughout it's lifetime. The change was the location of power, a lthough  
dom ination of the ASC by ICAEW members was w ritten into the new  
constitution, with 12 members (including the Chairman) nom inated ou t 
of a total of 23, the rem ainder being divided between the other CCAB 
m ember bodies. The reliance on ICAEW committees was reduced to m ore 
of a consultation role, with the ASC forming its own working parties, 
although the constitution did allow it to obtain assistance to carry out its 
work from suitable organisations and persons w ithout being specific as to 
the criteria for 'suitability'.
In 1978, the ASC set up a group under T R W atts to review the standard 
setting process and to consider possible im provem ents. This reflected the 
position of the ASC that it was time to seek the views of the public, and in  
a memo from the ASC to its members, the legitimacy of the Com m ittee 
was of concern: '...it was necessary to seek an overt public m andate' (ASC 
2/35/1). One of the problems was identified in an article by Lafferty (1979).
'You (Tom Watts) better than anyone m ust be aware of how much 
industry bias exists under the present set-up of ASC. Much as we 
would like to see each ASC member thinking only of users w hen he 
considers a proposed standard, the reality is that self-interest is 
bound to come through.' (p. 50, brackets added)
In 1978, a draft consultative document was issued to form the basis for 
public discussion and comment. In response to this, there were 131 
w ritten submissions and public hearings took place in Dublin, Glasgow 
and London. The prelim inary paper from W atts dated 10th March 1980 
indicated that the majority of those consulted believed that accounting 
standards should continue to be set in the private sector, and due to the 
technical nature of such standards, the backbone of the standard setting 
body should be accountants, although the need for non-accountants to be 
members was accepted. The paper also suggested the need for a 
supervisory body to ensure compliance w ith accounting standards, and 
also urged that standard setters should be seen to act in the general public 
interest with its activities as open as possible. However, W atts concluded 
(somewhat reluctantly) that constitutional pow er should rem ain w ith the
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Councils of the professional bodies, thus m aintaining control of the  
process w ithin the profession. A m eeting of the ASC on 24th M arch 1980, 
decided that this interim report should rem ain confidential (ASC 2 /35 /1 ).
The final version (the Watts Report) was issued to the CCAB in 1981. This 
report concluded that accounting standards should be set in the open after 
public consideration and discussion, that m em bership should no t be 
restricted to accountants and that a panel should be set up w ith the Stock 
Exchange to review non-compliance by listed companies. Additionally, it 
recom m ended that the standard setting body should be of high calibre and 
headed by a Director of Accounting Standards. A lthough m any of its 
recom m endations were not adopted until the form ation of the 
A ccounting Standards Board, some issues were reflected in the am ended  
1982 constitution which saw a shift from m em bers in practice to m em bers 
in industry, as well as reserving up  to 5 out of 20 places for users w ho need 
not necessarily be members of any of the CCAB professional bodies. There 
w as also the introduction of observer m em bers' from academia and the  
governm ent^. Links with the ICAEW were still strong. ASC secretariat 
staff w ho held wide responsibilities for the form ulation of initial papers 
and the drafting of documents still rem ained part of the ICAEW Technical 
D irectorate.
A lthough the membership of the Committee w as w idened over the life of 
the ASC, powers to issue standards in their own right were never held. 
The voting majority for members was increased in 1982 from two th irds to 
three quarters for the approval of any docum ent and even then prior to 
issue, pronouncem ents had to be agreed by the Councils of aU m em ber 
bodies leading to further delays^ (see Chapter 7 for a specific example). 
S tandards could be issued only by the professional accounting bodies 
them selves, which m eant that enforcement w as also effectively delegated®. 
Failure to observe standards rendered a m em ber liable to disciplinary 
action from  the appropriate accountancy body^, but the lack of strong
 ^There had been an academic member since 1969.
 ^ The only exception to this being discussion papers (ASC 2/49/2)
® The instigation behind this move came from the Scottish Institute who were reluctant to 
accept standards which were laid down by a sub-committee of the ICAEW, as the ASSC 
had been originally. See Slimmings (1981) p 18.
 ^ The explanatory forward to the Statements of Standard Accounting Practice issued in 1971 
state that 'The Council expects members of the Institute...to observe accounting standards' 
and 'The Council through its' Professional Standards Committee, may inquire into apparent 
failure by members of the Institute to observe accounting standards or to disclose departures 
therefrom'
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action led to criticism of these bodies (Edwards, 1989), w ith Renshall (1992) 
noting  that to his knowledge, no m em ber was ever disciplined for 
breaching accounting standards during the lifetime of the ASC.
A lthough the ASC is credited w ith significantly changing British financial 
reporting practice (Renshall, 1992), it nevertheless was dogged by its 
various limitations. As well as having to serve (and satisfy) six m asters o n  
the CCAB, there was also the problem  of the lack of formal consu lta tion  
m echanism . Despite the setting up  of a consultation group to advise o n  
m atters of the programme, proposals and work, this does not appear to 
have m et since 1982^°; following the W atts Report's recom m endations for 
a w ider m em bership it was felt that the consultation group no longer 
served a useful purpose (ASC 2/49/3). Shortcomings in the standard 
setting process were summarised in the C hairm an's budget subm ission to 
the CCAB for 1986/1987 and were specifically identified as staff shortages 
causing slowness of action, lack of research, the phasing of projects and the  
inability to review standard avoidance (ASC 1/42/1). The Com mittee had  
proposed in 1987 to resurrect consultative panels (Financial Reporting 
A dvisory G roup and Panel of Academic Consultants) as well as seeking to 
undertake a review of com m unications^\ Both of these proposals appear 
not to have been proceeded w ith because of the Dearing Report (1988), 
although they m ay perhaps be seen as one reason for that report.
Furtherm ore, during its lifetime, the ASC had never been able to achieve 
pow er to enforce accounting standards. The Chairm an of the ASC in 1978 
sum m arised the situation which was to prevail for the next twelve years 
in a radio interview , '...we m ust be clear that we are a body w hich is
setting a kind of law and the only way we can do t h a t  is by consent o r
persuasion ' (T Watts)^^. In a m eeting betw een the ASC and the Stock 
Exchange on 22.10.85, the Stock Exchange said they w ould not be inclined 
to suspend companies for non-com pliance w ith  a standard, and the only  
chance of enforcem ent would be through the law (ASC 1/81/1). In a 
m eeting the following day w ith the D epartm ent of Trade and Industry  
(DTI), Godfrey (then Chairm an of the ASC) stated 'The profession has 
lim ited pow ers of enforcement and the ASC itself had no such powers and  
did not seek them ' (ASC 1/81/1). M uch of the debate on non-com pliance
See letter from D Wright, ASC secretary to E Gillott dated 27.3.90 (ASC 3/6/6). 
see memo from J Renshall, ASC Chairman to D Wright dated 1.1.88 ( ASC 1/41/2). 
Interview on Radio 4 on 27.9.78 for 'The Financial World Tonight' (ASC 2/8/2).
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w as centred on Current Cost Accountings^. There exists evidence that at 
least on one occasion the ASC sought to have a form  of legal backing to 
SSAP 16. In a letter to Godfrey dated 13th December 1985, Michael Howard 
of the DTI stated that '...the legislative approach is not one which the 
Governm ent would be willing to take unless there were evidence of very 
m uch more support than there is at present' (ASC 1/81/1). However, by 
1989, the DTI were prepared to include a requirem ent in the Com panies 
Bill for directors to state whether the accounts were prepared in  
compliance w ith applicable accounting standards. In m aking this decision, 
they had no doubt considered the new structures for regulation, proposed 
by the Dearing Report.
The Dearing Report and the FRC
In Novem ber 1987, the CCAB had set up the Accounting Standards 
Review Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Ron Dearing to review 
the accounting standard-setting process. Not only were resource and 
procedural deficiencies addressed, but also the absence of effective policing 
and enforcement of standards. In a letter, S Gray, the academic m em ber of 
the ASC recognised this;
'While the ASC has achieved some progress I believe that its 
lim itations have now become significant to the extent that major 
changes are w arranted....what was needed w as a change in the 
Companies Act which really confirms my point about the prim acy 
of law.' (Letter dated 8.7.87 to J Ould
with copy to J Renshall, ASC 1 /38 /2 )
Later in the same letter he comm ented that the ASC should  w ork m ore 
closely w ith  the law' and that '...it seems to me unrealistic to believe that 
accountants have sufficient authority to significantly restrict or expand 
legal requirem ents'.
The Review Com m ittee reported in 1988, m aking two m ain  
recom m endations: a new non-statutory structure for setting and 
enforcing standards and proposals for changes in the law to encourage
The non-compliance rate was quoted by Godfrey as being 85%,
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compliance w ith accounting standards. The question of the incorporation 
of standards into law w as dismissed on the grounds that,
'..this inescapably requires a legalistic approach and a reduction in 
the ability of the financial community to respond quickly to new 
developm en ts ' (Dearing Report 10.2)
Ultimately, the recom mendations were adopted and in 1990, the Financial 
Reporting Council was set up w ith its constituent Accounting Standards 
Board, Urgent Issues Task Force and Review Panel. M any of the perceived 
shortcomings of the previous regulatory system were addressed, in that as 
well as receiving increased funding and em ploying some full tim e 
m em bers of the Board w ho operated independently of the accounting 
profession (detailed in Chapter 5), accounting Standards were issued by 
the ASB itself and the policing of those standards became a m atter for the 
Review Panel.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING REGULATION
Introduction
In the 1970's, following the setting up  of accounting standard  setting bodies 
in both the UK and the USA, the term  'economic consequences' became 
part of the accounting vocabulary^^. A lthough such consequences had 
already been identified^^, the particular term was not used. The rules of 
accounting found in previous Companies Acts in the UK, had doubtless 
produced such consequences. A lthough these were not perhaps explicitly 
discussed, they were nevertheless illustrated by the changing emphasis on  
shareholder and creditor protection contained w ith in  19th century 
com pany law^^. However, the separation of law and economic policy was 
thought possible in 1945 by the Cohen Committee w hich considered that 
it should concentrate on m atters of law and that economic policy was 
outside their term s of reference (Bircher, 1989). The earlier absence of 
economic consequences could be a result of a less regulated en v iro n m en t.
The identification of economic consequences is attributed by Cooper & Sherer (1984) to the 
desire by large US corporations to counter attempts to increase levels of disclosure and 
change reporting systems.
See for example Zeff (1971) who considered that, 'More than ever was true in the 1940's 
or 1950's, accounting principles in the 1960's had entered the realm of public policy' p. 229.
See, for example Edey & Panitpakdi (1956),
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since regulation usually creates some consequences (and it is this w hich  
often underlies the rationale for such an act). As Gellein (1978), a form er 
m em ber of the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the U nited  
States, points out 'standard setting w ould be purposeless if n o th in g  
resulted from the reporting' (p 75). If the results of accounting rules bring 
about economic changes then this will affect m atters of efficiency and 
equity; therefore the regulation of accounting becomes a m atter of in terest 
to the society in which it operates.
The Impact of Regulation
One starting point for examining the impact of regulation w ould be to 
refer to the role of financial reporting in society. The role described by 
Gellein (1978) involves the 'allocation of available resources to those 
standing ready to furnish goods and services' (p 75). But, as he points out, 
reporting itself is not the allocator^^, it is part of the structure whereby the  
allocation is m ade and therefore he suggests at an operational level, 
regulation should focus on decision-makers using the inform ation ra ther 
than  the consequences, a theme explored later in this thesis. This 
perspective is seen in various conceptual fram ework projects w hich h ave  
commenced w ith user needs (see for example The Corporate Report, 1975; 
ASB Statem ent of Principles, 1991, or the Statements of Financial 
Accounting Concepts in the US, 1978).
The direct impact of financial reporting m ay be seen in three m ain areas; 
the behaviour of m anagem ent, the effect on the firm  and the effect on  
society, although an inter-relationship exists betw een these areas as, for 
example, m anagem ent may decide to act according to the effect on the ir 
firm  or on society as a whole. Indeed the effect on the firm and the effect 
on society can in m any instances be considered together. Bromwich (1985) 
describes only allocative and redistributive effects which in them selves 
could be as a result of the behaviour of managers to create such effects.
The behaviour of m anagem ent as the inform ation producer, has been 
recognised by W atts & Zim m erm an (1978) and Cyert and Ijiri (1974), as a 
reaction to the effect on their own welfare. This type of im pact on
“ Resources may for example be allocated through government policies of taxation or 
subsidisation, irrespective of what information is contained in financial statements.
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m anagem ent decisions has been termed 'inform ation inductance' 
(Prakash & Rappaport, 1977; Selto & Neum an, 1981). Accounting reports 
may therefore influence the financing and operating decisions of firm s 
(Heald, 1980; Butterworth Gibbins and King, 1981).
The effect on the firm has been described generally by Gellein (1978) as the 
impact on the enterprise cash flows because of actions taken by outside 
parties. Beaver (1981) describes this in terms of the com petitive 
disadvantage of disclosure which could reduce the ability of a firm to reap 
the benefits of innovative activity. He uses a hypothetical example of a 
requirem ent to disclose a m anagem ent forecast of earnings which m ight 
in some circumstances alter the nature of the investm ent projects 
undertaken, thereby affecting the risk-retum  trade-offs associated w ith  the 
firm (although this latter example could also be used as an example of 
m anagem ent behaviour).
The impact on society of financial reporting may be seen in term s of 
distributional issues. Solomons (1978) explains that changes in the status 
quo are effected because standards are set in controversial areas, a 
sentiment echoed by Cooper & Sherer (1984);
'...the outcomes of accounting policy are essentially political in that 
they operate for the benefit of some groups in society and to the 
detrim ent of others'. (p. 208)
The American Accounting Association had already recognised this in  
1978, stating;
'Every policy choice represents a trade-off among differing 
individual preferences and possibly among alternative 
consequences'
Indeed May and Sunden (1976) justify the basis for the existence of a 
regulatory body by reference to the social welfare impact of accounting^®.
Examples of Research into Economic Consequences
Much of the research into economic consequences quoted in this section 
has been based on work carried out in the United States. The reason for
Although Cooper & Sherer (1984) point out that the values and preferences of that body 
may not reflect society's preferences.
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this m ay be the greater num ber of standards issued or m ay be a result of 
the larger am ount of research carried out in the US, but nevertheless, at 
the very least it does illustrate the probable consequences of sim ilar 
accounting standards in the UK. The following constitutes an illustra tive  
cross-section of research into the impact of accounting regulations, 
comm encing with the effect on the firm.
Marketable Securities-Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SPAS) 
12
By treating such securities in a different way from stocks, sm aller and less 
frequent write-downs of such securities are necessary^^. An adverse effect 
on earnings could be avoided by treating the entire portfolio as n on - 
current and  w riting-dow n value losses against shareholder's equity th u s 
m aking the earnings of investing firms less volatile (Daley & Tranter, 
1990).
Foreign Exchange (SPAS 8)
Solomons (1978) described how  the result of the standard was to increase 
greatly the volatility of reported earnings of companies w ith foreign 
operations by m andating the use of the temporal m ethod.
Leasing
In the US, Ruland (1984) quotes examples of opponents of capitalisation 
claiming that this policy w ould depress ratios and therefore increase the  
cost of capital for US firms.
Goodwill
The requirem ent for US companies to write off purchased goodwill was 
said to give an advantage to foreign companies in bidding for US 
businesses (Daley & Tranter, 1990). This particular impact was also 
recognised in the UK and the standard on goodwill is explored in greater 
detail in a later chapter.
Deferred Tax - Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 11
The original UK standard advocated the full allocation m ethod of 
accounting for deferred tax. Against a background of 100% capital
Under the standard, the calculation of lower of cost or net realisable value of marketable 
securities was based on an aggregate and not individual basis.
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allowances, 30% inflation and stock appreciation relief, H ope & Briggs 
(1982), in the UK pointed out that companies w ould report reduced after 
tax profits because of the deferred tax charge, as well as disclosing very 
large deferred tax liabilities in the balance sheet^°. This standard was 
subsequently replaced by SSAP 15 which used the partial allocation 
m ethod .
These types of research studies have often been criticised from  a num ber 
of different viewpoints. Foster (1980) for example noted the inconsistency 
of Lev's (1979) research into SFAS 19 (Oil and Gas Exploration), claim ing 
that this was indicative of the general failure of such tests to specify a 
theory of expected market effect. Taylor and Turley (1985) w arn  of the care 
that should be taken in interpreting the results of research, due to the 
difficulty of isolating a particular item of regulation from  aU o ther 
influences in the market. They also criticise the narrow ness of such 
research, stating; 'Economic consequences will not stop at the boundary of 
the stock market, but will extend into other markets' (p. 117).
Studies of M anagem ent Decisions
Studies of m anagem ent decisions are in many ways a subset of m arket- 
based research, in that a change in a m anagem ent decision will have a 
m arket effect and the anticipated m arket effect will influence m anagem ent 
decisions. Forcing managers for example to disclose that w hich they w ould 
rather no t disclose could bring about sub-optimal decisions. For exam ple, 
if a m anager is forced to disclose environm ental inform ation, he m ay n o t 
undertake certain activities which m ight have m axim ised firm s' profits. 
This could lead to a m arket effect whereby share price is reduced due to 
m arket perception of foregone opportunities.
Research and Developm ent (SFAS 2)
The FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) w as told by the 
respondents to its exposure draft that such a standard on research and 
developm ent would discourage spending on research w hich w ould  
otherw ise be in the best interests of the market (Gellein, 1978). Solom ons 
(1978) claims that the standard was said to constitute a threat to
Hope & Briggs quote the total liabilities in the manufacturing and distribution industries 
as increasing from £901m to £7,620m between 1971 and 1976.
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technological progress especially in the case of new companies coming to 
the market, although Vigeland (1977) found no apparent m arket reaction 
to the standard. This w as in m arked contrast to the findings of Horowitz & 
Kolodny, 1980 and 1981, and Dukes et al (1980), that firms who previously  
capitalised research and developm ent expenditure, significantly reduced 
such expenditure following the introduction of the standard.
Contingencies (SFAS 5)
The proposal to proscribe self-insurance reserves on grounds that the need  
for insurance would exceed the capacity of US insurance m arket, m ean t 
that overseas insurers w ould have to be used, thus im pacting upon the US 
balance of payments ( Gellein, 1978; Solomons, 1978).
Foreign Exchange (SFAS 8)
In order to mitigate the effect of this standard, it has been reported tha t 
additional currency hedging was used to m inim ise such fluctuations 
(Griffin, 1979). Investm ent and financing decisions by US companies are 
also felt to have been affected (Evans et al, 1978; Shank et al, 1980).
Oil and Gas Exploration (SFAS 19)
This standard was over-ruled by the Securities and Exchange C om m ission 
on the grounds that exploration activity could reduce if the basis of 
accounting were changed to ’successful efforts'.
Troubled D ebt Restructuring (SFAS 15)
This standard avoided banks having to write-down debts w hen they had  
been restructured. Daley & Tranter (1990) describe this treatm ent h av in g  
been adopted because of the possible effect on reduction of capacity and the  
willingness of banks to lend.
Leasing (SSAP 21)
Taylor and Turley (1986) describe the UK effect in term s of the direct 
consequences of a reduction in investm ents^, as well as the indirect effect 
e.g. changes in cost, thus altering the investm ent and financing decisions 
of managers. In the US, the capitalisation of finance leases has also been 
the subject of research which suggests that m anagers will try to re-
A sentiment also echoed by the DU in their reply to the Exposure Draft on leasing.
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structure leases in such a way as not to qualify as finance leases (Abdel- 
Khalik 1981)"".
Lobbying and Regulation
Even in the absence of market-based or other empirical tests of econom ic 
consequences, the presence of such consequences, potential or real m ay be 
evidenced through the actions of those parties interacting w ith accounting 
inform ation either as a producer or user. Ruland (1984) describes the 
economic consequences approach existing;
'...implicitly by parties lobbying for or against standards which will 
affect their welfare' (p. 224)
Lobbying is described by Sutton (1984) as the taking of an action to 
influence a rule-making body. Such actions are examined in detail in later 
chapters in the context of the development of two UK standards.
Direct lobbying of the standard setting body could either be by government, 
governm ental agency, by industry (including professional bodies) or by 
any other information user. In the first instance it is sometimes difficult 
to discover whether the government instigates its own actions in lobbying 
or is merely passing on pressures exerted on it from outside. Solom ons 
(1986) and Daley & Tranter (1990) quote the example of the A ccounting 
Principles Board in the US being overturned by both the SEC (Securities 
and Exchange Commission) and Congress on the issue of accounting for 
investment tax credits. FASB received similar pressure from the SEC over 
their attempted standardisation of oil and gas accounting in FAS 19 
(Solomons 1986), following the anti-trust division of the Departm ent of 
Justice testifying to the SEC on this standard (Beaver 1981 p 50). Solom ons 
(1981) considered that the origin of this action was outside of govenunent; 
'...the Securities and Exchange Commission w ould not have acted... 
to over-rule this standard if there had not been political pressure 
from certain oil and gas companies' (p. 68)
In the case of troubled debt re-structuring, FAS 15, it was the C om ptroller 
of the Currency who lobbied the SEC (Daley & Tranter, 1990), a lthough  
they also quote examples of the SEC being lobbied by industry on the sam e
“ Perhaps this fear was ill-founded in view of the later research on gearing levels and 
bond premiums, see Wilkins & Zimmer (1983).
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issue. Additionally, Daley & Tranter (1990) in the case of the original 
exposure draft on marketable securities describe the insurance industry as 
lobbying the SEC.
There are also UK examples of direct governm ental in tervention in the  
process of regulation. According to Solomons (1986) the Sandilands 
Com m ittee was set up to circum vent the Constant Purchasing Pow er 
Standard (PSSAP 7), because of the proposed use of indexation in the  
standard. Indeed in the terms of reference, the Sandilands Committee was 
told to take into account the need to restrain inflation, a lthough  
suggestions have been made that it was also an intention to re-distribute 
w ealth from  workers to shareholders. (See Cooper & Sherer, 1984). O ther 
examples of the UK government acting as a pressure group w ith regard to 
accounting regulators are examined in Chapters 7 and 8.
A lthough governm ents both in the UK and the US appear to h av e  
effectively over-ruled accounting regulators on occasions, industry lobbies 
do also appear to be successful w here some standards are concerned (two 
of which are looked at in detail in a later chapter). Hope and Briggs (1982) 
state that the first standard on deferred tax (SSAP 11) was effectively 
w ithdraw n in the face of industrial opposition. W idespread refusal to 
comply w ith SSAP 16 (Current Cost Accounting) was a contributory factor 
to its demise. Evidence of lobbying can be seen in the replies to Exposure 
Drafts both in the UK and the US, and although this is often the only 
visible evidence of lobbying, it m ust be noted that there are m any o ther 
stages at which it may take place (Lindahl, 1987; Sutton, 1984).
Accounting R egulation - Political or Technical?
H om gren (1973) is not alone in believing:
'The setting of accounting standards is as much a process of political 
action as of flawless logic or empirical findings' (p. 61)
The process tends to be political because the outcomes of standards is re­
distributive and affects the welfare of groups in society (Bromwich, 1985). 
A t the same time he (Bromwich) claims that there is little evidence that 
Pareto solutions exists. In that case, not only are those w ho m ight benefit 
from regulations inclined to influence the outcome, bu t also those w ho
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m ight lose. The welfare issue tends to be centred around different user 
groups^^ ,and in the absence of optim al accounting policies, regulators 
h a v e
'...a political role of trading off conflicting objectives of financial
statem ent user groups' (Cushing 1977 p. 311)
Solom ons (1978) in emphasising the behavioural view of accounting 
regulation, points out that accounting is not unique in affecting 
behaviour, using paradigms from physics, geology and medical research to 
illustrate behavioural effects. Hawkins (1978) considers that FASB, because 
it has the pow er to influence economic behaviour, also has the obligation 
to support (government) economic plans. Thus he takes the som ew hat 
radical view  that macro-economic objectives should be param oun t in  
determ ining  accounting standards^^. Other writers such as R appaport 
(1977) advocate a perspective broader than pure technical considerations, 
w hile Buckley (1976) criticises US standard setters for only using  
theoretical arguments and being oblivious to social impact. Once this v iew  
is adopted, the regulatory process m ust become intentionally  political. 
This is defended by Gerboth (1973) on the grounds that politicisation of 
accounting is a necessary part of the democratic legitimisation of authority. 
The FAF (Financial Accounting Foundation), the organisation overseeing  
the w ork of the FASB, appears to have accepted this argum ent, th ro u g h  
their adm ission that standard setting requires some perspective and th a t 
the regulators are representatives of the entire constituency of users, 
im plying a political process. This 'representative' role is h o w ev er 
som ew hat difficult to reconcile w ith the fact that no set of standards exist 
w hich are able to rank alternatives in accordance w ith preferences and  
beliefs (see Demski, 1973; Arrow, 1963).
The tentative (and perhaps optimistic) solution to this is suggested by 
Cooper & Sherer (1984) ;
^ Recent conceptual framework projects have tended to emphasise the investor user group 
justifying this choice 'As investors are providers of risk capital to the enterprise, the 
provision of financial information that meets their needs, will also meet most of the needs 
of other users that financial statements can satisfy',( Para 10, Accounting Standards Board, 
Exposure Draft, Statement of Principles).
The result of such a view would appear to place accounting regulation within the 
responsibilities of government, but Hawkins is not explicit in this area.
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'It is necessary to make explicit a social welfare function which 
enables trade-offs to be made between individuals and society'
(p. 214)
While this assumes that such a function could be disclosed, it may also be 
said to involve some compensation principle where a Pareto so lu tion  
cannot exist. Both the acceptance of a social welfare function and any 
ensuing compensation are however, political acts^^.
Accounting as Public Policy
It would appear from the research carried out into economic consequences 
that these do exist and therefore that accounting regulation like any other 
political actions has an effect on the community in which it is carried out. 
The argum ents used in regulation may be technical, but the results 
involve changes in welfare and are therefore political. The process 
whereby standards are set imitate parts of a political process whereby the 
regulators are lobbied by those having an interest in the area under 
discussion. The objective of accounting should be neutral according to 
Solomons (1978) who considers that the intention to achieve anything 
other than 'pure m easurem ent ends', would 'destroy faith in accounting' 
(p 69). Ruland (1984) looking at accounting regulation from the v iew poin t 
of ethical philosophical thought and in terms of deontology and teleology, 
concludes that the former through the pursuit of representational 
faithfulness^^ should guide the regulators and describes FASB's conceptual 
fram ework project as an 'effort to operationalise the representational 
faithfulness approach' (p 224).
Representational faithfulness however, in a way rem iniscent of 
Solomons' (1978) 'financial map-making', is not universally accepted and 
appears to be at odds w ith the social welfare view of accounting. Cushing 
(1977), describes optimal accounting principles as those whereby users 
achieve an expected payoff which is greater than or at least equal to the 
corresponding payoff under an alternative principle. There is implicit in
^ If, for example, the interests of the equity investors are exclusively satisfied, this may 
involve a wealth transfer from labour to capital. If however subsequent legislation is 
passed which guarantees minimum wages or shorter hours, this could represent the re­
distribution.
This qualitative characteristic is subsidiary quality of reliability in SFAC 2. Nobes & 
Parker (1995) give as a definition that ^accounting information should represent what it 
purports to represent: in other words, it should be true.' p. 156.
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such a statem ent that the objective of regulation is to seek Pareto optim al 
solutions. This changes the role of accounting to one of social policy rather 
than pure description. Beaver (1981) adds to this by talking of the relative 
im portance which should be assigned to the preferences of each user 
group. Any ensuing welfare decisions may not necessarily be m ade by the 
regulators themselves but from other sources as Ruland (1984) suggests; 
'...if one refrains from acting for the welfare of others, it is not at all 
certain that their welfare will not be attended to by other means
(p. 233)
This is reminiscent of the Carsberg, Arnold and H ope (1977) suggestion of 
choice betw een accounting alternatives becoming part of a democratic 
political process.
This leads to two possible approaches to accounting regulation. Firstly the 
neutral and secondly the pre-determ ined social w elfare/national goals 
approach. If the form er approach is adopted by the regulators, then on a 
standard by standard basis they will be lobbied by those seeking to increase 
their own welfare as there is no universal acceptance of the in terpretation  
of neutrality. If the latter approach is taken, then again those seeking to 
maximise their own welfare will attem pt to change the social welfare 
objective of the regulators. Under both circumstances, the process of 
regulation is in the political arena and the regulators m ust attem pt to 
insulate themselves from such influence if they are to act independently.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Accounting regulation however is only one part of the broader context of 
the general system of rules affecting society. The fram ew ork for such rule- 
making is a constitution, defined by Graham and Prosser (1988) as follows;
'A constitution, written or unwritten, outlines the basic structure of 
the state, the relative powers of the organs and lays dow n particular 
principles for the action of public bodies, for example the due 
process clause in the US constitution.' (p. 4)
W riting in  the nineteenth century. Dicey (ed. W ade, 1959) considered that 
there were two fundam ental constitutional principles; the legal
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sovereignty of Parliament and the Rule or Supremacy of law. Bradley
(1985) describes the legal sovereignty of Parliam ent as a doctrine of 
constitutional law which means that are no legally enforceable lim its to 
the legislative authority of the Parliament. The fact that the courts are able 
only to review the adm inistration rather than the validity of legislation 
im plies that such power is absolute. Dicey stated that the legislature has 
'the right to make or unm ake any law w hatsoever' and that no body or 
person outside of the legislature 'is recognised by the law  of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliam ent' (p. 40).
Liberal Democratic Principles
The 'W estm inster' system is described by Oliver (1991) as an expression of 
the liberal-democratic political tradition, under which the exercise of state 
pow er is justified in terms of the public interest rather than  of the in terest 
of one class or groups The tradition dates back to the 17^' century w here  
the term  'com m on good' (Locke), 'general interest' (Mill) and 'general 
w ill' (Rousseau) are all expressions used to describe approxim ately the  
same ideas as the public interest. Finer (1970) outlines six basic 
assum ptions for the liberal-democratic state. The first of these is tha t 
governm ent is derived from public opinion and is accountable to it. 
Accountability implies an ongoing test of the representativeness of 
government: it is not sufficient for pow er to have been granted in the past 
based on public opinion at that time. The second of these assum ptions 
concerns the expression of public opinion which implies som e kind of 
suffrage carried out through a system of representatives. The th ird  
assum ption is that in matters of contention, it is the m ajority will th a t 
should prevail. The rem aining assum ptions tend to qualify rather th a n  
com plim ent characteristics of democracy. The first of these is th a t 
governm ent is lim ited in that certain rights of the individual and  of the  
private association are safeguarded. Additionally, society is recognised as 
being pluralistic, hence the rule of governm ent is not confined to any one 
group, bu t should operate in the com m on interest, putting  o n  
governm ent the rather onerous task of reconciling different v iew poin ts. 
The final qualification concerns the denial of any objective science of 
society or of morals and again serves the purpose of lim iting pow er 
through the adm ission of tolerance based partly on the prem ise th a t
Although Oliver (1991) notes increasing criticism of the system over the last decade in 
terms of public disillusionment in matters of prosperity and the distribution of wealth.
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view s as to w hat is true and proper for governm ent to act upon  w ill 
change over time^®.
The Sovereignty of Parliam ent
The sovereignty of Parliament is described by Jowell (1985) as being one  
of the major premises upon which democratic theory rests. Bradley (1985) 
states that even the right to m ake constitutional changes by ord inary  
processes of legislation is in their powers. This sovereignty is built u p o n  
the legitimacy of parliam ent to act and is the process by which authority  is 
given to those who wield power (Halsey, 1986). Legitimacy is given to the  
legislative process because of the system of elected representatives 
(Bradley, 1985). A lthough authority can be derived from tradition^ 
m o d em  societies see that universal and unconstrained acceptance is a 
necessary condition for legitim isation (for example see Rousseau). 
A lthough obedience to the state w as traditionally viewed as being based on 
habit and custom (see Moore, Johnson, Marx), social contract theories 
rested m ore on the idea of obedience being based on the consent of the  
governed^®. Bentham considered that the majority opinion represented 
the greatest sum  of happiness. A n alternative view of authority is g iven  
by Finer (1970) who considers that the exercise of power is acceptable 
because its advocates are regarded as the wisest, the best or the m ost 
representative or because '...it appears conducive to happiness or welfare 
or greatness or w hatever other value has an over-riding value ' (p. 15). 
This echoes both Bentham w ho believed that majority o p in io n  
represented the greatest sum  of happiness and Burke in his description of 
the State as holding 'the accum ulated w isdom  of generations', a lth o u g h  
Finer's (1970) acceptability of pow er does reflect changes in society over 
tim e.
A uthority  does not however necessarily achieve these objectives. Halsey
(1986), while acknowledging that general rules may be based on the  
preferences of the majority, points out that bureaucrats may easily and  
frequently 'break the chain from  popular will to executive decision '
^ Reminiscent perhaps of Counsers opinion on the meaning of True and Fair.
For example the dynastic legitimacy of absolute monarchy which Cranston (1966) 
describes as the Divine Right of Kings, a widely accepted belief throughout Europe in the 
17th century.
^ Social contract theories have ranged from the Hobbesian absolute power of the sovereign 
to the limitation of such power by the natural rights of the individual (Locke), this latter 
version being more in line with liberal democratic theory.
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(p. 159), implying perhaps that wide discretion, at times verging on policy 
decisions is exercised by bureaucrats^ ^  A second lim itation Halsey 
identifies is in the area of personal authority, where decisions are accepted 
on the basis of a kind of charisma (which was one of W eber's (1947) types 
of legitimate authority), whereby the inspired leader is absolved of hav ing  
to justify the decision in terms of theory, fact or value^^.
The election of representatives of the people to Parliam ent is the way in  
which legitimacy is given to the legislative process (Bradley, 1985). The 
process is one which encompasses notions of consent and 'responsibility ', 
a further feature of liberal democratic governm ents implying the concepts 
of 'responsiveness, good conduct and accountability' (Dunleavy and 
O'Leary, 1987). The grant of authority to Parliam ent is given partly in  
recognition of the sovereignty of that body as the locus of rule-m aking. 
Where other bodies are involved in rule-making, formal authority m ay 
not been vested in them directly by the people. Additionally, there m ay be 
no way in which subsequent accountability can take place.
Power Outside the State
The tradition of rule-making outside of Parliament in the UK dates back to 
the 18th century with the creation of certain non-governm ental agencies. 
The constitutional awkwardness of having pow er exercised outside of 
central governm ent has long been recognised on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Graham and Prosser (1988) consider that changes in the structure 
of the state to create public agencies have, in the UK, in contrast to France 
and the United States raised little debate. This is endorsed by Lewis (1985) 
who talks in terms of the 'disintegration of the model of representative 
and responsible governm ent' (p. 199) because of the way the British state 
operates 'increasingly not through a fram ework of public rules, but 
through adm inistrative processes in which it seeks to achieve particular 
goals through the discretionary use of power'. Graham & Prosser (1988) 
describe how;
'Instead of being exercised through institutions of central and local 
governm ent conventionally subject to democratic forms of 
accountability, an imposing edifice of quasi-govem ment has
Additionally, Smith & Hague (1971) quotes public concern that a unified civil service 
acting under a minister is an impediment to public accountability because of secrecy and lack 
of public access to the bureaucracy.
Examples of this are quoted by Crossman (1976), on becoming a minister.
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been erected posing new problems of accountability and control'
(p. 8)
Courts have adopted the language of 'private' and 'public' law w ith o u t 
addressing the new constitutional problems raised by the former, at tim es 
disclaim ing adm inistrative law jurisdiction over both 'quasi' and 'quasi 
non-governm ent' bodies (Harden, 1988).
The Pliatzky Report^ ^  (1980) referred to fringe bodies w hich are 'no t a 
G overnm ent D epartm ent or part of a Governm ent D epartm ent' but 
w hich have 'executive, adm inistrative and regulatory functions'. These 
fringe bodies are not only numerically significant, (with a 1979 estim ate by 
Holland and Fallon putting  their num bers at 3000), bu t have been a long­
standing feature of the UK w ith some of the earliest examples being the  
Poor Law Boards of the nineteenth c e n tu ry ^ I t  was recognised that pow er 
exercised outside governm ent did not accord with the traditional view  of 
the liberal democratic state. Sir Ivor Jennings w riting in the 1930's 
described prosaically how;
'..tw enty four ministers are not leaders of columns that m arch 
behind them  in regular ranks, for the columns now  have outriders 
on their flanks and a relatively unorganised mass of camp 
followers trailing behind...Equally false is it to assum e that for every 
act that is done by a public authority, someone is responsible to 
Parliam ent' (p. 80)
This was also recognised in the USA where the President's Com m ittee on  
A dm inistrative M anagem ent set up in 1937, described regulatory agencies 
as the 'headless fourth branch of government'.
These changes to traditional adm inistration have been brought about in  
m any instances by the search for economic efficiency, w hich tends to h ave  
over-ridden other considerations. The growth in state in tervention  in the 
economy in the tw entieth century has taken place against a background of 
constitutional thought which assumed that the state carried out few 
functions (Graham & Prosser, 1988), and therefore the constitu tional
^ This was a government report into "types of body which have a role in the process of 
government in the UK, but which are not Government Departments or part of a Government 
Department" (p. 1).
^ For a historical view of agencies, see Baldwin & McCrudden (1987) Chapter 1.
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im plications of this growth appear not to have been considered^ M oran  
(1988) describes how  these economic changes 'im plied im p o rtan t
alterations in key constitutional practices in the way the line was d raw n
separating public from private power' (p. 56). Recent com m itm ents to 
lim ited state intervention in industry does not signify the solution to th is  
problem  but has merely brought about a shift of pow er to n o n ­
governm ent organisations.
'Policies have been pursued which have been designed to 
encourage, directly and indirectly, the emergence of organisations 
willing and able to co-operate w ith governm ent in its approach to 
social and economic problems and to assum e delegated 
responsibilities accordingly' (Harden, 1988, pp. 42/43)
Examples of such organisations are the Securities and Investm en ts 
Board (SIB) and the Self Regulatory Organisations (SRO's) w ith pow ers 
delegated by the Board. Such structures tend to operate w ith in  a 
corporatist fram ework which is defined by Shm itter (1979) as;
A system of interest representation in w hich the constituent units 
are ... recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted
a deliberate representational m onopoly in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports.' (p. 13)
Corporatism  is view ed by Middlemass (1979) as a form of co n tin u o u s 
contract in which power is shared between the state and large organised 
groups^ w ith H arden (1988), arguing that corporatism  has been th e  
traditional basis for the operation of City institutions.
'The reshaping of the City has not dim inished the importance of 
corporatism in its structure, albeit there has been a change in the 
nature of self-regulation and the forms of state involvement in the 
regulatory process.' (p. 50)
He talks of these institutions as now being 'm ore visibly clothed w ith th e  
power of the state'. M oran (1988) also describes how  the established system
This is not a recent development. The central constitutional problem of regularising 
relations between nationalised industries and government was given too little thought, 
with other matters dominating the thinking on these industries. (Graham & Prosser, 1988) 
^ Although Birch (1985) felt that corporatism has not really occurred in the UK, and 
quotes the fate of the NEDC's and the Social Contract as examples.
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of regulation in the City was corporatist. Institutions which he described as 
sem i-private' such as the Stock Exchange carried out 'representation and 
regulation' The system under which the City operated meant that;
'..entry to markets was closely controlled, w ith admission 
depending on willingness to observe severe limits on competition; 
authority was exercised w ith a m aximum of discretion and a 
m inim um  of precise rules, especially of rules derived from statute; 
and the whole system was guided and protected by the City's 
G uardian Angel, the Bank of England.' (p. 58)
This situation term ed by H arden & Lewis (1983) 'a delegation of public 
functions to private control', decayed because of w hat Moran (1988) 
described as 'a com bination of scandal, economic crisis and m arket 
innovation ' (p. 58). He outlines how, by the beginning of the 1980's these 
arrangem ents were clearly not working, and yet the surprising response of 
the governm ent was to make such a corporatist system stronger th ro u g h  
the Financial Services Act of 1986, which he describes as an attem pt to 
appropriate the power and legitimacy of the democratic state to support 
corporatist arrangements. Gower (1985) rem arks that ...the Securities and  
Investm ent Board is envisaged as being a private, practitioner-based 
body.... exercising public functions and statutory powers.' (p. 12). The 
original SIB and its subordinate SRO's were able to exercise a m onopoly of 
regulatory powers over their constituents and are therefore claimed by 
M oran (1988 p. 59) to be an example of a system  which is exactly in  
accordance w ith Shmitter's (1979) definition of corporatist representation.
Baldwin & M cCrudden (1987) recognise a further problem  associated w ith  
the use of agencies, in that they can be '....constitutionally awkward in th a t 
they combine powers that have traditionally been kept separate' (p. 3). T he 
powers to which they refer are the legislative, adm inistrative and jud icial 
powers. A lthough the ASC may have been term ed legislative (but w ith  n o  
powers of enforcement), certainly the post 1990 structure for accounting 
regulation contains in the Review Panel, investigative powers w h ich  
w ould im ply an adm inistrative if not a quasi-judicial function.
W ithin this array of non-governm ental agencies, private sector 
accounting regulatory bodies have existed since 1970. Situated am ong  
agencies which have been described as 'constitutional anomalies' could
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im ply that the accounting regulators, prom ulgating a kind of law^^, w ere 
in  a som ewhat tenuous situation, and there have always been concerns 
tha t the governm ent w ould take over their functions. N evertheless the  
ASB w ould now appear to be firmly established as the agency holding an  
alm ost delegated authority to issue accounting rules, through the  
recognition of their status and pronouncem ents in the Com panies Act.
SUMMARY
This chapter describes how private sector accounting regulation in the UK 
started  from the ICAEW and gradually incorporated the other professional 
accounting bodies. A lthough reviews of the standard setting process 
in troduced a wider input to regulation, the institutional and  operational 
problem s m eant that a fundam ental change occurred in 1990 w ith the  
setting up of the FRC and its constituent companies. A ccounting 
regulation has been show n to have economic consequences which m ay 
affect both the behaviour of m anagers and the actions of those 
stakeholders who use accounting inform ation for decision-making. These 
regulations have been described as a kind of law, but one w hich is set in  
the private sector rather than  by governm ent. As such, accounting 
regulators join a growing band of agencies whose constitutional position is 
unclear, bu t whose presence, governm ent not only tolerates, bu t w ou ld  
appear to encourage. This them e is explored in later chapters.
^ See earlier quote from Watts.
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CHAPTER 2
AGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 outlined certain of the constitutional problems concerned w ith  
pow er being exercised outside of Parliament. In this chapter, it is the 
institutional structure behind that power which is being examined in the 
context of regulation, described by Kells (1992) as a process whereby;
'...a system, institution, program or procedure is attuned over time 
to expectations (intentions, standards, norms) through choices and 
actions judged by the regulators to be needed as a result of formative 
or sum m ative evaluation' (p. 17)
Regulatory actions imply a response to a changing environm ent and 
interaction w ith the originators of the expectations. The choices and 
actions of the regulators would not appear capable of satisfying these 
societal expectations, unless the institution carrying out the process is 
structured in such a way as to allow formative and sum m ative  
evaluations to be made. The purpose of regulation is generally equated 
w ith prom oting the public interest^ (Lemak, 1985; Stigler, 1971; Noll, 1971). 
If this is the case, the regulatory body should therefore act in accordance 
w ith this m andate w hether implicitly or explicitly expressed. A lthough  
there exists more than one version of the public interest, it would appear 
that a pre-requisite for any of these versions is that the agency concerned 
should act in an independent m anner defining such a term as "freedom 
from control' or 'possessing autonomy' (Chambers, 1993; Collins, 1979).
W hether or not the agency can be described as independent, m ust depend 
upon both the internal characteristics and external environm ent of the 
agency. The identification of the key characteristics which could influence 
the judgem ent of the regulators, is a prerequisite to assessing the 
perform ance of a regulatory body as well as the developm ent of a m odel 
which may predict w hether regulatory pronouncem ents are made in the
’ Chapter 4 examines public interest in the context of accounting regulation.
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general interest or whether some form of 'capture' or undue influence 
will occur. This chapter examines those characteristics of agencies w hich  
m ay affect (either positively or negatively), their independence. 
Additionally, it places accounting regulators under the broad definitions 
of agencies .
DEHNITIONS
One of the initial problems encountered in attem pting to study agencies is 
one of identification and definition. W ithin the field of political science, 
the term is applied to organisations described variously as quangos, 
commissions, boards, committees, bureaux and statutory authorities, w ith  
some writers also applying the term agency to those governm en t 
departm ents which have similar characteristics (Burch & Wood, 1986; 
Dunleavy 1991). The Oxford English Dictionary (1982) defines agencies 
both in terms of institutions i.e. having concrete existence', an  
'establishment', as well as in terms of actions i.e. 'working as a m eans to 
an end'.
Other agency definitions tend to be found m ainly w ithin dictionaries of 
public adm inistration which stress their carrying out of a governm ental 
type of function while remaining independent^ of any branch of 
governm ent (Shafritz, 1985; Chandler & Plano, 1988). The term  'B ureau ' 
tends to be used mainly in the US whilst more generally the terms 'Board' 
or 'Com m ission' are often used interchangeably w ith 'Agency', a lthough  
'Board' may be differentiated by being applied to a group that exercises 
policy or decision-making functions, whereas 'Com m issions' are often 
assigned regulatory responsibility (Chandler & Plano, 1985). W here the  
w ord committee is used, it is usually defined as a sub-group of a larger 
body formed for convenience to look at m atters of detail which im plies 
that this delegation of responsibility prevents the m aking of binding 
decisions (Robertson, 1985). The committee therefore can only m ake 
recommendations to the main body or report conclusions^.
 ^ The definition of independence on the previous page, encompassing freedom from control is 
particularly relevant in this context.
 ^ The lack of direct powers in this definition can be seen to apply to the ASC.
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Certain agencies have been term ed "quangos', which are described by 
Stoker (1990) as '...organisations that involve voluntary and private 
enterprise resources but which nevertheless receive public funding and 
undertake tasks crucial to public policy' (p. 127), bu t Self (1985) criticises the 
w ord quango as being misleading and expresses a preference for the term s 
'governm ent regulated or sponsored agencies' and 'hived off or sem i­
independent public agencies', whereas current term inology also includes 
non-departm ental public bodies' (Thompson, 1993). W hat is com m on 
am ong the definitions is the fact that public policy or public business is 
being carried out by a non-govem m ental departm ent and it is perhaps th is 
function that is m ore im portant than the descriptive label attached to the  
organisation carrying it out. Chapter 1 examined the constitutional 
problem s associated w ith such actions and w hy the regulation of 
accounting m ight be considered an act of public policy.
CLASSIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS
Quite apart from the problem of definition or description, agencies do n o t 
appear to be capable of being placed into discrete categories which capture 
all of their characteristics. Hanson & Walles (1978) recognise the 
difficulties in providing either a functional or typological classification of 
agencies. They see the reasons for such difficulties as arising from the 
various ways in which agencies are constituted and their heterogeneity of 
purpose, a sentim ent also expressed by Self (1977). W here attempts at 
agency classification have been made, they have tended to be one 
dim ensional, not reflecting all the organisational and functional 
complexities. Self (1985) for example produced a classification based on the 
m otives for agency creation (which is examined in detaü in Chapter 3). 
This w ould not necessarily reflect or represent a classification made for 
example the basis of either agency power, purpose or constitution. Agency 
functions form ed the basis for the Pliatzky (1980) classification but certain 
of the functions he described e.g. advisory and executive, could be found 
w ithin the same body. Thompson (1993) classifies w hat he term s as 'quasi- 
govem m ental bodies', by way of legal forms of creation. These include 
creation by statute, by Treasury m inute and registration as a company.
In the absence of a single satisfactory way of classifying agencies due to the 
complex and heterogeneous nature of such organisations, most w riters
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have tended to analyse agencies through sets of characteristics o r 
conditions (Hanson & Walles, 1978; Jennings, 1930; W ilson, 1980; Sm ith , 
1972; Dunleavy, 1991). This does not necessarily produce simply a disparate 
num ber of characteristics'*. A review of the literature both from the UK 
and USA, indicates that these characteristics m ay be classified into th ree  
m ain areas: a) motives for agency creation; b) agency tasks and c) agency 
structure and operations. These areas encompass the conditions w hich  
Self (1977) considered necessary to maximise the independence of agencies. 
Selfs four conditions were, 1) abnegation of governm ent control, 2) 
dealing w ith  tasks which can be isolated from the rest of governm ent, 3) 
existence of an adequate and independent source of revenue and 4) the  
absence of a powerful interest group of clients who substitute theirs for 
governm ent control.
A ny attem pt at examining the independence of agencies under the  
structure outlined will thus include Self's (1977) m axim ising conditions. 
The m otives for creation is significant in that an agency m ay have been 
form ed by governm ent deliberately to shift a function from the political 
arena. A lternatively, an agency may have been created by the p rivate  
sector in order to prevent governm ent interference, yet exists w ith  the  
tacit consent of governm ent as the ultim ate holders of state power. The 
tasks of an agency may define the degree of independence it enjoys. A 
function that is seen as non-political w ould be free from g o vernm en t 
interference (although possibly not from the actors in the societal area in  
w hich it operates). The structure and operations of an agency include its 
funding, personnel, procedures, constitution and clientele, each of w hich  
can im pact significantly its' decisions and therefore on its' independence.
 ^ One of the most comprehensive attempts in this area was made by Phillip Holland, a 
Member of Parliament who in 1979, recognised 947 different types of agencies using several 
variables, although his motive for this work was to reflect (and condemn) the then 
contemporary proliferation of agencies (Holland & Fallon 1979).
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Motives For Agency Creation
Baldwin & M cCrudden (1987) provide a brief history of the reasons for 
agency creation, and describe how the earliest examples of UK agencies 
carried out functions considered at the time to be non-political. Agencies 
such as the Poor Law Commission at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century were independent from direct parliam entary supervision and 
were characterised by being controlled by Commissioners whose 
independence was enhanced by having responsibility for their ow n 
budgets^. Such a structure as this was intended to create a strong and 
fearless adm inistration, but became subject to intense political pressures 
because of its lack of accountability to (and sponsorship from) 
government. Ultimately, as they grew in size and functions, such agencies 
were either assimilated into existing ministries or became Departments of 
State in their own right (Smith, 1972)^. The history of agencies are 
described by Baldwin & McCrudden (1987) in almost cyclical terms, arising 
during the period of evolution of governm ent and declining w ith the 
growth of central governm ent from 1830 to the end of the century. 
Although several new agencies were created by the Liberal governm ent of 
1906, concern was increasing during the early part of the twentieth century 
w ith the growing power of central governm ent, especially after the first 
world war. Such concerns were first articulated by the syndicalists and the 
Fabian socialists (Smith, 1972), and had increased by the end of the second 
world war^. However during this period of growth in State power, the 
1930's had seen the setting up of quasi-regulatory m arketing boards, and 
the 1940's had seen wide scale nationalisations (see H annah, 1983). These 
actions did not involve the transfer from the State of existing powers and 
responsibilities, but nevertheless established the principle of pow erful 
non-govem m ental or private sector bodies.
Agency creation received a boost from the Fulton Committee in 1967 
which encouraged the use of agencies in a broad role in society. H ow ever
 ^ The income arose from a parish levy on all occupiers of property (Rose M , 1971).
 ^The Poor Law Commission being abolished in 1847 and was replaced by the Poor Law 
Board, whose President was a member of the Government, thus bringing the poor law into 
the sphere of political control.
 ^The publication of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom' in 1944 reflected these concerns.
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this committee was in many ways only reflecting the creation of a p lethora 
of agencies in the 1960's which continued through to the 1970's. These 
agencies covered both social life and industrial activity, partly in order to 
create a continuous form of control rather than spasmodic tinkering w ith  
m atters, as well as being the result of a m ove towards a more pluralistic 
approach to public policy.® New attitudes and a different approach to 
public policy were illustrated by the incoming Labour governm ent of 1964 
in the setting up of the Departm ent of Economic Affairs. This significant 
new  D epartm ent required a host of planning and regulatory agencies to 
w ork alongside it, among which were the Prices and Incomes Board (1965) 
and the Industrial Re-organisation Corporation (1966). Agency creation did 
not stop w ith  the change in governm ent in 1970. Baldwin & M cCrudden 
(1987) explain this in terms of social changes;
' A lthough the notion of the m anaged economy had waned by the 
start of the seventies and the cult of economic liberalism had 
become stronger, the momentum  of corporatism  was sustained.
The new  aim was to make tripartism  w ork - if not for the purposes 
of general planning, then in specific areas' (p. 21)
The devolu tion  of governm ent powers w hether in the interest of 
increasing pluralism  or whether for some other m otive, may be seen as a 
m ajor factor behind the creation of agencies. A governm ent in tent o n  
reducing State pow er might try to do so by setting up alternative bodies^.
® Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) describe institutional pluralism as an antidote to
uncontrolled State power although they admit that 'Pluralistic approaches to policy
making still dominate the political science literature of Western Europe and North 
America, although much less than in the 1960's’ (p 70).
 ^ The functionalist view of the State in its ex-ante approach defines the State as that set 
of institutions which carries out particular goals, purposes or objectives’ (Dunleavy & 
O’Leary, 1987 p 3). Under such a definition therefore, a private sector accounting regulatory 
body would be seen as part of the State. Since the emphasis of this chapter is on the 
characteristics affecting the independence of agencies (from governments as well as those 
being regulated), this functionalist view of the State will not be used further.
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H ood (in Baldwin & M cCrudden 1987), notes that agencies could be used 
by government in creating space for a new policy w ithin the m achinery of 
governm ent or concealing the real size of the bureaucracy. His idea could 
be extended to the use of agencies to re-inforce existing policy. The 
argum ents against 'big governm ent' both in the US and UK have arisen  
in response to the grow th in governm ent which Self (1985) attributes to 
changes in the technological, economic and social environm ents. The 
creation of agencies could be seen as a way of rolling back the frontiers of 
the state. This may appear to be at odds with m oving tow ards a stronger 
and m ore centralised state, but in the case of the UK, D unleavy (1991) 
reconciles this apparent paradox by describing the m ove by the T hatcher 
governm ent;
'away from the conventional integrated ministry structures, and 
towards a Swedish-style distinction between core policy-making 
ministries and hived-off executive agencies' (p. 225)
Sm ith (1972) attributes the developm ent of regulatory agencies in the U S 
to fear of direct governm ent intervention in the economy. Noll (1971) 
also expresses similar sentim ents in describing a pervasive view  that 
regulatory agencies protected society by positioning them selves betw een 
unscrupulous businessm en and corrupt politicians. The US has a 
traditional fear of tyranny, and any sharing of powers therefore shou ld  
m ake it difficult for the governm ent to either be captured by in terest 
groups or dominate society (Wilson, 1980). The objections how ever to 'big 
governm ent' are not necessarily based on fear or ideology bu t m ay be 
pragmatic. The overload thesis of Rose (1985) argues that as governm en ts 
take responsibility for solving m ore problems, then the w eight on political 
and adm inistrative m achinery grows. If more regulation is forthcom ing, 
then popular compliance decreases and bureaucracy becomes disliked (as 
well as becoming more expensive to operate). The overload argum ent is 
also espoused by the m anagerialist school (Slatter, 1982) and gives as its 
solution, the hiving-off of m ore routine tasks to sem i-au tonom ous 
agencies. N ot only does this provide a repository for routine functions, 
but also serves the purpose of helping to create expert bodies. Efficiency 
gains may be m ade by m oving away from the am ateur and generalist 
approach of the civil service, towards m ore expertise and scientific 
m anagem ent (Smith, 1972). This theme of specialisation and expertise is
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expanded upon by Hanson & Walles (1975) who accentuated the need for 
the;
'...use of administrative and managerial techniques allegedly 
difficult for the officials of a normal government departm ent to 
acquire and apply' (p. 194)
giving as their m ain reasons for such difficulties, civil service status, 
subjection to Treasury control and answerability to Parliament. Baldwin & 
M cCrudden (1987) also recognise the benefits of the use of expertise w ith in  
a rule-making or adjudicative body whose actions are inappropriate for a 
governm ent departm ent or a court. They further argue that w ithin such 
bodies, independence from government needs to be shown just in order to 
apply such (neutral) expertise. An agency might just as well be used rather 
than an expert court because of the potential volum e of decisions as well 
as the ability to be free from technicalities of procedure. Their specific 
justifications for the use of agencies encompass both the expertise and the 
'big governm ent' rationales as well as operational factors, and are as 
follows;
1) ability to involve the public in decision-making possibly through the 
use of appointm ents to incorporate interest groups, which, due to 
operating conventions, may not be possible in the case of governm ent 
departm ents.
2) giving the appearance that the governm ent is doing som ething about a 
matter. A governm ent can always claim that an expert body is 
investigating or acting on a particular matter.
3) where administration of a particular policy is viewed as being politically 
dangerous w ith few obvious political benefits to the government.
4) lobbying and requests for political favours may be deflected from the 
governm ent to a body which will evaluate their argum ents on a technical 
basis
5) avoids awkward or burdensom e duties being added to existing tasks of 
departm ents or courts.
6) if a certain matter is the sole responsibility of one agency, it will be better 
administered. Through the build-up of expertise, the better adm inistration  
will follow automatically; such expertise could be either technical or 
procedural.
7) division of labour helps with specialisation and expertise.
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8) speed of decisions and freedom from technicalities are an  advantage 
over the court system.
9) agencies are not restricted to formulating policy on a case by case basis as 
are the Courts.
10) fine tuning of rules can be m ade w ithout involving the legislature. 
This in turn prevents delay in re-acting to situations.
11) an  agency may be a m echanism  which raises and clarifies a rgum ents 
upon  which political decisions depend. Public opinion is focused and  
issues are introduced that enrich political debate.
H ow ever wide ranging and appealing these argum ents, the 'constitu tional 
aw kw ardness' of agencies described in Chapter 1 is still not overcom e. 
Jennings, writing in the 1930's had elucidated five circumstances u n d e r 
w hich the adoption of sem i-autonom ous forms of adm inistration  m igh t 
be justified. This is a form of classification based on function. Firstly there  
was the provision of a service of a cultural or personal kind w hich m igh t 
be distorted by political responsibility (e.g. the BBC or the Arts Council) 
Secondly, there were those institutions set up to enable producers to 
m arket products in an organised way. Thirdly there was the need to 
regulate professions such as medicine and the law, w hich w ere only 
subject to slight political supervision. Fourthly, there w as the organisation  
of technical services needing little political control (e.g. the Forestry 
Commission). Finally, there were authorities of a quasi-judicial type, such 
as those set up  to deal w ith the licensing of transport or liability to 
taxation. Generally, this functional classification was based on the n o tio n  
that cultural, judicial and technical functions could be m oved safely 
outside the political arena.
A final reason for the creation of agencies is som etim es given that policy 
m akers are loath to interfere in certain im portant areas of econom ic 
activity such as the Stock Exchange, banking system or financial m arkets 
w hich are generally left to regulate their own activities (Burch & W ood, 
1986). In the United States by contrast, it is a federal governm ent agency, 
the Securities and Exchange Com mission (SEC) w hich acts as a regulator. 
The argum ent for non-governm ental involvem ent does how ever ignore 
governm ent pressures that may be pu t on the sector to initiate self­
regulation' Veljanovski (1990) uses the example of the liberalisation of the
46
financial services sector as a reason for the increase in regulatory agencies, 
and could in fact have added the privatisation of utility companies in the 
UK as a further example. A feature of agencies created by deliberate 
abnegation of formal authority  by politicians, is that cam paigns to abolish 
such agencies are largely ineffective (Self, 1985) as they owe their existence 
to political expediency.
Agency Tasks
The Pliatzky Report (1980) classified agencies by tasks, term ing such bodies 
executive agencies, advisory agencies and tribunals. The latter function  
will not be exam ined further as they may be thought to act as 'court- 
substitutes', (Abel-Smith quoted in Baldwin & McCrudden, 1987), and the 
Franks Committee (1957) considered that tribunals should;
'properly be regarded as machinery provided by Parliam ent for 
adjudication rather than as part of the machinery of 
adm in istra tion '.
Advisory bodies w ould appear to have a passive role to play in that they 
are unlikely to be m aking policy or regulations and w ould often function  
as an interface betw een two other parties. Thom pson (1993) quotes the  
A dvisory Committee on Pesticides and the Royal Fine Art Com m ission as 
being examples of such bodies, although he did not acknowledge the  
inputs to policy decisions that advisory bodies may provide.
The executive function includes a wide range of agencies, since it covers 
regulatory, m anagerial, prom otional and trading functions w hich im ply 
an active rather than a reactive role w ithout necessarily incorporating a 
political role, as the examples of the Arts Council and the Civil A v ia tion  
A uthority (also quoted by Thom pson, 1993) would confirm. Flowever, 
regulatory agencies m ay im pinge upon one condition for the  
m axim isation of agency independence set by Self (1977). This condition is 
that the agency should be dealing with tasks which can be treated in  
isolation from the rest of governm ent. A lthough it could be argued that 
any act of regulation brings w ith  it its own set of externalities, regulations 
w hich specifically create economic consequences may not be able to be 
considered in isolation from the rest of governm ent economic policy.
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Expertise is a characteristic of m any specialist agencies. It is central to the  
use of agencies and places an activity am ongst appropriately skilled people 
(Hague, McKenzie & Barker, 1975). Self (1977) considered that those 
agencies involved in the greatest am ount of technical tasks were those 
w ith  the highest degree of discretion. If governm ent therefore was unable  
to train, recruit or retain suitably qualified staff to carry out the function  
itself, it m ay also have difficulty in m onitoring the operations of a 
technical agency.
In the case of regulatory agencies, their general function is to serve a 
clientele which is normally the group that will be protected by th e ir  
regulations. Self (1977), uses the M onopolies Com mission as an exam ple 
of an agency serving consum ers and working according to th e ir 
interpretation of the public interest^®. The use of the term public interest is 
not easy to define, but in the context of regulatory agencies, it is 
traditionally equated with the rem edying of m arket failures justify ing 
intervention and is further examined in Chapter 4.
Structure A nd O perations
The structure and operations of an agency include both internal and  
external factors. Internal structure covers funding, personnel and m ethod 
of proceeding, whereas external factors concern the environm ent in w hich 
the agency is operating. One of Selfs (1977) conditions for m axim ising  
agency independence was the existence of an adequate and independen t 
source of revenue. Certainly agency actions m ay be constrained if 
revenues are inadequate and additionally the provision of finance shou ld  
be structured in such a way as to ensure that the provider does not u n d u ly  
influence the recipient.
Agencies dealing w ith technical m atters tend to be have a high p ropo rtion  
of professional staff. Despite Selfs (1977) positive correlation betw een 
discretion and expertise, nevertheless in 1985 he w arned of the loss of 
independence where there was a close identification betw een an agency
This being the Commission's criteria referred to in the summary of all monopoly enquiries 
(see Monopolies and Mergers Commission annual reviews).
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and a profession, a situation likely to arise where regulation of technical 
m atters was being carried out. N ot only might the professional w orking in  
the agency be influenced by their professional colleagues outside the 
agency who are subject to their regulations, but they may be w hat W ilson  
(1980) describes as;
'..employees who receive rew ards (in status if not in m oney) from 
organised members of similar occupations elsewhere. They m ay 
hope to move on to better jobs elsewhere, but access to those jobs 
depends on their display of professionally approved behavior and 
technical competence. They may also be content to rem ain in the 
agency, bu t they value the continued approval of fellow 
professionals outside the agency, or the self-respect that comes from 
behaving in accordance w ith internalized professional norm s'
(p. 374)
Additionally, the appointm ent system for chief executives to regulatory 
agencies may signify some external input which may im pact u p o n  
independent decision-making, although the appointm ent system  m ay be a 
legitim ising device where the governm ent makes the appointm ent.
Baldwin and McCrudden (1987) recognise three m ain operational choices 
faced by agencies. Firstly w hether to proceed by way of education, 
negotiation or by enforcem ent of existing standards. Education and  
negotiation may emphasise a representational role, acting as a type of 
pressure group, whereas the enforcement role will require neutrality. The 
second choice involves w hether its' role is going to be re-active or p ro ­
active; will it be increm entalist or com prehensive in its approach to 
change. Thirdly, how are its rules to be enforced? Are they to be backed by 
legislation, take the forms of codes of practice or will there be adjudicatory 
powers? The first and third choices may well be fixed by the term s of 
reference when the agency is set up. This may help to define the degree of 
independence. The approach to problems often depends u pon  the  
environm ent in which the agency operates. Environm ental change caused 
by prices or new technology affect regulatory practice. W here such an  
environm ent is changing rapidly, agencies may have to be re-active, bu t a 
case could equally be made for agencies to be pro-active in order to keep 
ahead of events.
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For an agency to operate successfully w ithin the liberal democratic state, it 
m ust, like any other political institution, achieve legitimacy. Baldwin & 
M cCrudden (1987) consider legislative m andate, expertise, due process, 
efficiency and control as being the five criteria for achieving legitimacy. 
Agencies owe their origins to a num ber of forms which define no t only 
their actions but also their authority. Those created by specific acts of 
Parliam ent or by Royal Charter may tend to have more legitimacy th an  
those set up by incorporation under the Companies Acts as they can be 
seen to have been established with the backing of governm ent. Baldwin & 
M cCrudden (1987) further consider that m any agencies 'operate broad 
m andates which are difficult to cite as convincing defences w hen they are 
under attack' p. 34. Their argum ent rests on the fact that the m ore precise 
a m andate is, the greater is the claim to legitimacy. In an ideal world;
'agencies might derive legitimacy through a legislative m andate in 
which Parliament would set down the tasks it w ants agencies to 
achieve, attribute powers and designate both precise objectives and 
appropriate standards to govern agency behaviour' (p. 34)
Expertise as a characteristic was seen as essential to technical tasks being 
carried out but additionally it is a contributory factor to legitimacy in that 
specialists may be seen as having a right to exercise pow er in their ow n 
fields.
The due process criterion incorporates such agency procedures as 
participatory decision-making, consultation and openness. It also invo lves 
the question of w hether decisions m ade are fair, consistent and equal. Use 
of these elements of due process does not necessarily lead to efficiency 
(another characteristic which may maximise independence). Additionally, 
outcom es arrived at by using due process may not correspond w ith  the  
legislative m andate where one is in place. Participatory decision-m aking 
can involve the agency in consensus-seeking which may im pact upon  the 
im partiality of decisions, in contrast to a system of unilateral decision­
m aking by the agency.
The criterion of efficiency is given two forms by Baldwin & M cCrudden 
(1987). The weak form which examines w hether given objectives are 
pursued  in an effective m anner suffers from inherent difficulties, g iven  
that even where a clear definition of objectives exist, there are still the
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problem s of m easurem ent of success in achieving these objectives. The 
term  'effective m anner' covers such areas as the choice of m eans to 
achieve objectives and the best em ploym ent of resources. All of this, they 
po in t out m ay occur in a situation where there is a mismatch betw een the  
task in hand, the strategy and the regulatory institution itself. The strong 
form  of efficiency involves an assessment of the consequence of decisions, 
w hich should have as a pre-requisite, a consensus as to d istributional 
m atters.
Accountability
W ithin liberal democracies, a feature of governm ents is that they shou ld  
be both  representative and responsible (Birch 1964). A lthough there is n o  
single interpretation of 'representative' (see Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987), 
responsibility itself implies various concepts, including responsiveness, 
good conduct and accountability. The expression 'stewardship of the public 
interest' (Oliver, 1991, p. 23), could be said to sum m arise these areas. The 
UK constitution (although unw ritten), provides for individual m in isters 
being accountable to the elected assembly for the w ork of th e ir 
departm ents and the cabinet being collectively responsible for governm ent 
policy. W riting in 1864, John Stuart Mill outlined how this should w ork, 
Tt should be apparent to all the w orld who did everything, and th ro u g h  
w hose default anything was left undone' Mill was describing a clear 
relationship between pow er and accountability w ithin the context of the  
state exercise of power. The eighteenth century had how ever already seen 
the creation in the UK of certain non-governm ental agencies and by the  
early part of the tw entieth century, the constitutional aw kw ardness of 
having  powers exercised outside of central governm ent had already been 
recognised on both sides of the Atlantic (Jennings 1930, The Presidential 
Com m ittee 1937). More recently, in the UK, interest in accountability 
w ould  appear to have increased partly in response to changes in the  
structure of providing public services. A study by Stewart, Lewis and  
Longley (1992) concluded;
"Those who exercise public power in society should be
answerable for the exercise of that power...Such powers are
“ This might require the designation of precise objectives as well as appropriate 
standards as quoted on the previous page.
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only justified if those who exercise them  are answerable to 
them  (the citizens). The powers, it can be argued, do n o t 
belong to those who exercise them, bu t belong to the citizens 
on whose behalf they are exercised. That relationship is only 
justified if there is accountability' (p. 4, brackets added)
The Stewart et al (1992) argum ent rests firmly on the use of accountability 
as a legitim ising device. W ithin a liberal democracy, elections serve the  
functions of both conferring power and calling to account those w ho h av e  
been exercising powers during the preceding period. Stewart et al (1992) 
recognised that the traditional forms of public accountability may not, in  
fact achieve their objectives and that this problem  is com pounded by a 
m ore complex society and a more questioning public. W ithin a dem ocratic 
state therefore, it is axiomatic that the exercise of power carries w ith  it th e  
obligation of accountability^^. Thus an organisation which is carrying o u t 
the exercise of power which otherwise m ight be wielded by the state 
should  sim ilarly be accountable.^^ However, due to the use of agencies, 
traditional political accountability cannot be assumed. Therefore new  
form s of accountability have been identified (Smith, 1980) to overcom e 
this problem .
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Each regulatory agency operates w ithin an environm ent in w hich one  
group is regulated for the benefit of others. Both of these actors have an  
incentive to influence the actions of the regulators for their ow n purposes. 
One of Self's (1977) conditions for m axim ising the independence of 
agencies was the absence of a powerful interest groups of clients. T his 
tends to occur where either costs or benefits are likely to be concentrated
There are however degrees of accountability and writers such as Mayston (1993) consider 
that government in general in the UK is becoming less accountable. This situation, coupled 
with growth in the exercise of power by agencies, implies a general reduction in 
accountability by those who exercise power towards those on whose behalf it is exercised.
^^Baldwin and McCrudden consider that the rendering of power is more acceptable where "... 
an agency might be made accountable for its interpretation of its mandate to a 
representative body...' p 36. The notion of control is central to the independence of an 
agency. If accountability implies control, then independence would appear to be minimised. 
Baldwin and McCrudden use the term control synonymously with accountability.
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on one group. W here this arises then W ilson (1980) describes three 
potential systems of politics arising^^, interest group politics, client politics 
or en trepreneurial politics and in each case pressure groups have every 
incentive to organise and take action.
Interest group politics arise where the regulation under consideration w ill 
benefit a small group at the expense of another sm all group. In this case, 
each side has a strong incentive to organise and attem pt to exert influence. 
The general public, although possibly sym pathetic to one side or ano ther 
will no t actively participate in the process. Client politics results w here the 
benefits are likely to be concentrated, while the costs are widely diffused. 
The potential beneficiaries are likely to unite to support the proposition. 
Finally, entrepreneurial politics arise where a relatively small benefit is 
generally conferred at costs to be bom  by a small segm ent of society and 
this segm ent will organise to attem pt to defeat the regulation. In the case 
of accounting regulation, in place of the usual producer and consum er 
examples, we find preparers and users^^.
Accounting Regulation
The three different agencies involved w ith accounting regulation in the 
UK since 1970 were described in the previous chapter. By contrast, the U S 
experience of private sector accounting regulation has been longer (since 
1959), bu t w ith only two bodies, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). A lready a 
divergence from the definitions of agencies given at the beginning of th is 
chapter, can be seen w ith the US (and subsequent UK) use of 'Board' being 
som ew hat at odds w ith Chandler & Plano (1988) w ho w ould h av e  
preferred the use of Com mission' to indicate the regulatory function. 
Until 1990, the use in the UK of the w ord committee' described the origin 
of the ASSC, which was incorporated as a com m ittee of the ICAEW 
(Howlin & Skerratt, 1992; Taylor & Turley, 1986). The subsequent retention
Wilson does describe a fourth system where both costs and benefits are widely dispersed 
and there is little incentive for interest groups to participate.
Chapter 9 applies Wilson's types of politics to the accounting regulatory environment.
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of 'committee' from 1976 onwards reflects the view of the ASC as a jo in t 
committee of the CCAB (Taylor & Turley, 1986) .
Despite differences in both structure and operations, all these bodies have  
carried out functions which w ould otherwise have fallen to governm ent. 
Indeed these functions can be seen to be carried out by governm ent in  
such countries as France and Germany (Nobes & Parker, 1995), and prior to 
the in troduction of the UK Statements of Standard Accounting Practice 
(SSAP's), the governm ent might be considered to have been at the  
forefront of accounting regulation through the Com panies Acts^^. 
Accounting regulatory bodies act in a similar way to any other agency, 
carrying out some task of public policy possibly using public funding bu t 
nevertheless also receiving some m easure of voluntary  or private  
enterprise resources (the tasks and the resourcing of agencies are looked at 
in Chapters 4 and 5). A lthough the regulation of accounting m ay be 
thought of as different from other types of regulation w hich often deal 
prim arily w ith pricing matters, nevertheless the objectives of regulation 
rem ain the same, i.e. some form of the prom otion of the public interest by 
increasing the welfare of groups affected by accounting. Indeed in o ther 
examples of regulatory activity, the quality of the product also falls w ith in  
the rem it of the regulators'^. Daley and Tranter (1990) seem quite clear in  
contextualising accounting in this way, claiming;
'Setting forth rules that govern the form and content of 
inform ation w hich is disseminated from business organizations to 
the public is a form of regulation'. (p. 16)
The independence-m axim ising characteristics described in this chapter can 
thus be applied to accounting regulators. The relatively short experience of 
private sector regulation, allows its origins to be examined in the context 
of recent history. The tasks of the regulators are well defined and 
contained w ithin the w ritten constitutions of the UK accounting 
regulatory bodies. Their structure and operations are partly visible
Especially if the Recommendations of the ICAEW are considered as guidance rather than 
an attempt at regulation.
The utility regulators in the UK are also concerned with the quality of service.
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through the financial press and technical publications as well as th rough  
exam ining the archives of the Accounting Standards Committee. The 
regulatory environm ent occurs because of interaction between the 
regulators, the regulated and those on whose behalf the regulations are 
framed. Each accounting standard issued w hether in draft or final form  
represents an arena in which the various interests can be viewed.
SUMMARY
Accounting regulation w ould appear to concur w ith the paradigm  of 
regulation and therefore the analysis of both the structure and other 
characteristics of accounting regulatory agencies may be m ade using both 
theories and descriptions derived from other agency types. The problem  
of providing a definition and therefore being able to identify and classify 
agencies was addressed. A functional definition of an  agency as an  
organisation carrying out tasks which might otherwise fall to governm ent 
w ould appear to solve the problem of identification, but not of 
classification, because of the array of structures, functions and 
constitutions such bodies possess. Previous research into agencies tends to 
have used characteristics rather than classifications, and although these 
characteristics are num erous, they tend to fall w ith in  three m ain  
categories: 1) m otives for agency creation 2) agency tasks and 3) structure 
and operations. Each of these characteristics m ay be seen to impact upon  
the independence of the particular agency being examined.
The motives for creation could either maximise or m inim ise the 
independence enjoyed by an agency, in that the agency m ay have been set 
up precisely to avoid any form of undue influence, or alternatively in  
order that it may be seen to be independent, whereas it is in fact being 
controlled. Agency tasks may by their very nature, insulate the regulators 
from an untrained clientele, although this m ight imply that the agency is 
controlled by a small elite. Internal characteristics such as funding or 
personnel can impact upon impartiality through self-interest, and the 
external environm ent defines the pressures faced by the regulators. The 
following chapters examine each of these sets of characteristics insofar as 
they apply to the UK accounting regulatory bodies although the US is used 
for comparative purposes w here relevant. Relevant theories are applied to 
the motives for agency creation and their internal characteristics, and the
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external environm ent is examined through the use of case studies tracing 
the developm ent of two accounting standards.
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CHAPTERS
MOTIVES FOR AGENCY CREATION
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter identified those characteristics w hich affect the  
independence of agencies. The subsequent five chapters exam ine those 
characteristics in depth, applying them  to accounting regulatory bodies in  
the UK. The first characteristic, the motives for agency creation is 
significant in that the agency m ay be set up outside of g o vernm en t 
specifically to insulate it from political pressures. This could apply equally 
w here either the governm ent or the private sector creates the agency. 
Indeed, from the 1930's onwards, constitutional law yers and political 
scientists have looked at both  the justification of the use of agencies and 
the advantages of regulation and adm inistration carried on outside of 
governm ent.
This chapter commences w ith  an examination of two different accounting 
regulatory classifications. W ithin these, examples are given of different 
regulatory arrangem ents for comparison purposes, bo th  in European 
countries and other major industrialised nations. As m any aspects of 
society are regulated and controlled by governm ent there w ould appear to 
be a compelling argum ent for accounting regulation to be a function of the  
state, especially in view of the economic consequences outlined in Chapter 
1. In any case, private sector agencies would appear to operate only w ith  
the implicit or explicit consent of the State w ho could over-rule any 
decisions made w ith legislative action, or in an extrem e case, outlaw  the 
agency \
The approach of this chapter is to look at the justifications of the use of a 
private sector agency to regulate accounting in the UK. A n exam ination of
 ^ The relationship between the accounting regulators and the state is extremely complex. 
Evidence is given in later chapters as to incidents of both conflict and mutual support.
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the general features of accounting regulatory bodies has been m ade, as well 
as a m ore detailed approach to dem onstrate the operations of the standard  
setters. For this, the development of two standards has been selected, SSAP 
20 (Foreign Currency Translation) and SSAP 22 (Accounting for Goodwill). 
These two standards have been selected because they offered choices of 
accounting treatm ents, their developm ent covered a significant period in  
the life of the ASC (1977 to 1984) and because records relating to th e ir  
developm ent were available at the ASC archives.
CLASSinCATIONS OF REGULATION
At the extremes of the regulatory continuum  are the state and the m arket. 
These do not simply m ark the param eters of possibility; examples exist of 
the state control of accounting under au thoritarian  regimes in fo rm er 
C om m unist countries and also of the m arket, especially in UK com pany 
accounting in the n ineteenth  century, w here disclosure was felt to be a 
m atter of negotiation between directors and shareholders^. The m o d e l 
illustrated below, was developed by Puxty, W illm ott, Cooper and Lowe
(1987), and illustrates the three possible influences on accounting 
regulation, the m arket, the State and the com m unity.
Market State
Liberalism Legalism 
Corporatism >
Associationism
Community
Figure 3.1 Regulation of financial reporting. (Source: Puxty et al. (1987) p. 283.)
 ^ See for example Edey and Panitpakdi (1956).
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W ithin these parameters lie the four modes of regulation. Liberalism and 
legalism are explainable in terms of the extreme examples already quoted, 
bu t Puxty et al (1987) introduce Associationism and Corporatism  as 
in term ediate types and it is the extent to which the com m unity  is 
represented that tends to differentiate between these two m odes. In the 
form er (Associationalism), organisations formed to advance the interests 
of their members control the regulatory process, w hereas u n d er 
Corporatism , the state incorporates certain interest groups into its ow n 
system of regulation in an attem pt to achieve public rather than  m arket 
purposes. Under both of these systems, the com m unity is not totally 
excluded, but only a part of it tends to be represented. The application of 
the study of accounting regulation by Puxty et al (1987) to four countries 
produce the following results:
U nited States - Elements of legalism and associationism w ith
the latter subordinated to the form er
U nited Kingdom - Principally associationist
G erm any - Legalism predom inant
Sw eden - Corporatist
It m ust be remembered however, that the study was based on the ASC 
rather than  the ASB, and the form ation of the new body m ay indicate a 
m ovem ent towards Corporatism.
The above classification tends not to differentiate betw een the m aking of 
rules and their enforcement. Nobes (1992{b}), how ever incorporates both  
functions in his regulatory classification. State regulations are subdiv ided  
into those which are statute based only, and those w hich have a 
governm ent committee forming an input into the system. This w ould  
tend to move somewhat towards a more corporatist m odel, a lthough  th is 
m ay not involve the com m unity m generaP. Like any attem pt at 
classification, the results for all countries do not fit perfectly. As this study 
is concentrating on the UK, it can be seen on the Nobes diagram  
reproduced on the following page, that a feature of the UK scene is
 ^ Assuming that 'community' represents all interests in society.
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described as independent creation w ith professional enforcem ent, once 
again reflecting the ASC rather than  the ASB.
ACCOUNTING RULES
non-government création government creation 
and enforcement
government
enforcement
professional
enforcement
statute statute committee
only ^committee
independent professional independent mixed professional
creation creation creation creation
US Ausüaiia
Canada
UK Nettiertands NZ Germany Japan France
Figure 3.2 International classification of creation and enforcement of accounting rules. 
(Source: Nobes (1992(b)), p. 101)
The classifications dem onstrate an array of different sources of regulation , 
m any of w hich in practice em anate from the State. G iven the  
predom inance of the argum ents that state pow er is increasing and  
concerns voiced at big governm ent' (see Rose, 1976), it m ay seem  
paradoxical that accounting as a significant instrum ent of econom ic and  
social control has escaped direct state regulation in so m any countries of 
the world. The existence of private sector regulation by e ither 
governm ent sponsored or governm ent tolerated agencies, w ould  im ply  
that there are advantages in this m ethod of operation w hich appear to 
outw eigh  the disadvantages of allow ing pow er to be exercised outside of
60
the State. The following sections examine some of these possible m otives 
for the existence of agencies and explains those advantages.
EARLY THEORIES OF AGENCIES
Two of the Jennings' (1930) justifications for agency use outlined in the  
previous chapter, are not applicable to accounting regulators. The th ird  
'circumstance' (as he termed these conditions), i.e. the regulation of 
professions, could apply to the professional associations of w hich 
accountants are members, although under the pre 1990 accounting 
regulatory system it was through their membership of the CCAB that 
these associations were responsible for issuing standards and ensuring  
compliance. In their early existence, they were responsible only for m atters 
of training and discipline (Zeff 1972), but as they took on m ore 
responsibilities for issuing technical guidance then this gave them  a m ore 
regulatory role. Once the ASSC was established, the accounting bodies 
gave up their accounting rule-making functions and it was this new body 
which attem pted to control indirectly the actions of accountants insofar as 
technical issues were concerned. The organisation of technical services 
needing only slight political control was the fourth justification given by 
Jennings. This would appear to apply in the absence of external effects 
caused by these "services', but the identification of the econom ic 
consequences of accounting and the placing of accounting w ithin a 
political framework^ means that this circumstance cannot be applied to 
accounting^.
The ASC never performed the final judicial role described by Jennings, 
delegating matters of enforcement and interpretation to the separate 
m em ber bodies of the CCAB. Insofar as the current structure for 
accounting regulation is concerned, the Review Panel (RP) does indeed 
have a quasi-judicial function in that it is the body which examines w hat 
it considers to be breaches of accounting rules and is able to negotiate 
remedies and in the final instance recommend prosecution to the
 ^ According to Cooper & Sherer (1984), value judgements made by regulators imply that the 
interests of some groups are emphasised at the expense of others.
 ^Jennings was writing as a lawyer rather than as an economist.
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D epartm ent of Trade and Industry, but it does not have the u ltim ate  
pow er of making judicial decisions.
MODERN THEORIES
The m ost comprehensive analysis of motives for agency creation, appears 
to have been supplied by Baldwin and M cCrudden (1987). T heir 
argum ents related m ainly to those agencies and other bodies which had  
been set up by governm ent, but m ay be equally applied to self-regulation 
w ithin the private sector whose activities could be curtailed or assumed by 
the governm ent if they so wished. The Financial Services Act of 1986 
w hich em powered the Securities and Investm ent Board (SIB) to grant 
licenses to investm ent businesses and m onitor authorised firms are an  
example of governm ent instigated self-regulation. Similarly, the  
Com panies Act of 1990 recognises the ASB as the official accounting 
standard  setting body under Section 256(1), although the government were 
not the instigators of the formation of the Board^.
The Baldwin & M cCrudden 'M otives'
A) A bility  to involve the public in  decision-m aking.
W ithin the area of accounting regulation, public involvem ent could take 
place either through m em bership of the regulatory body or th rough  
attem pts to influence such a body. Following the W atts Report (1981) the  
m em bership of the ASC was changed from consisting exclusively of 
m em bers of CCAB bodies to include representatives of user groups. The 
process of setting standards was how ever still dom inated by the  
accounting profession and at no time during the life of the ASC were there 
m ore than two individuals who were not also m em bers of CCAB bodies^. 
Enforcement of regulations (or lack of enforcement), w as carried out by the 
accounting bodies themselves. U nder the ASB, appointm ents are m ade to 
the Board by an appointm ents comm ittee of the Financial Reporting 
Council; thus the Board may not necessarily be dom inated by accountants.
 ^ However as wiU be seen in Chapter 5, the executive appointment system is the same for 
the SIB as for the FRC.
 ^ See Chapter 5 for a full analysis of members.
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Involvem ent by external parties in the case of indiv idual accounting 
standards arises from the system whereby consultations are held w ith  
interested parties and comment letters are received in response to 
exposure drafts. These comment letters are all evaluated by the standard 
setters before either re-issuing the draft or issuing the standard.
In the case of Accounting for Foreign Currency Translations, th ree  
Exposure Drafts were issued, ED 16, ED 21 and ED 27, although the first of 
these was a proposed supplement to SSAP 6, Extraordinary Items and Prior 
Year Adjustm ents. O ut of 79 replies to the first Exposure Draft, only 51 
com m ented on foreign exchange and out of these, the m ajority  
com m ented on foreign exchange gains and losses in relation to 
extraordinary items w ith little m ention of the substantive issues w hich  
were to be addressed by later Drafts. Before the issue of ED 21, which dealt 
com prehensively w ith the methods of translation and m atters of profit 
recognition, a m eeting was held on 18th April 1977 betw een m embers of 
the ASC and representatives of major companies to discuss the proposed 
standard. This was recorded in a letter dated 29th July 1977 from J Carty of 
the ASC to M Thornton of the Economic Intelligence U nit of the Bank of 
England;
ASC held a meeting of representatives of 20 major companies 
whose accounts are affected in a material way by foreign currency 
transactions' (ASC 2 /8 /4 )
After ED 21 was issued in September 1977, a m eeting was held by 
representatives of the ASC with the Finance Directors of 42 m ajo r 
com panies (ASC 2/30/2). Prior to the issue of ED 27, evidence exists of 
prelim inary drafts of the ED being sent to Cadbury Schweppes, U nilever, 
P & O, Metal Box and I C I  (ASC 2/37/2). Not only were com panies 
targeted for comm ents, but also analysts. In a letter to B Ogle of the ASC, 
Pauline Wallace ,the under-secretary writes;
I d id  speak to an investment analyst at Phillips and Drew and was 
advised that this should give the inform ation w hich they require'
(ASC 2/29/3)
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As part of the consultation process, 41,400 copies of ED 27 were distributed 
in October 1980 and the text was reproduced in the technical and 
professional press (ASC 2/29/3) In reply to this, some 107 letters were 
received by the ASC®. Additionally in 1981, two public meetings were held 
on 20th and 27th February. These meetings consisted of submissions m ade 
by one company, two professional firms and three academic 
establishments (on 20th February) and four companies and two 
professional firms (on 27th February) ^
The Exposure Draft 30 Accounting for Goodwill was issued in October 1982 
and there is less evidence of consultation than in the previous example. 
Some 20,000 copies of the Exposure Draft are reported as being distributed 
w ith the text being reproduced in the professional and technical press 
(ASC 1/78/2). In reply to this, 97 comment letters were received. 
Previously, Peter Holgate of the ASC visited a num ber of companies w ho 
had recently had major acquisitions or mergers (ASC 2/61/3), and there 
exist notes of a meeting held with M Sorrell of Saatchi & Saatchi on 8th 
July 1983 (ASC 2/61/2). On 13th March 1984, a working party reported to 
the planning sub-committee the following consultations:
1) companies which had recently made major acquisitions
2) companies which in their comments on ED 30 had indicated a
particular problem
3) ASCs legal advisers
4) Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS)
5) the CCAB m ember's technical committees
In general, the ASC did not appear to be constrained in its ability to 
involve the public in decision-making. It had freedom to m ake 
appointm ents both w ithin its' m ain and sub-committees and in its'
® This could imply agreement with the Draft, lack of interest, wrong targeting of interested 
parties, a lack of belief that replies would be taken seriously or perceived costs of lobbying 
in this way. As far as the writer is aware, there is no research into the reasons for non­
involvement.
’ Accountancy in April 1981, reported 'a steady dozen in the audience'.
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working parties. Despite the fact that consultation w ould appear to h ave  
been m ade mainly w ith one group, preparers rather than users, 
nevertheless the ability to consult with interested parties was available, 
and  the Exposure Drafts appear to have been w idely circulated^®. 
A lthough consultation at the draft stage appears to have been 
comprehensive, nevertheless it was the accounting profession w ho tended 
to be involved, although it could be argued that technical m atters could 
no t be considered by laymen. Public hearings m ight have been a way to 
m ake the consultation process more visible, but their use, in contrast to 
FASB, was very rare in the UK.
B) Giving the appearance that the Governm ent is doing  som ething.
Initial dem ands for actions tend to be m ade to the governm ent. W here  
accounting is concerned, governm ents have often referred in w ritten and 
verbal replies to Parliamentary questions, to work being carried out by the  
accounting profession, and by expressing their confidence, have in tim ated  
that the problem is under control. An example of this arose in 1970 w hen  
the then Secretary of State was asked to take steps to encourage the  
standardisation of accounting practices. The formal reply stated that the 
ICAEW together w ith the Scottish and Irish Institutes were working on  
this in accordance w ith the 'Statem ent of Intent' of 1969 issued by the 
ASSC (Hansard, Vol 807). Following the publication of the Sandilands 
Report in 1975, the President of the Board of Trade announced in  
Parliam ent;
...that the accountancy profession has agreed to set up  a steering 
group as recom mended by the Committee, to consider further the 
practical and other issues involved, w ith  a view to the 
im plem entation of CCA in company accounts....'
(Hansard, vol. 901 )
More recently, the governm ent has deflected questions on accounting by 
reference to the ASB. On two occasions, John Redwood of the D epartm ent 
of Trade and Industry has, in the case of foreign exchange stated;
Perhaps too widely as the response rate might indicate, although this wide circulation 
could be interpreted as legitimising the process through the involvement of the accounting 
community.
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'The requirements of SSAP 20 are a m atter for the Accounting 
Standards Board'
(Hansard, Vol. 182)
Faith in the regulators was also expressed by him  on a m ore general basis 
in another reply, this time in the context of goodwill;
'Issues of this sort are better dealt w ith through accounting 
standards than the law'
(Hansard, Vol. 183)
Dem ands for action were effectively 'delegated' by governm ent to the 
accounting standard setters through its' own inaction, giving the 
appearance that some steps were being taken elsewhere w ith  the 
governm ent's blessing. Luehlfing (1995) describes a hypothetical situation  
of a public outcry over some accounting failure, followed by the prom ise 
of action by the accounting establishment. The governm ent is th en  
provided w ith an alternative to legislation and assures the public that it 
will be m onitoring the actions of the accountants.
C) The political dangers of policy administration.
Wallace (1980) suggests that self-regulation provides a form  of self- 
insurance for politicians and bureaucrats, giving them  the opportunity  to 
shift politically costly future events to the private sector. Accounting in  
general is not a vote-w inning issue w ith W ilson (1980), describing how  
elections are won or lost on issues of personal income or national security 
rather than  regulatory matters. Lewis (1985) aligns this idea to his 'escape 
theory', under which, in addition to avoiding parliam entary  checks and 
financial control to which Departm ents would be subject, agencies can 
produce desirable results (from the governm ent's point of view) w ith o u t 
the governm ent having to take unpopular actions. This aspect of agency 
use, he terms the 'poison chalice'.
Inflation accounting provides an example of a potentially dangerous area 
for governm ent. The high levels of inflation of the early 1970's m ade it 
necessary for some action to be taken in order to prevent erosion of capital 
and to allow for comparability of results, but solutions to accounting for
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changing price levels have always been both radical and controversial". 
A lthough it was the governm ent that set up the Sandilands Com m ittee, 
few elem ents of inflation accounting were incorporated into Com pany 
Law. It was the standard setters who had to issue a provisional SSAP 
(PSSAP 7 advocating Constant Purchasing Power (CPP) accounting). This 
w as then w ithdraw n and replaced by SSAP 16 which was initially issued as 
a m andatory statement, then became voluntary before finally being 
w ithdraw n. From the time of Sandilands Report being produced, it was 
possible for the governm ent to back away from the situation.
ED 30 Accounting for Goodwill, could be seen as being as being politically 
dangerous due to the effects of the accounting treatm ent on the 
acquisitions market. During a m eeting between M Sorrell of Saatchi and 
Saatchi and the ASC;
'Mr Sorrell claimed that a num ber of the acquisitions over the past 
few years would not have taken place had ED 30 been in force as a 
standard. ' (ASC 2 /61 /2)
In the event, SSAP 22 was issued allowing not only a choice of treatm ents 
of goodwill on acquisition but also allowing selective use of either 
treatm ent. The 'weakness' of the solution was not of the g o vernm en t's  
m aking .
The im pact of floating exchange rates brought about the necessity for a 
foreign exchange translation standard in the 1970's (Blake, 1994; Kettell, 
1978). However, ED 21 was described as 'coming dow n firmly on both  
sides of the fence' (Accountancy, 1977). One of the m ain problem s was the 
tension between the US standard (Statement of Financial A ccounting 
Standard (SFAS) 8 advocating the temporal method) and the cu rren t 
practice in the UK (use of the closing rate method). The US had already 
experienced the difficulties that could be caused by a depreciating currency;
For example, the use of entry or exit values require a fundamental change in certain 
accounting assumptions.
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'The Americans, after years of accepting the results produced by the 
temporal method, have come to the conclusion that the results 
produced by that method are now meaningless. In fact, it now 
produces a huge loss because the weakness of the dollar; and 
American industry, in these circumstances, feels that it is totally 
unacceptable.' (Accountancy 1979 p. 1)
In a volatile situation where appreciating or depreciating currency will 
effect gains or losses depending upon the translation m ethod used, there is 
little to be gained by a governm ent in becoming involved in this area 
where the result of action is likely to be random.
D) Deflection of lobbying and requests for political favours
Overt lobbying of accounting standard setters occurs through com m ent 
letters based on Exposure Drafts. The replies to the exposure drafts in  
respect of foreign currency and goodwill are as follows:
Table 3.1 Replies to exposure drafts on foreign exchange and goodwill.
Foreign Exchange ED 16 51 replies
ED 21 119 replies
ED 27 107 replies
Goodwill ED 30 96 replies
These replies represent an array of preferences, all of which were studied 
and noted by the members of ASC and by the w orking parties. In addition 
to this channel, informal lobbying may also be carried out through the 
meetings of ASC representatives w ith companies, through m em bership of
ASC committees and sub-committees and through personal contacts. The
governm ent could probably not avoid all pressure group activity as 
lobbyists would realise that the governm ent also has powers through the 
Companies Acts to effect accounting changes^^, although the reliance 
placed by the governm ent on standard setters is evidenced both th rough
The cases of lobbying government are better documented in the US, see the examples 
quoted in Chapter 1.
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the few Parliamentary questions on m atters of accounting detaiP^ and the 
endorsem ent of the revised structure for accounting regulation by the 1989 
Com panies Act and by Parliament (Hansard Vol. 174)
E) A voidance of awkward or burdensom e duties being added to 
departm ents or courts
The involvem ent of the D epartm ent of Trade (Now the D epartm ent of 
Trade and Industry) in the form ulation of the standards on both  foreign 
exchange and goodwill was m ainly from a consultation rather than  from a 
lead po in t of view. It was the ASC which carried out the preparatory  
studies and the ongoing processes as detailed below, consulting w ith  the  
D epartm ent as felt necessary. The workload for production of the standard 
for foreign exchange was extremely great for the ASC, consisting of the 
following steps, identified from the ASC archives :
Table 3.2 The chronological development of SSAP 20.
M o n th /y ea r O peration/T ask
1976 Research study by Professor F low er/A rthur
A nderson
4/77 M eetings w ith  major companies
6/77 Text of ED produced
8/77 Postal ballot of ASC members
9/77 ED 21 Issued
11/77 Conference held under B Ogle
4/78 116 replies received
4/78 Deloittes m ake member of staff available to
analyse com m ent letters 
5/78 Panel reviews comment letters
1/79 Panel reviews Exposure Draft
8/79 M eetings w ith  FASB in US
See the earlier quotations from John Redwood.
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11/79 Meeting w ith 42 major UK companies
7/80 New draft sent to 34 companies
9/80 Revision of draft
2/81 Public meetings
1981-1983 Resolution of legal difficulties
4/83 SSAP 20 issued
These are only the stages in the process mentioned specifically in the ASC 
archive material. No evidence exists of w hat m ust have been th e  
considerable task of drafting the six versions of the ED (the num ber of 
versions m entioned in a mem o from Pauline Wallace (the u n d e r­
secretary of the ASC) to ASC m em bers dated 5.8.81, (ASC 2/40/2). 
Additionally meetings of the ASC regarding the Drafts and discussion 
betw een members remain unrecorded although it could be safely assum ed 
that these occupied a great deal of time, and yet this standard was only a 
part of the ASC's workload. During the period from the issue of ED 21 
(Accounting for Foreign Currency Transactions) in September 1977 
th rough  to the issue of the related standard SSAP 20 (Accounting for 
Foreign Currency Translation), the following accounting standards and  
exposure drafts were issued:
Table 3.3 ASC standards and drafts issued 1977-1983.
SSAP 12 Accounting for Depreciation December 1977
SSAP 13 Accounting for Research and
D evelopm ent December 1977
SSAP 14 Group Accounts September 1978
SSAP 15 Accounting for Deferred Tax October 1978
SSAP 16 Current Cost Accounting March 1980
SSAP 17 Accounting for Post Balance Sheet
Events A ugust 1980
SSAP 18 Accounting for Contingencies August 1980
SSAP 19 Accounting for Investm ent Properties Novem ber 1981
ED 30 Accounting for Goodwill October 1982
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ED 31 Accounting for Acquisitions and
Mergers October 1982
ED 32 Disclosure of Pension Inform ation
in Company Accounts May 1983
H ad the Departm ent of Trade and Industry assum ed responsibility for 
incorporation of all these issues into com pany legislation, then the bu rden  
on the D epartm ent would have been considerable and progress m ay have  
been slower.
As well as reducing the burdens on governm ent, the work of the courts 
m ay be reduced by meetings to discuss those areas where standards m igh t 
be in  conflict w ith the law. In the case of the proposed standard on foreign 
exchange there was a very real danger of future conflicts betw een 
accounting and the law in the area of legally distributable profit. Until the 
Com panies Act of 1980, there was practically no m ention in UK law of 
distributable profit. Table A of the Act stated that no dividend should be 
paid otherwise than out of profits. Case law had given little guidance on  
the subject, sometimes producing contradictory and confusing 
judgem ents'^. The 1980 Act introduced specific rules as to the reserves 
that could be used for the purpose of a distribution. The m ain problem s 
how ever were caused by the im plem entation of the EC Fourth Directive 
in the Com panies Act 1981. Schedule 1 of the Act required companies to 
take account of profits only to the extent that they were realised. ED 27 
how ever allowed exchange gains and losses on long-term m onetary item s 
to pass through the profit and loss account. Prior to the issue of ED 27 in  
October 1980, the ASC had been 'w arned ' of the im pending problems. A 
letter dated 7.5.80 from F Jenkins of the Departm ent of Trade to J Carty the 
ASC secretary stated;
' A t the very least it will be assum ed that compliance w ith a SSAP 
w ould not involve any risk of infringing the statutory
requirem ents we think it im portant that the ASC should
consider the treatm ent advocated in the proposed exposure draft in
See for example Napier and Noke (1992).
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the light of the imminent and prospective statutory position in the 
U K ' (ASC 2 /30 /2 )
The treatm ent of gains on long term m onetary liabilities proposed by ED 
27 did  cause problems at a later date. At a m eeting w ith the ASC, th e  
D epartm ent of Trade explained that the treatm ent contravened S. 12 of th e  
1981 Companies Act. The ASC argued that this was a special circum stance 
in accordance w ith S. 15 which perm itted a departure from accounting 
principles where it appears to the directors of a company that there are 
special reasons^^. The DoT response was that particulars of the departu re  
w ould  have to be disclosed along w ith reasons for the departure and its 
effect on the financial statements. (ASC 2/29/3)^^. The m atter had thereby 
been resolved before a specific case arose.
On 29th July 1982, the ASC consulted w ith learned counsel, T Curry QC 
regarding the legal aspects of the proposed standard (ASC 1/9/1). T he 
Standard was to run  into one more problem  w hen one m em ber of CCAB 
(ACCA) requested that the standard should not apply to banks. Once again, 
the ASC was forced to take legal advice on this m atter and consulted th e  
legal firm of Slaughter and May who clarified this point by letter on 7th 
and 13th December 1982 (ASC 1/9 /1).
In the case of ED 30 Accounting for Goodwill, there do not appear to be th e  
same conflicts between accounting and the law. Indeed a suggestion was 
m ade in a letter from J Knox of the DoT to K W ild of the ASC (16.10.80) 
that the panel on goodwill be reconstituted to reply to the draft 7 th  
Directive. (ASC 2/9/4). Previously, a request had been made to Knox to 
check w ith his legal staff, matters of legality of the proposed treatm ents of 
goodwill (ASC 2 /24/1). A meeting was held w ith Jenkins of the DoT o n  
1.4.82 to discuss legal aspects of the draft and Jenkins replied to Renshall of
As this dealt with an accounting principle, S 15 was applicable rather than the use of 
the true and fair override.
The professional press at the time interpreted the DoT's reaction as signifying reluctance 
to accept the special reasons argument and commented that although the definition of 
^realised' had been pinned to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), there was 
more than one interpretation of GAAP (Accountancy, 1982).
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the ASC comm enting on the reconciliation of the proposed standard w ith  
the law (ASC 2/89/1) Prior to the issue of the standard in December 1984, 
legal advice had been obtained throughout the year on the  
appropriateness of the writing-off of goodwill to unrealised reserves (ASC 
2/47/2).
Despite these conciliatory actions, nevertheless N apier and Noke (1992), 
suggest that the relationship between accounting and the law rem ains 
unstable, especially due to w hat they describe as a more aggressive 
approach by accounting. Despite this, few legal cases w ith the exception of 
revenue law are centred around financial reporting. It m ay be that 'beh ind  
the scenes' negotiations and the frequent use of legal opinions p reven ts 
such cases coming to court.
F) Better administration, specialisation and expertise.
The regulation of accounting concerns highly technical issues for w hich  
expertise is needed. Expertise in dealing w ith these issues is usually found  
in qualified professional accountants. How lin & Skerratt (1992) describe 
how  following a change in the ASC constitution in 1976, 12 of the 23 
m embers w ere to be appointed by the ICAEW, the rem aining 11 m em bers 
being divided alm ost equally betw een the ICAS, ICAI, ACCA, ICMA and 
CIPFA. The 1982 constitution stated that up  to 5 of the 20 places should be 
reserved for users of financial accounts, who need not be members of any 
of the CCAB Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies) bodies^^. A ll 
CCAB m em bers had how ever to agree accounting standards before they 
could be issued, as such standards were enforced by the in d iv id u a l 
m em ber professional bodies. N ot only was the regulatory body ru n  
m ainly by m em bers of the m ain accounting institutes, but m uch of the  
process of consultation was. also dom inated by the accounting profession. 
In the case of the Foreign Exchange Drafts, the following represents 
members of CCAB bodies identified as responding to the Drafts:
Chapter 5 contains a fuller analysis of members.
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Table 3.4 CCAB members responding to ED s 16,21 and 27.
ED Professional Firms Technical Advisory Industry
C om m ittees/Institutes 
16 16 15 18
21 24 24 30
27 20 12 18
The total of respondents for each draft were as follows; ED 16: 51, ED 
21:116, ED 27:107. In the case of ED16, only those replying in respect of the  
foreign exchange elements of the standard have been included. In the  
industry figure, only ICAEW members have been included where it was 
possible to identify them specifically from the relevant list of m em bers for 
the year^®. In view of the positions held by the other industria l 
respondents, e.g. financial director/controller, accountant, it is un likely  
that they w ould not be members of one of the CCAB bodies.
The governm ent w ould appear to lack the expertise in m atters of 
accounting that exist w ithin the private sector. Parliam entary questions 
were frequently posed both verbally and in w ritten form regarding the  
shortage of qualified accountants in governm ent departm ents. M oran  
(1988) quotes Gower (1984 p. 21) as claiming that in 1984, the C om panies 
Legislation Division of the DTI had no lawyer or accountant, and only  
four staff who had been in post since 1980. This situation was accounted 
for by wage differences between the civil service and industry and the  
professions, and the nature of accounting in the civil service, relying o n  
cash rather than  accrual accounting m eant that there did not exist the  
experience of the complex issues faced by businesses. Baldwin & 
M cCrudden (1987) also put forward the theory that it is not only expertise 
bu t also adm inistration which can be better organised by  an agency because 
the function is;
Professional associations' list of members do not always include the company affiliation 
of members.
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'the sole or central interest of the organisation, and not just a 
peripheral m atter dealt w ith by som eone whose attentions are 
prim arily directed elsew here/ (p. 4)
If the detailed regulation of accounting were left to the governm ent, it 
w ould in all probability be the Companies D ivision of the DTI and m igh t 
well become a 'peripheral matter'.
Beresford's (1995) argum ents for setting standards in the private sector are 
that a;
'private-sector board brings greater expertise to the table. It can 
attract board members and staff w ith the requisite practical 
experience, compensate them appropriately, retain them  for a 
sufficient period and provide the support services necessary for 
them  to do their jobs.' (p. 59)
In addition, Lewis (1985) writing about agencies in general, puts forward 
the idea that non-governm ental officials are m ore likely to be able to 
harness indiv idual enterprise and initiative for the public good, due to 
the;
'different experiences, working m ethods and m ode of organisation 
other than those norm ally found in governm ent departm ents...'
(p. 206)
G) Speed of Decisions
Lewis (1985) justifies alternative structures to trad itional bureaucracies o n  
the grounds of introducing a more flexible and  adaptive approach to 
m atters. Speed of decisions and freedom from  technicalities are an  
advantage enjoyed by the agency form. Since the  form ation of the ASSC 
in 1970 until its demise in 1990, there have been only four new  
Companies Acts ( 1976, 1980, 1981 and 1989). The regulatory output of the 
ASC is listed in its final 'Report and R ecom m endation ' to its governing 
body the CCAB for the final meeting on 25th July 1990;
ASC (under its original title of the Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee) held its first meeting in December 1969. During its 
existence it has issued 55 Exposure Drafts, 2 Statements of 
Recommended Practice, 28 discussion papers and other docum ents.
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Thirty four Statements of Standard Accounting Practice have been 
recom m ended to and approved by the governing bodies'.
(Renshall 1993)
A lthough in certain areas the length of time between issue of a first draft 
and the standard has been considerable, e.g. ED 16 September 1975 to SSAP 
20 A pril 1983, nevertheless the sheer volum e of the output of the ASC 
indicates that the decision-making process was efficient and able to cover 
areas on which company law was silent. Patient (1992) describes how  
...between such Acts the accounting profession played its part' (p. 24). The 
current structure of accounting standard setting allows even greater speed 
of decisions, in that the ASB issues standards in its own right w ith o u t 
having to seek approval from a higher body and has the ability to w ork o n  
a majority basis. Additionally the Urgent Issues Task Force is able to issue 
Abstracts' which come into force immediately and have the same pow ers 
as standards. From the inception of the UITF in 1990 to the end of 1996, 
some 15 abstracts have been issued.
H) Agencies are no t restricted to form ulating policy on a case by  case basis
A n agency is able to develop a long term and consistent policy. In the 
developm ent of accounting regulations, consistency is im portant because 
it is considered an essential characteristic in accounting (Solomons 1986, 
U nderdow n & Taylor, 1985 ), and indeed is a fundam ental concept u n d e r 
SSAP 2. One of the ways in which consistency may be achieved is th ro u g h  
a conceptual framework. Indeed Carsberg's (1984) definition of such a 
fram ew ork contains the term;
'In essence, a conceptual framework comprises a set of basic 
principles that command general support and can be used to help 
w ith  detailed decisions by increasing the likelihood of consistency 
and reducing the costs of analysis.' (p. 25)
A ttem pts, w ith varying degrees of success have been m ade in the UK to 
develop such a framework. Although SSAP 2 issued in 1971 covers som e 
of the ground of a conceptual framework, it could not be given that title. 
The Corporate Report issued by the ASSC in 1975, although lacking the  
robustness of later studies, may have been the first real attem pt to develop 
a conceptual fram ework in the UK in that it deals with;
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'the fundam ental aims of published financial reports and the 
means by which these aims can be achieved' (p. 3)
A consultative docum ent issued by the ASC in 1978, 'Setting Accounting 
Standards' asked w hether the ASC should encourage research into a 
conceptual framework^^. Following the negative conclusions reached by 
Macve in his 1981 report for the ASC, initiatives in this direction passed to 
professional bodies (e.g. ICAS, ICAEW). The ASB how ever has seen the 
form ulation of a conceptual framework as being a priority;
'FRS's are based on the Statement of Principles for Financial 
Reporting being developed by the Board, which addresses the 
concepts underlying the information presented in financial 
statements. The Board is developing this statem ent of principles to 
provide a fram ework for the consistent and logical form ulation of 
individual accounting standards. The fram ework also provided a 
basis on which others can exercise judgem ent in resolving 
accounting issues' (ASB 1991, para 4)
The production of a conceptual fram ework if this were possible, w ould 
allow consistency between rules and prevent apparent anom alies arising 
betw een accounting concepts such as accruals and prudence. SSAP 20 by 
recognising gains on unsettled transactions satisfies only one of these. 
Additionally a choice of using either the tem poral or closing rate m ethod  
does not allow consistency. Similarly the choice of accounting treatm ents 
of goodwill under SSAP 22 also is an example of inconsistency. A voidance 
of such anomalies could occur as a result of a comprehensive framework.
J) Fine tun ing  of rules w ithout involving the legislature
The ASC derived the authority to develop accounting standards from the 
CCAB, although the latter body had to approve these before they could be 
issued by professional bodies to their m em bership. Situations have arisen 
from time to time which cause standards to be am ended. These m ay be
The reply to this question has been described as an overwhelming 'yes' (Davies, Paterson 
and Wilson, 1994).
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because of loopholes in the original standards, by economic changes or by 
the need to reconcile standards w ith company law. From the 25 standards 
issued by the ASC seven have been w ithdraw n (two standards PSSAP 7 
and SSAP 16 dealing w ith accounting for the effects of changing prices 
have been w ithdraw n, SSAP 11 has been replaced by SSAP 15 and SSAP's 
6,10,14 and 23 have effectively been replaced by Financial R eporting 
Standards (FRS's) issued by the ASB). Of the rem aining SSAP's extant as at 
December 1996, one standard has been amended or revised three times, 5 
standards twice, 4 standards have been amended or revised once and the 
rem aining 8 are as issued. Thus during the twenty years of the life of the 
ASC, the total of standards issued, w ithdrawn and changed is 42. D uring 
the same period, four Companies Acts have been passed.
A dditionally accounting standards are reasonably flexible in their 
application which allows a certain degree of fine tun ing  to take place 
automatically. The explanatory forward to accounting standards states that 
in  applying standards, it is necessary to have regard to the spirit and 
reasoning behind them  (ASB 1991). Under com pany law, there is no  
obligation to use applicable standards in preparing accounts; all that has to 
be produced is a statem ent of compliance or non-com pliance, and in  the 
latter case a statem ent of the reasons and effect of this action. (CA 1989 7 
sch.; CA 1985 4 sch. 336Af^ .  The result however of such a statem ent m ay 
lead to investigations by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP).
K) A m echanism  w hich raises and clarifies public debate upon  w hich  
political decisions depend.
The debate on accounting standards arises through the way in w hich the 
ASC and ASB have proceeded w ith the development of new  standards. As 
already quoted in this chapter, the ASC distributed 41,400 copies of ED 27 
and 20,000 copies of ED 30. ED 27 received some 107 replies and w as the 
subject of two public hearings. The debate was also carried on th rough  the 
technical press. Between the issue of ED 21 (September 1977) and the end 
of 1978, Accountancy carried nine articles on the proposed foreign
The result however, of such an action may be an investigation by the Financial reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP)
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exchange standard. The public meetings and the opportunity  to com m ent 
by letter, detailed earlier in this chapter and the fact that the debate is 
carried on through the press, is perhaps the reason w hy standard setters 
tend to have a higher profile than civil servants. Additionally, the 
publicity given to draft standards means that the procedures for carrying 
on the debate are better know n whereas the m echanism s for the 
formulation of company law, may be less well known.
OTHER THEORIES OF AGENCIES
Both Hood (1978), Lewis (1985) and Thom pson (1993) consider that 
agencies may be created in an attem pt to conceal the real size of the  
bureaucracy. Certainly, a government wishing to do so, could offload tasks 
to an agency, although this w ould imply that the task is one w hich 
governm ent considers that it ought to carry out bu t is organising the 
performance of this function in a more expedient way. Efficiency 
considerations were at the forefront of governm ental thinking in the 
creation of "next step" agencies following the Ibbs Report of 1988^h Hood 
describes this as 'the great bureaucratic disappearing trick'. According to 
M oran (1988), the reason for this could be either ideological or financial;
To equip the Departm ent or establish a free-standing regulatory 
commission w ould have required a substantial am ount of m oney 
and staff by a governm ent nominally hostile to an increase in public 
spending and public employment.' (p. 69)
Although in term s of m em bers of the ASC (in 1985 there were 20 
members), the num ber of individuals may seem low, this does hide the 
others involved in the process. As well as the research com m issioned by 
the ASC (e.g. the study on 'The Accounting Treatm ent of Overseas 
Currencies - ASC 2/8/4), the necessity of receiving approval to the 
standard by the technical and research committees of the CCAB m em bers 
w ould imply even m ore individuals were involved in the standard 
setting process. The workload of the ASC, already outlined in this paper
These agencies can be substantial in number with the Benefits Agency (65,000) staff 
employing twice the number of staff in several major government departments - see the 
Estates Gazette 1994.
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points to considerable non-governm ental resources being used in the  
developm ent of accounting standards.
The grow th of the num ber of agencies may also be seen as the  
m ultiplication of centres of power which indicates a move towards 
pluralism  (Lewis, 1985) Self-regulation through agency use may also be an  
indication that the governm ent does not wish to interfere in w hat it sees 
as im portant areas of the economy (Burch & W ood 1986). This does n o t 
appear to be a consistent governm ent policy, as such areas as fair trading 
are kept w ithin governm ent departm ents, whereas the Stock Exchange is 
allowed to regulate its own affairs, a task which, according to Moran (1988), 
the DTI never wanted. Historically the role of governm ent in accounting 
regulation was to ensure that necessary steps were taken for the protection 
of investors and creditors (Edey & Panitpakdi, 1956). W ith the exception of 
the 1981 Companies Act, there has been little stated in the law on such 
issues as income m easurem ent or asset valuation which has been left to 
the accounting profession, and even those items included in CA 1981 w ere 
m ore as a result of compliance with the 4th Directive rather than being 
instigated by the UK governm ent. Since the m id 1980's there has been a 
grow th in self-regulatory agencies within the area of financial services^^. 
The lack of governm ental interference in the Stock Exchange and the  
passing of the Financial Services Act are examples of both passive and 
active support for private sector arrangem ents If therefore capital and 
financial m arkets are best served through self-regulation, it may follow 
that accounting as a major decisional input to these m arkets is best 
arranged in the same way.
SUMMARY
There exist a num ber of different models of accounting regulation  
examples of which can be found throughout the industrialised nations . 
W here regulation takes place outside of governm ent, the m otives for 
agency creation are significant to the independence of an agency as they
^ For example the Self Regulatory Organisations (SRC's) recognised by the Securities and 
Investment Board. SRO's rules are considered by Moran(1988) to have the force of law and 
membership is legally obligatory. For a further description see Large (1993).
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m ay indicate that the governm ent accepts the rationale for their existence 
and m ay thus accept their independence.
The historical justifications for agency use do not appear to fit accounting 
regulators possibly because they represent former societal arrangem ents 
rather than m odem  functions and structures both in the public and  
private sectors. In the 1930's, agencies were fewer in num ber and tended to 
relate directly to the specific functions described by Jennings (1930) and  
sum m arised in Chapter 2. The privatisation of utility com panies in the  
UK and the subsequent setting up of independent regulatory bodies is an  
exam ple of the formation of new  agencies as a response to a changed 
economic structure for an industry.
The Baldwin and McCrudden (1987) 'm otives' were tested against both  
general and specific actions taken by the ASC. A lthough it appeared th a t 
there was a wide involvem ent in the process of accounting standard 
setting, this involvem ent may not have included all groups in society 
w ho w ould be affected by the regulations issued. Official Parliam entary  
questions gave the im pression that action was being taken on certain  
m atters by virtual delegation to the ASC (even though m atters of 
accounting are rarely discussed in Parliament). This effective 'de legation ' 
was m ost visible in areas where political dangers existed e.g. in fla tion  
accounting. The governm ent avoided lobbying and requests for political 
favours by m aking the regulatory body the target for any action. N o  
evidence could be found of external bodies trying to pressurise the DoT to 
change accounting standards (although no doubt lobbying does take place 
in respect of the consultative papers issued before any am endm ent to 
com pany law). The developm ent of accounting standards a lm ost 
exclusively used resources from the private sector, w hich avoided the  
w ork being undertaken by the DoT. Additionally, potential conflicts m ay 
have been avoided by the apparent consultation carried ou t especially in  
regard to SSAP 20. The ASC was by its nature an expert body w h ich  
undertook  a wide-rangeing agenda which dem anded adm in istra tive  
expertise. A lthough the ASC was often accused of being slow to respond, 
its actions were quicker than company law (the subsequent form ation of 
the UITF under the reforms of 1990, introduced a rapid  response to 
accounting problems). Similarly fine tuning of rules has been possible
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th rough  both amendments to standards and their flexibility of application. 
Agencies m ay be seen as w orking within an overall conceptual fram ew ork 
rather than in piecemeal fashion. Considerable resources have been used 
to develop such a conceptual framework, even though there still exists 
som e inconsistencies within standards.
A lthough there w ould appear to be sufficient justification for the  
continued use of the private sector regulatory agency, there m ay exist 
factors which endanger the independence of the agency. Concealing the 
real size of the bureaucracy for example could be appealing to a 
governm ent, both from the overload and the ideological view point. T he 
attraction of this is that if the agency can be controlled or at least 
influenced by the State, policy can be m ade and im plem ented at low or 
zero cost to the governm ent. The move towards self-regulation w ould  
im ply the governm ent willingly w ithdraw ing from a particular arena and 
reflects current developments in areas such as financial services, a lthough  
no doubt there w ould be a lim it to the scope and content of the decisions 
that the regulators could make.
Perhaps there exists a further m otive for the State delegation of authority. 
The exercise of pow er w ithout political accountability m ust be at times an  
appealing goal for governm ents. Certainly there are attem pts by the  
governm ent to influence the contents of accounting standards th ro u g h  
replies to exposure drafts, and there have been recorded incidents of 
governm ent ’threats' to regulators that issues would be incorporated in to  
com pany law if not included in standards (Robson, 1988). This them e is 
further expanded in Chapter 8 w hich looks at the role of the g o v ern m en t 
in relation to published accounts and again in Chapter 9 in the context of 
agency capture and iron triangle theories.
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CHAPTER 4
AGENCY TASKS______________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine both the specific function of the accounting 
regulators i.e. the developm ent of accounting standards, as well as the 
general function of the use of expert bodies to work in the public interest.
The Pliatzky Report of 1980, referred to in Chapter 1, provided a 
functional classification of agencies, separating them  into two 
adm inistrative roles: executive and advisory. It w ould appear how ever 
that the ASC through its' regulatory role, had an executive function only 
and did not have an advisory role once a standard had been issued, any 
related guidance tending to come from the professional bodies.
'ASC does not comment on or interpret standards.'
letter from Desmond W right (under secretary of
ASC) to Reads & Co, 6.2.87 - ASC 1 /44 /1
Thom pson (1993) considers that executive functions incorporate a 
prom otional role, which in the case of the ASC was carried out th rough  
actions taken to obtain acceptance of accounting standards, w hich  
according to Watts, Chairm an of ASC (ASC 2/8/2) involved consent or 
persuasion'. The prom otional role is implicit w ithin the regulatory role 
in that the process of form ulating standards incorporates the prom otion of 
ideas by the regulators not only in their discussion and exposure drafts, but 
also in the other consultative actions taken.
COMPANY LAW AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
According to Self (1977), a condition of m axim isation of agency 
independence is whether tasks can be treated in isolation from  the rest of 
governm ent. One approach to this question is to examine w hether the  
task being undertaken duplicates the work of governm ent insofar as 
form ulating policy is concerned. This approach incorporates the 
economic consequences of accounting regulation which are exam ined in
83
C hapter 1 and further illustrated in Chapter 8. The second approach is to 
look at the specific areas in which both governm ent and the private 
sectors operate.
Statutory inform ation in an annual report and accounts is presented in  
both  quantitative and qualitative forms consisting of the profit and loss 
account, the balance sheet, cash flow statement, notes to the accounts , the 
Directors report and the Audit report. Edey (1977) classified types of 
accounting standards into four areas, description, disclosure, presentation 
and m easurem ent. These areas are not the exclusive dom ain of
accounting standards, and examples of each type m ay be found w ithin UK 
com pany law. The following table examines various 'topics' in accounting, 
and illustrates the presence of both law  and standard setters 
pronouncem ents relating to each of these subjects.
Table 4.1 Subjects covered by standards and the law.
Subject Com panies Act A ccounting Standard
G oing concern 1985 4 sch 10 SSAP 2
Consistency 1985 4 sch 11
Prudence 1985 4 sch 12
Accruals 1985 4 sch 13
D eparture from
Principles 1985 4 sch 15
Accounting Policies
(general) 1985 4 sch 36A
G overnm ent Grants 1985 4 sch 28 SSAP 4
Depreciation 1985 4 sch 18 SSAP 12
Stock Valuation 1985 4sch27(l)-(2),
sch 25, sch 26 SSAP 9
G oodw ill 1985 4 sch 31(1) SSAP 22
Investm ent Properties 1985 4 sch 32 SSAP 19
Developm ent Costs 1985 4 sch 3(2)(c) and
sch 20 SSAP13
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Investm en ts 1985 4 sch 84, sch 45(1)
sch 45(2) ED 55
Subsidiary Undertakings 1989 3 sch, 1 sch 10 FRS 2
Debtors 1985 4 sch format, note 5 SSAP 9
Related Party
T ransactions 1989 1 sch 9 FRS 8
Reserve M ovem ents 1989 1 sch 10 FRS 3, SSAP 20
R evaluation Reserve 1989 1 sch 6 SSAP 19
Deferred Tax 1989 1 sch 8 SSAP 15
D ividends and
Taxation 1985 4 sch 51(3) SSAP 8
Pension Schemes 1985 4 sch 50(4) SSAP 24
C ontingent Liabilities 1985 4 sch 50(2) SSAP 18
Post Balance Sheet
Events 1985 7 sch 6(a) SSAP 17
Extraordinary and
Exceptional Items 1985 4 sch 57(2), 57(3) FRS 3
Prior Year Adjustm ents 1985 4 sch 4(2) FRS 3
Segm ental Reporting 1985 4 sch 55(1) SSAP 25
Income from Leases 1985 4 sch 53(5) SSAP 21
Investm ent Income 1985 4 sch 53(4) SSAP 8
Interest Payable 1985 4 sch 53(2) SSAP 21
O perating Lease Rentals 1985 4 sch 53(6) SSAP 21
Taxation Charge 1985 4 sch 54 SSAP 15
Group Accounts
(Generally) 1989 Various Sections FRS 2, FRS 6
FRS 7, SSAP 1
Form at 1989 s 4 FRS 3
From the above list, it is difficult to describe the regulation of accounting 
as a task which can be treated in isolation from the rest of governm ent.
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It w ould appear that the only areas where accounting matters incorporated 
in the law are not supplem ented by the standard setting body are the 
Director's Report, the publication of accounts and exemptions, the 
m aintenance of company records and matters affecting capital and 
distributions. In the majority of other areas both sources of authority act, 
som etim es in a complem entary manner, sometimes in conflict and on  
occasions duplicating requirements. In SSAP 9 'Accounting for Stock and 
W ork in Progress', all three can be found, whereby the standard defines a 
classification of 'am ounts recoverable on contracts' under the Com panies 
Act general classification of debtors. Conflict appears in that the use of 
LIFO is perm itted under the Act, but prohibited by SSAP 9 \  W ith the 
exception of this m ethod, the general valuation rules and the disclosure 
requirem ents in respect of stock are similar.
EXPERTISE
Self (1977), considered that the more technical the content of the area 
covered by the regulatory agency, the more autonom y the agency was 
likely to possess, although he did not indicate how technical content is 
defined or indeed measured. A list of characteristics of professions, such as 
that produced by Perks (1993) may provide a standard against w hich 
degrees of technical content could be compared in that expertise is a 
feature of professions. These eight characteristics are 1) skill based on  
theoretical knowledge; accounting requires both skill and theory, in that 
there is a defined output from accounting, and that the practice of 
accounting is carried out under a (not always recognisable) theoretical 
framework; 2) professional association; the UK has six m ain accountancy 
bodies who control both entry to mem bership and the activities of 
members; 3) extensive period of education, although in the UK, 
possession of a recognised degree is not a requirem ent for studen t 
m em bership of all professional accounting bodies, it is becoming the 
norm. In addition to this some of these bodies require qualifying periods 
both before and after training and also continuing professional education;
 ^ Although this produces an outdated figure for stock in times of rising prices, nevertheless, 
the Companies Act compensates for this by requiring disclosure of any material differences 
between the replacement cost or most recent purchase of stock and the book value. LIFO is 
used by some British companies e.g. Cookson Group pic, but is quite rare.
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4) testing of competence; this is done through exam inations set by the 
professional bodies. Although certain exemptions are available in the UK, 
these are generally limited w hen compared to the US for example; 5) 
Institutionalised training; before being allowed to use a designated title, 
UK accounting bodies require members to have practical and re levan t 
experience; 5) licensing; members are licensed by their professional bodies. 
The value of this license is that it may allow the holder to utilise the 
m onopoly conferred in respect of carrying out statutory audits; 6) code of 
professional conduct or ethics; all accounting institutes require a h igh  
level of professional behaviour from their members^. This m eans that 
m em bers of accounting bodies are liable to be disciplined or indeed 
excluded from membership. 7) self-regulation; not only has the 
m anagem ent of Tntemal m atters' been the province of the accounting 
profession, but also accounting and auditing standards have been set 
predom inantly  by members of the profession and 8) legitimacy; this is 
achieved by the grant of a Royal Charter to each of the m ain accountancy 
bodies and by the audit monopoly conferred by company law.
SERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Regulatory agencies have a clientele to serve (Self 1977), w hich is norm ally 
the group that will be protected by their regulations. The traditional v iew  
of regulatory agencies was that they protected society by positioning  
them selves in between unethical businessm en and corrupt politicians 
(Noll 1971). Lemak's (1985) ideal model of a regulatory agency based on the 
notion of fairness, describes procedures to restrain unethical behaviour in  
the private sector for according to Stigler (1971), regulation is institu ted  
prim arily  for the protection and benefit of the public at large, or some large 
sub-class of the public', although N eedham  (1983) considers this to be 
'im plicitly assum ed rather than explicitly docum ented'. Miles and 
Bham bri's (1983) 'regulatory activists' see their tasks (as m em bers of the 
regulatory body) as representing the public interest.
 ^ Ethics for an accountant or auditor may cover such diverse areas as confidentiality, 
obtaining professional work and fees. For a detailed summary of the ethics of the 
accountancy profession, see Maurice (1996).
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M uch of the theoretical (and indeed) the empirical w ork quoted refers to 
agencies set up to regulate trade or m ore especially public utilities. 
A lthough the publicity often attached to these types of agencies relates to 
pricing of services, this is not their sole responsibility. The quality of the 
service supplied and the dissem ination of inform ation m ay also be an 
obligation of the regulatory agency, but these functions can only be carried 
out and  m onitored if product and performance standards exist^. The 
regulations made are distributative as illustrated by the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL), 1993, in their guide;
'H e (the Director General) m ust prom ote the interests of consumers, 
effective competition, efficiency by those providing services.... In 
carrying out this function, the Director General has to achieve the 
best balance as he sees it of these objectives.' (Brackets added)
The public interest aspect of accounting regulation can be exam ined in  
term s of both producers and consumers, the former being the preparers of 
financial statements and the latter being the users. The regulation of 
accounting by the prom ulgation of accounting standards is a m echan ism  
w hereby the consum ers of inform ation (i.e. stakeholders) may be assured 
of the quality of that information. Since the in troduction of the lim ited 
liability form of company by the 1855 Companies Act, regulation has been 
in place to protect these 'consum ers', at that time thought to be only 
investors and creditors^. W ith the developm ent of the stakeholder view of 
the firm, more users groups are now recognised®. It can be argued that the 
consum ers of accounting inform ation need the same protection as the 
consum ers of other commodities. However as w ith  other spheres of 
regulation, public interest is considered to incorporate efficiency. This 
w ould appear to have been acknowledged by the ASB in its Q ualitative
 ^ For example Ofwat's annual report for 1993 talks of \..the right quality service at the 
right price. There must also be scope for the companies to make progress on improving water 
quality and the aquatic environment' p. 2.
 ^ Consumer protection also had the additional safeguards of the statutory appointment of 
auditors and the Prevention of Fraud Act. See for example Edwards (1989) and Edey and 
Panitpakdi (1956).
 ^ Chapter 6 expands on the theme of stakeholders in the context of accountability.
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Characteristics Statem ent (1991), by recognising a cost-benefit trade-off in  
the  production of information.
The term  'public interest' was in fact used in the original Constitution of 
the ASC;
The Committee's objects shall be to define accounting concepts, to 
narrow  differences of financial accounting and reporting treatm ent 
and to codify generally accepted best practice in the public interest'
b u t no definition was given of w hat was m eant by this, and the term  was 
changed to "general interest' in the ASC 1982 Constitution bu t was n o t 
included in that of the ASB. In a written answer to a parliam entary 
question on 13th December 1989, John Redwood quoted directly from the 
1982 constitution;
'...shall not regard themselves as delegates of sectional interests but 
shall be guided by the need to act in the general interests of the 
community and of the accountancy profession as a whole'
(Hansard, Vol 163)
In the United States, the situation is similar in that;
'... the standard setters are expected to represent the entire 
constituency as a whole and not be representatives of a specific 
constituency group.' (Belkaoui, 1985)
Insofar as definitions of the public interest is concerned, these tend to 
represent some form of balance between consum ers and producers. N o ll 
(1971) defines public interest as the policies that the governm ent w ould 
follow if it gave equal weight to the welfare of each m em ber However, in  
the context of regulation, he introduces a third dim ension by discussing 
the balance between employees and owners of regulated firms and the 
purchasers of the services provided. Noll and Owen (1983) talk of 
advancing the interests of mem bers of society in their roles as consum ers, 
b u t doing so in a m anner that promotes economic efficiency. Lemak (1985) 
synthesises public interest into the word 'fairness', m eaning the balance 
betw een a reasonable return  on investm ent for the producer and the  
receipt of quality products and services at fair prices for the consumers. A ll 
of these definitions appear to incorporate concepts of both equity and 
economic efficiency.
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The w ider public interest definition is also found in the United States 
where, the mission statem ent of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) states;
'The mission of the FASB is to establish and im prove standards of 
financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and education 
of the public, including issuers, auditors and users of financial 
in fo rm ation '
If the 'mixed' version of consumers and producers of information defines 
public interest, then in accounting terms, the interests of both the 
preparers and users need to be considered in the regulatory process. There 
w ould appear to be three possible ways in which the regulatory agency 
could satisfy this requirement. Firstly, the com position of and the vo ting  
powers of the members of the regulatory agency m ust reflect the ir 
constituents. Secondly, the agency m ust possess a clear definition of the 
term  public interest and the way in which this can be satisfied. Finally, 
inputs to the regulatory process m ust be m ade by both preparers and users.
Membership
Details of membership in the early days of the ASSC and ASC are not easy 
to obtain. Individuals are often identifiable only from papers and m in u tes  
of m eetings held in the ASC archives. The 1982 Constitution of the ASC 
provided for the reservation of up to five places out of twenty on the  
committee for users. In 1985, Taylor and Turley identified 4 user m em bers 
of the ASC from their organisational backgrounds. The m em bership of 
the ASB as at October 1994 would only appear to contain one user w hereas 
the 1991 Exposure Draft on Objectives of Financial Statements, like the  
Corporate Report (ASSC 1975), identified seven user groups, (although 
one group, the governm ent m ay be said to be represented through its 
observer status).
Definition
The lack of definition of the term  "public interest" by the ASC was partly 
com pensated by the The Corporate Report (1975), a docum ent w hich  
emphasised users and the responsibility to them  by preparers;
'O ur basic approach has been that corporate reports should seek to 
satisfy, as far as possible, the information needs of users. We believe
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there is an implicit responsibility to report incum bent on every 
economic entity whose size or format renders it significant. This 
responsibility arises from the custodial role played in the 
com m unity by economic entities.' (ASSC, 1975 S 1.12)
U nfortunately  the Report did not address the potential problem s of 
conflicting inform ation needs, whereby disclosure to one user group for 
exam ple m ight harm  the interests of another group, nor did it appear to 
recognise that public interest is formed from an array of different interests. 
In any case, the Corporate Report was never officially accepted as the  
objectives of, or as an official policy document of the ASSC. The ASB in its 
Statem ents of Principles overcame the problem of differing (but n o t 
competing) interests by concentrating on one group;
'As investors are providers of risk capital to the enterprise, the 
provision of financial statements that meet their needs will also 
m eet m ost of the needs of other users that financial statements can 
satisfy. A w arding primacy to investors does not imply that other 
users are to be ignored. The information prepared for investors is 
useful as a frame of reference for other users, against which they 
can evaluate more specific information that they m ay obtain in 
their dealings w ith the enterprise.' (ASB, 1991 para 12)
It is perhaps difficult to either see this as either a definition of public 
interest or a statem ent of the way such interest m ight be satisfied. 
Certainly the argum ents for a political economy of accounting p u t forward 
by Cooper & Sherer (1985) had identified this problem.
Inputs
The th ird  way in which the public interest could be reflected in the w ork  
of an agency is through inputs to the regulatory process. These inputs exist 
in the form  of com m ent letters received on Exposure Drafts. H ow ever, 
w ithin  the accounting domain, it is sometimes difficult to d istingu ish  
betw een preparers and users in the reply letters. Beresford (1993), cites 
examples of preparers presenting themselves to FASB as users^. In the case
* Quoting examples of bank lending officers having been influenced by the preparer side of 
the bank in their comments. Indeed the Committee of London Clearing Banks describe 
themselves as both users and preparers in a comment letter dated 30.6.84 (ASC 1/7/4).
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of ED 16, insofar as the foreign exchange provisions were concerned, only 
two respondents (Delta Group and Thom pson Organisation) could be 
interpreted as acknowledging users; the former recognising difficulties for 
users, and the latter m entioning difficulties of comparability, w hich m ay 
be assum ed to be a user-orientated comment. As all com panies have a 
statutory obligation to prepare financial statements, it m ay be assum ed 
that they also are preparer-orientated. Of the representative bodies, only 
the British Property Federation and the Committee of London Clearing 
Banks replied and both of these replies may have been from a preparer 
point of view.
In the case of ED 21, more companies seemed to acknowledge user needs. 
O ut of the 45 company respondents, 9 mention users or comparability. Of 
the 7 representative bodies (Accounting bodies and the DTI having been 
excluded from the total), two. The Association of Investm ent T rust 
Com panies and the Committee of London Clearing Banks, perhaps 
dem onstrate their preparer orientation by requesting exem ption from  the 
standard in their com m ent letters. Insofar as individual com m ents are 
concerned, it is difficult to categorise these, as some are em ployed by o ther 
organisations and are expressing personal opinions and the types of 
comments received do not place the respondents in the category of e ither 
user or producer.
ED 27 received a similar num ber of responses from companies (46), but 
m ore (13) from representative bodies. Seven of these com panies 
acknowledge in some way users through m entions of shareho lder 
inform ation, comparability or understandability. Insofar as the  
representative bodies are concerned, only two appear to represent users. 
One of these, the Society of Investment Analysts w ould appear to be a user 
by definition, and the other. The British Insurance Association, states its' 
interest both as a preparer and as a user for institutional in v es tm en t 
purposes.
Generally, it has been assum ed in the above analysis that the accounting 
profession tends to be more orientated towards preparers than  users in  
that they are either preparing financial statements or auditing those 
statements prepared by clients (although on occasions they could be acting
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as interpreters of information). Even where replies are received from  
users. Perks and Georgiou (1992) w riting of FRS 1, believe that;
'...the Board is influenced more by the interests of producers than 
by the information requirem ents of users . An analysis of the 
responses to the draft standard shows that, amongst users of 
financial statements, most favoured the direct m ethod; amongst 
producers of financial statem ents the overwhelm ing majority 
strongly objected to the direct method^ being required and argued 
that a choice between the two m ethods should be allowed.
Similarly, the large-scale exemptions for small companies, appear to 
result from pressure from producers against the proposals in the 
exposure draft' (p. 39)
N ot only does there appear to be the problem  of user inputs not being 
given sufficient weight in the process of standard setting, bu t the lack of 
interest by users, could comprom ise the achievem ent of a public interest 
orientation of standards. Beresford (1993) accounts for this by suggesting 
that users are not as well equipped or organised as other groups. This 
causes an imbalance in decision-making:
'Users are experts in w hat information would be most useful to 
them  and w hy and the relative benefits of the Board's proposals in 
m aking capital allocation decisions. While other constituents and 
the Board, can only speculate about w hat would be m ost beneficial 
to users, only the users really know ' (p. 73)
Beresford as Chairm an of the Financial Accounting Standards Board also 
adds that a standard which pleases the largest num ber of replies to 
Exposure Drafts may not be consistent w ith the mission of the FASB.
SUMMARY
O n m atters of accounting detail, the tasks carried out by accounting 
regulators are in m any instances not isolated from those of governm ent. 
Examples were seen of items regulated both by accounting standards and 
the law, leading to pronouncem ents which were com plem entary, 
contradictory or identical. The tasks undertaken may be seen as highly
 ^ By requiring a summary of receipts and payments made, this method brings information to 
users that would not be otherwise available.
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technical and carried out by professionals who are rigorously trained and 
licensed and Self (1977) would therefore see them  as likely to be m ore  
autonom ous through this particular characteristic.
The general function of a regulatory agency was seen as serving the public 
interest, and most general definitions of this term  included the interests of 
both  consumers (users) and producers (preparers). The three elem ents of 
how  this m ight be achieved were examined. The m em bership of the  
regulatory bodies did not appear to have been representative of the body 
they m ight be assumed to serve (i.e. the information users) It appears that 
users are not now, nor have been in the past, well represented on standard 
setting bodies. The term public interest' does not appear to have been 
defined even when used by the ASC. If accounting like m any other fields 
can contain conflicting goals, the solution m ight only be in the  
achievem ent of some form of interpersonal utility orderings to achieve a 
non-dictatorial social welfare ordering (Boadway & Bruce, 1984). The 
solution used by the ASB at present w ould appear to deny the existence of 
conflicting aims through emphasising the one user group, w hose 
requirem ents it considers sufficient to cover all other groups. Finally, it 
was seen that users appear to have very little input into the regulatory 
process, which, if they do have differing information requirem ents, w ou ld  
im ply that public interest, from the v iew point of the in fo rm ation  
requirem ents of each group, is not being achieved.
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CHAPTER 5
AGENCY FUNDING AND PERSONNEL
FUNDING
Agencies may be funded in a variety of ways. There are those w hich have  
been hived off from governm ent departm ents and are usually financed 
entirely from those Departm ents' budgets e.g. Benefits Agency, and those 
agencies set up by a particular profession to regulate part or all of its 
activities; e.g. the early period of the ASSC which was financed totally by 
the ICAEW. Some agencies are financed in accordance with Stoker's (1990) 
definition of quangos as;
...organisations that involve voluntary and private enterprise 
resources bu t which nevertheless receive public funding '
(p. 127)
although some financing structures cannot be so easily categorised; they 
w ould appear to be government financed, but w ith the governm ent acting 
purely as an intermediary, imposing a levy on the particular industry and 
then passing this over to the regulatory agency as in the case of the UK 
utility com panies^ Such action w ould appear to insulate the regulators 
from the regulated although even if the provision of finance is guaranteed 
by statute, it could lead to the regulators being dependent on the 
governm ent and thus acting almost as a branch of the executive.
Both the ASSC and the ASC were totally funded by the accounting 
profession. The form ula for the cost-sharing did change from a pro-rata 
system according to the num ber of places occupied on the ASSC (ASC 
4/3 /2), to one based on the m em bership of the professional bodies. This 
w as p u t forward in the proposals for am endm ent of the ASC constitu tion  
in 1982.
 ^ In this way, these agencies are effectively 100% financed by the industry which they are 
regulating without being directly dependent upon them.
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' This would be an appropriate time to align the method of ASC 
funding with that of all other CCAB committees i.e. the six 
governing bodies would be asked to share the costs pro-rata to the 
size of their memberships.' (ASC 5 /3 /5 )
All financial resources from 1969 to the date of the comm encem ent of the 
ASB were supplied by the professional accounting bodies mainly th rough  
the CCAB although physical resources were also supplied (albeit on a 
different basis which will be examined later in this chapter). Howlin & 
Skerratt (1992) describe how committees of the ICAEW served the ASSC in 
its early life. These committees included the Technical Committee, the 
Parliam entary and Law Committee, and the Technical and Research 
Committee who produced papers directly for consideration by the ASSC. 
Meetings were held at Chartered Accountants' Hall, the headquarters of 
the ICAEW and evidence exists of ASSC agendas being sent out on  
Institute headed paper^ in 1970 (ASC 4/1/1). The 1976 Constitution of the 
ASC stated that the ICAEW Technical Directorate should assist the Staff 
Committee (ASC 4/7/5), although by 1983 it would appear that assistance 
to the committee was to be paid for from the ASC budget (ASC 4/7/5), and 
in a note for new members in 1987, the secretary and three u n d er­
secretaries of the ASC were all described as Chartered Accountants based at 
Chartered Accountants' Hall (their costs being paid for by the ASC). The 
note also explained that all meetings were held at the Chartered 
Association of Certified Accountants at Lincoln's Inn Fields^. (ASC 5 /3 /6).
It was not only the direct financial and other physical resources from  
CCAB members which supported the work of the ASC, but also 
professional firms. During 1989 for example, meetings of the ASC 
Planning Sub-Committee were usually held at the offices of Peat, Marwick, 
Mclintock in London. (ASC 1/41/2). Previously, a series of inform al 
meetings had been carried out during 1985 w ith professional firms, to 
review all accounting standards in the light of the 1985 Companies Act
 ^ The later introduction of ASSC headed paper was a move to give the Committee greater 
impact in sending out letters to third parties (Telephone conversation in 1995 with J 
Winters, former ASSC under secretary).
 ^ This was said to be a move by Ian Hay Davison to placate ACCA who were questioning 
the costs they were paying for so little public credit (Winters, see above).
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(ASC 1/75/2). Co-opted members of project panels (working parties), 
reporting directly to the ASC were voluntary providers of their services. 
Additionally, m em bership of the ASSC and the ASC was an unpaid  
position^. Until 1982 all Committee members were also m embers of CCAB 
bodies w ith an em phasis on those working w ith in  the profession. The 
effective cost of this m em bership was paid by the em ployer organisation 
representing a significant contribution in view of the generally senior 
nature of the individuals involved. Even after 1982 the majority of the 
comm ittee were still members of CCAB bodies.
In the case of the Financial Reporting Council and the Accounting 
Standards Board, they are both empowered by their M em orandum  and 
Articles of Association
'to seek and accept grants and funding of any description from any 
governm ent, state, authority, body or person in connection w ith the 
exercise by the Company of any of its functions or powers, including 
(any) grants m ade pursuant to section 256 (3) of the Companies Act 
1985 or any modification or re-enactment thereof.'
(PRC (Ü) (f), ASB 3 [c])
The actual funding of the FRC is on a voluntary, bu t pre-agreed basis w ith  
the m ajor sponsors^. All funds are paid to the FRC which is th en  
responsible for disbursing these where necessary to the ASB and the FRRP 
(Financial Reporting Review Panel). The proportions paid are as follows:
Table 5.1 Funding structure of the FRC.
1/3 Departm ent of Trade and Industry 
1/3 CCAB bodies 
1/3 Institu tions
 ^ The major firms (who were represented on the ASSC/ASC ), also pledged the support of 
their growing technical departments (Winters, see previous footnotes).
 ^ There were difficulties encountered in agreeing the funding and Accountancy describes 
'months of ^gument between the DTI and the accountancy profession over who is to pay for 
the new system' (Accountancy, 1989 p9).
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The third category consists of the following;
3/4  The Stock Exchange
1/8  British Bankers Association
1/8 Association of British Insurers, National Association of Pension
Funds, Association of Investment Trust Companies, Association of 
U nit Trust Investment Funds.
The original report of the Review Committee looking into the proposed 
changes to accounting standard setting in 1987 (Dearing), recom m ended 
the following structure for contributions;
' Adequate funding should be provided by a levy on the filing of all 
com pany annual returns; by seeking contributions from the 
financial community, including the Stock Exchange; by the sale of 
literature on standards and decisions on emerging issues; by a 
continuation or modest increase of present levels of funding from 
the profession; and through arrangements for public sector bodies to 
contribute on a scale matching that of private sector entities of 
com parable size.' (Dearing, 1988 R15)
The levy on filing suggested by the Report was £1 per com pany which it 
estim ated w ould raise £700,000 or about one half of the proposed level of 
expenditure. In 1989, the Department of Trade and Industry produced a 
consultative docum ent based on the Dearing Report in which they 
expressed their opinion that companies should make a small contribution  
to the cost of setting and enforcing standards and suggested that the fees 
paid by com panies should be set at a level which w ould finance a 
governm ent contribution of a third of the cost. The reason for the  
reduction in the proportion was given in the same document.
' We think that the contribution made in this way should be well 
under half the total so as to avoid giving the Governm ent too 
influential a voice in comparison w ith other interested parties.'
(Paragraph 18)
A lthough this w as stated openly at the time by the DTI, nevertheless they 
w ould appear to refute any link between the increase in filing fees for
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companies (from £20 p a to £32 p a) and the contributions paid  to the FRC^. 
This m ight suggest that the DTI are claiming m ore credit for funding the 
FRC than is actually the case. Ultim ately the Stock Exchange contribution  
w as m ade by means of a levy on listed companies.
By comparison, in the United States, the financing of FASB is carried ou t 
through the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF). As this is set up  as a 
non-profit organisation income is exem pt from taxation, and donations 
are deductible as charitable contributions on the donors tax returns. The 
contributions to FASB were as follows in 1993:
Table 5.2 Funding structure of FAF
Public Accounting Profession $3,337,000
Banks, Industry, investm ent
firms and other supporters $3,190,000
Source - F A F Annual Report 1993
All such contributions to the Board are m ade on a voluntary basis^. 
However, there are no contributions made by either federal or state 
governm ents (although the latter contribute to the G overnm en t 
Accounting Standards Board ).
One of Self's (1977) conditions for m aximising agency independence is the 
existence of an adequate and independent source of revenue. Adequate is a 
som ew hat subjective concept and although com paring budgets of standard 
setting bodies is possible, this m ay hide differing functions and 
environm ents. The maximum budget of the ASC was £526,000 in its final 
year of operation (ASC 1/41/2), bu t this sum  did not include prem ises 
which were supplied, as far as can be ascertained, by CCAB member bodies, 
or the tim e of Committee members w hich was unpaid. N either of Self's 
maxim ising conditions appear to have been satisfied in that revenue does
 ^ Telephone conversation with R Coker, assistant company secretary of FRC on 10.1.95.
 ^ The writer could find no evidence of conflict over the funding of FASB, although 
undoubtedly there would exist the incentive for all the contributors to become Tree riders^
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not appear to have covered costs and the source of that revenue was the 
representative bodies of those being regulated.
The supply  of such 'free' resources as premises, personnel and expenses is 
also com m entated on by Mitnik (1980) who discusses industry control 
over its regulatory authority, observing;
'By doing the regulators "favors" and satisfying everyday job 
performance needs through supplying information, the industry  
can ease regulators' work loads (i.e., increase their level of 
"convenience") and create friendships between industry  mem bers 
and agency personnel' (p. 211)
The review of accounting standards carried out by professional firms and 
quoted earlier in this chapter is an example of such a favour w hich w ould 
have reduced the workload of the ASC.
PERSONNEL
The significance of the personnel of a regulatory agency w ould appear to 
relate m ainly to their backgrounds, although some w riters consider that 
staff only represent one of a broad range of factors affecting agency 
behaviour (Moe, 1985). Reagan (1987) quotes studies from  K atzm ann, 
Kelman, Quirk and Rabkin, in support of the proposition that professional 
norm s contain value elem ents as well as technical ability^. On the other 
hand. Grant & M arsh (1977) consider the common background argum en t 
som ew hat dubious on the grounds that this facilitates contact rather than  
creating influence. These apparent contradictions are in som e ways 
reconciled by Lemak (1985), who talks of the interaction of the regulators 
and the regulated as a form of agency capture. It is not therefore sim ply the 
sharing of norm s which leads to influence, but also perhaps the contacts 
both social and institutional (through professional associations) w hich 
bring about influence.
® In the UK, the term 'social closure' is often used to describe the value elements (Jones, 
1995).
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From an analysis of the background of m embers of accounting regulatory 
bodies, it would appear that there is a high degree of com m onality both in  
professional training and backgrounds. In 1987, for example, the seven  
m em ber Board of FASB contained six CPA's (Certified Public 
Accountants), four of w hom  had practising experience w ith some of the 
largest international accounting firms, while the others consisted of an  ex 
treasurer of IBM, a director of auditing and accounting w ith  a regional 
public accounting firm and one academic. A lthough it is a requirem ent of 
FASB that all Board Members sever their relationships w ith  p rev ious 
employers, six of the members had undergone the sam e training and had 
probably acted more as preparers than users of financial statem ents. By 
1995, the com position had changed to only five CPA's, the other two 
m em bers coming from academia and the securities industry. 
Nevertheless, the m ajority voting system could m ean dom inance by those 
w ith a background in big industry and large accounting firms.
An analysis of the m em bers of the ASC between 1978 and 1987, show s 
som e changes in the background of members following the new ASC 
constitution of 1982. Up until that date, all mem bers of the ASC were also 
m em bers of CCAB bodies, reflecting the allocation of seats betw een the 
professional associations (with the ICAEW having the right to appoint 12 
out of 23 members). From 1982 to 1987 two mem bers of the ASC were n o t 
members of CCAB bodies. Despite the 1982 Constitution providing for up  
to 5 of the 20 places being reserved for users of financial accounts, there did 
not appear to be a significant shift from industry and practice members to 
representatives of other organisations during this period.
In the following analysis of the background of m em bers of the ASC, the 
'O thers' category include those who are not apparently preparers or 
auditors of financial statements^, including representatives of Local 
Authorities, N ationalised Industries, Lloyds, The Stock Exchange and 
academics. This latter category had always been m em bers of the 
ASSC/ASC since 1969, and from that date until 1990, there had  been four
 ^ For example, the 30.11.82 membership list included representatives of University of 
Reading, British Railways Board, The Stock Exchange, the Government Accountancy 
Service and Somerset County Council,
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m em bers ( Edey, Bromwich, Gray and Nobes), and the ASC had issued a 
w orking paper in July 1988 on the establishm ent of closer links w ith the 
academic community. By 1990, there were some nine academics serving as 
m em bers of or advisers to the ASC and its working parties (ASC 1/76/2). 
Those m em bers in practice tended to be partners in larger firms of 
accountants, while the industry members held senior positions in m ajor 
com panies in the UK.
Table 5.3 Analysis of ASC members 1978-1987.
Date ASC CCAB ICAEW Industrv / Others
M em bers Practice
30.11.78 23 23 12 18 5
30.11.79 22 22 12 17 5
30.11.80 22 22 11 16 6
30.11.81 22 22 11 16 6
23.3.82 23 23 12 16 6
30.11.82 20 18 9 15 5
30.11.83 20 18 8 14 6
1.9.84 20 18 8 15 5
1.9.85 20 18 8 15 5
1.9.86 20 18 8 15 5
1.9.87 21 19 9 14 6*
* includes 2 m em bers w ith no apparent industria l/p rofessional
connections.
Insofar as working parties were concerned, there appeared to be n o  
constitutional arrangem ents as regards their composition. Some w orking 
parties such as that formed to consider ED 16 and that for price level 
accounting, consisted totally of ASC members. Certain others, such as the  
working parties for pension costs and goodwill, had no current ASC 
members. The appointm ent of working parties was for some time the task 
of the p lanning sub-committee (ASC 2/49/3), although there may h ave
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been alternative and less formal m echanisms in place. Renshall was asked 
by W atts, ASC chairman to lead the w orking party on goodwill (2/24/1). 
Towards the end of the ASC's life, W right, the under-secretary, wrote to 
the Technical Director of ICAEW asking for nam es of people w illing to 
serve on two new working parties (ASC 5/3/1). Previously, A rthur Young 
were asked to nominate a member of the working party on goodwill (ASC 
2/61/2) and Holgate, ASC under secretary in 1985, w rote to brokers and 
companies for suggestions for working party candidates (ASC 5 /3 /3 ). F rom  
the above, there appears to have been no system or criteria indicated for 
the selection of candidates. The only com m on factor relating to m em bers 
of the working parties, was that they were almost exclusively the dom ain  
of m em bers of CCAB bodies. Their relevance to the exercise of pow er in  
the regulatory context is difficult to quantify although there exist m any  
examples of working parties being over-ruled by the ASC.
Not only m ay the identity of accounting regulators be significant, but also 
their m ethod of appointm ent i.e. are they appointed by those they are 
seeking to regulate or by those on whose behalf they will be acting. In the  
United States, Reagan (1987) describes how  attem pts were m ade to m ake 
regulatory commissions more accountable through strengthening the  
President's power to appoint and rem ove the chairm en of these 
commissions. The result of this has led to a reduction rather than an  
increase in the independence of commissions in the opinion of W elborn  
(1977);
'through the position of chairman, the regulatory agencies stand in 
relatively close association w ith the executive branch in various 
im portant respects, rather than being truly independent of it'
(p. 141)
This is som ew hat in opposition to the theories of agency capture by the  
regulated industry which are examined in Chapter 9, a lthough the tw o 
views can be reconciled by the fact that the appointm ent to a specialist 
agency may have to draw on the only source of available technical 
expertise i.e. the industry being regulated. This is the justification given by 
Reagan for so m any regulators having a background inside the industry. 
An alternative analysis m ight be provided by ascertaining w he ther 
regulators are appointed on the basis of their close association w ith  
governm ental thinking or their perceived independence.
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The appointm ent of all Board members of FASB, a non-governm enta l 
agency, rests w ith the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF)^°. M iller 
and Redding (1988) consider it theoretically possible that a Board m em ber 
m ight modify a position on an issue to ensure re-appointment, a lthough  
they claim that there is no evidence that this has ever occurred. They 
identify the greatest threat to independence arising if a particular group 
(preparers) were to gain control of the FAF Board of Trustees, a lthough  
they talk of this in terms of it being highly improbable. Belkaoui (1985) 
however illustrates the control over the US standard setting process by the 
'big eight'. This occurs through the control by the 'big eight' of the AICPA 
whose Board of Directors have exclusive authority to elect and remove the 
members of the FAF Board of Trustees. If therefore the major accountancy 
firms are considered preparers rather than users, the hypothetical case 
described by MiUer and Reading (1988) represents reality.
The ASSC being a committee of the ICAEW had its officers appointed by 
the Institute President. Am endm ents of its constitution in 1970,1971 and 
1975/76 brought in other CCAB bodies, each with a fixed num ber of places. 
Each of the members was appointed by their own professional body. The 
revision of the ASSC constitution in 1976 stated in Paragraph 2c) that 'T he 
Chairm an and Vice-Chairman would be appointed by the Chairm an of 
CCAB on the recom m endation of ASSC....' Howlin and Skerratt (1992) 
describe how under the new ASC constitution of 1982, a N om inations 
Committee was set up consisting of a representative of each of the CCAB 
bodies and the ASC chairman. This appears to be evidenced by a letter 
from W Hyde (who had ceased to be a member of the ASC in 1979) to the 
President of CCAB dated 5.8.82 stating;
' In formulating our recommended list of members we have taken 
careful note of the need to ensure appropriate representation, 
balance, continuity and rotation and to provide for these for the 
future...' (ASC 5 /3 /5 )
This was presum ably w ritten in his capacity as ICMA representative o n  
the N om inations Committee. The Nom inations Committee lapsed
The Financial Accounting Foundation acts in many ways like the FRC in the UK and as 
well as having the power of appointments, they are also responsible for funding and 
overseeing the work of FASB.
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betw een 1982 and 1989 w ith appointm ents being m ade by CCAB office­
holders, consulting w ith the ASC chairm an where appropriate (Howlin & 
Skerratt 1993). The 1983 C onstitution of the ASC had contained the 
provision in paragraph 12 that the pow er of appointm ent of m em bers was 
vested in the CCAB. In 1986, the ASC revisited its 1981 docum ent 'Setting 
Accounting Standards' and noted that CCAB bodies had retained effective 
control of membership m atters w ith only one non-accountant and only 
three users on the Committee (ASC 1/41/2). Prior to this, the notes of a 
m eeting of ICAEW office holders in 1985 reported that;
'Brian Jenkins indicated that the CCAB meeting on 4th Novem ber 
w ould be discussing the Vice-Chairmanship of the ASC. H e said 
they would also discuss w ho should be the new Chairman....'
(ASC 1/48/4)
This right of appointm ent appears to have been w ritten  into the 
Shareholders Agreement of the CCAB dated 19.2.86 w hen  it was 
reconstituted as a limited company. The Agreem ent provided that ' The 
Bodies shall procure that the Board shall appoint a C hairm an and a Vice 
C hairm an of ASC for a term  of up to three years' (ASC 3/8/4). A letter 
from Renshall (then Chairm an of ASC) to E W am e (secretary of CCAB) 
dated 14th February 1989 stated ' I w ould like to see greater represen ta tion  
from non-accountants' (ASC 5/3/1), although, he continued in the sam e 
letter ' As you know, the Chairm an of CCAB has asked me to advise o n  
the rotation and replacement of mem bers of ASC.' A ppoin tm ent of new  
m em bers of all three CCAB committees was established under Clause 4 of 
the am ended CCAB constitution dated 6.2.89. Throughout the lifetime of 
the ASC the power of appointm ents had shifted from the professional 
bodies to the CCAB.
The form ation of the ASB shifted this pow er away from the accounting 
profession. As an incorporated company, the ASB has its' procedural 
arrangem ents stated in its Articles of Association and paragraph 34 (b) and 
(c) grants powers of appointm ent, re-appointm ent and rem oval from  
office to the Appointm ents Com m ittee whose powers also extend to the 
office of Chairman, Vice Chairm an or Technical Director. Paragraph 1 of 
the Articles interpret the A ppointm ents Committee as;
'...the board of directors as constituted from time to time of The 
Financial Reporting Council Limited and any 3 other m em bers of
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the Council of The Financial Reporting Council Limited w hom  the 
directors of the Financial Reporting Council Limited m ay nom inate  
for this purpose from time to time'.
The Board of Directors of the Financial Reporting Council cannot exceed 
four in number^^ (FRC M em orandum  and Articles of Association, 
paragraph 23 {a}) and the power of appointm ent and rem oval (including 
the chairman) rest w ith the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and 
the Governor of the Bank of England (paragraph 23 {b}) or their duly 
authorised representatives.^^ Guidelines are how ever given to the two 
appointees of the desirability of directors including
A) a m em ber of the CCAB or w ith experience relevant to the interests of 
the accountancy profession,
B) a m em ber of the Council of the International Stock Exchange or w ith  
experience relevant to the carrying on of financial activities.
C) a m em ber of the governing body of the Confederation of British 
Industry or w ith experience relevant to the interests of industry and 
commerce (paragraph 23 (c) 1-3)
The Council of the FRC may have up to 30 m em bers who are appointed 
by the directors of FRC Ltd. Apart from the directors them selves, there are 
four reserved places. One governm ent representative appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, one representative of the Bank 
of England, appointed by the Governor, plus the Chairm an of the ASB and 
of the Review Panel, both acting ex-officio. The additional m em bers 
should be m em bers of the accountancy profession in either the public or 
private sector and users in order to secure;
As at 31.12.96, the Directors were Sir S Lip worth. Deputy Chairman of Natwest Bank 
Pic; J Kemp-Welch, Chairman of the Stock Exchange; B Currie, Chairman of CCAB and 
President of ICAEW; and Sir C Marshall, Chairman of British Airways Pic.
This is basically the same institutional arrangements that exists for the Securities and 
Investment Board (SIB). Other regulatory bodies such as the Health and Safety 
Commission have members appointed by the Secretary of State for Employment after 
consultation with representative bodies.
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'...a proper balance between the interests of persons engaged in the 
preparation of accounts and those engaged in reporting on accounts 
and of the public.' (FRC Mem and Arts paragraph 4[l][f][2])
The function of the Council given by the M em orandum  and Articles of 
Association is to;
'...determine the general policy of the Com pany in relation to the 
attainm ent of its objects, and to formulate the general nature of the 
guidance and advice to be given from time to time by the Com pany 
to such companies or other bodies as it m ay establish or support for 
that purpose'. (para 42 [1])
W ilson (1980), in his study of the behaviour of regulatory agencies, 
identified in the case of governm ental agencies three types of employees. 
The first type he identifies, politicians, does not apply directly in the case of 
accounting regulation. Politicians are features of governm ent agencies 
especially in the United States as they "see them selves as having a fu tu re  
in elective or appointive office outside the agency.' (p. 374). It is not easy 
to relate these to UK agencies. His second type, careerists, w ho are 
described as 'employees who identify their careers and rew ards w ith  the  
agency' (p. 374) did not exist in the ASC because the m ainly vo lu n ta ry  
nature of the w ork precluded such a structure, and it is probably too early 
in the life of the ASB to identify any careerists. The term s of office of 
Board m em bers of FASB is lim ited to two term s of five years. Project 
m anagers m ay however remain longer w ith FASB and can be prom oted to 
that position, although no research appears to have been carried o u t 
relating to these employees. Additionally industry fellows are appointed 
for two year periods usually on secondm ent from Big Eight firms (M iller 
& Redding, 1988).
Professionals are the third type, seeking either a stepping stone' to a better 
career or rem aining w ith the agency for the m aintenance of th e ir 
professional esteem. Reagan (1987) considers that a significant inpu t to 
regulatory behaviour is caused by the factor that he refers to as the  
revolving-door', that is a tendency for regulators who come from  the  
regulated industries to see things from the industry  view point, and  to 
have a strong incentive to please the leaders of the industry they are
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regulating, in the hopes of m oving into good private sector positions^^. 
The analysis of members of the ASC in this chapter illustrates that the  
m ajority were all sim ultaneously holding senior private sector positions 
while working as regulators. It w ould seem unlikely that actions taken 
w hen acting as regulators would damage their private sector employers (or 
clients). Equally, it m ight be assum ed that the 'correct' actions taken 
w ithin the regulatory arena might assist their careers.
The form ation of the Accounting Standards Board in 1990, saw the 
introduction of a full-time Chairm an and Technical Director. To date 
(April 1997), there have been no changes in these office holders. By 
contrast, of the original seven (part-time) m embers of the Board appointed 
in 1990, none still were members at the end of 1996^ .^ As the m em bers in  
professional practice between both these years were either partners or 
holding senior positions and the industrial mem bers were all of Director 
level w ithin large public companies, it is perhaps difficult to estimate the  
benefits they would receive from m em bership in terms of career 
enhancem ent.
A lthough the writer could find no analysis carried out, it would, in the  
case of FASB, not be unreasonable to assum e that Board m em bers o n  
expiry of their term  of office returned to the profession, possibly w ith  
enhanced reputations. This is more accentuated in the case of practice 
fellows who are usually seconded from the Big Eight ' firms and as M iller 
& Redding (1988) explain;
'This dominance is not planned, bu t merely reflects the facts that a 
larger firm is more capable of absorbing the loss of the fellow's 
services for two years and of using the special knowledge that he or
she gains at the FASB Virtually all fellows have been
prom oted to partner after their service, and some have continued to
^ Although in his US study, he did not consider that the correlation between a regulated 
industries' source of personnel and the pro-industry orientation of decisions was any greater 
in the independent regulatory agencies than in the 'line agencies'.
The closest example of continuous service is Professor Whittington, who was originally 
the academic advisor in 1990 before becoming a board member.
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work with the Board as representatives or spokespersons for their 
firm s.' (p. 46)
SUMMARY
The significance of funding and personnel has long been recognised, w ith  
TR 549 issued in 1984, stating ' It should be bom  in m ind that the v o lu m e  
of work undertaken by the ASC is determined by the governing bodies 
through their decisions on the ASC's budget and level of staffing.' N o t 
only is it the volume of work that is affected. Reagan (1987), in his study of 
US regulatory agencies classifies both budgetary control and the power of 
appointm ent as always having been limitations of agency independence. 
The ASSC and the ASC were supplied w ith all financial resources from  
the accounting profession and other resources in terms of personnel and 
offices were supplied almost exclusively from the same source. The 
FRC/ASB funding appears to follow closely the m odel of FAF/FASB w ith  
voluntary funding from a wider variety of sources.
All the accounting regulatory bodies examined in this chapter 
dem onstrate a close identification with the accounting profession, 
although from 1982 onwards there was an attem pt in the UK to m ove  
away from the emphasis on members of recognised accountancy bodies, 
who were also preparers^^. The prevalence of qualified accountants 
how ever is felt to be an inevitable function of the tasks involved in  
accounting reg u la tio n ^ T h e  UK has moved away from the US m odel of 
appointm ents by involving a wider constituency in the process a lthough  
ultim ate control of those responsible for m aking the appointm ents now  
rests w ith  the government. This is more in line w ith the more general UK 
and US model of regulatory agencies (although in the US such 
appointm ents are Presidential). FASB though, as a non-governm enta l
The ICSA (Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators) had expressed doubts 
by considering that widening the membership of the ASC was nullified by the fact that 
standards were still issued by the CCAB. (ASC 2/53/2).
Noll (1971) preferred the idea that non-political (and non-business), neutral individuals 
could be appointed to agencies, who over the years could become expert enough to detect the 
most socially desirable policies.
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agency still appears to have its appointm ents system dom inated by the 
accounting profession.
Insofar as the 'revolving door' is concerned there is a little evidence from  
the US of this occurring, although such a phenom ena was not applicable 
in the early UK days of standard setting as the regulators were 
sim ultaneously employed by industry and the professions. However, this 
m ay be seen in the future in the case of the ASB, w ith the introduction of 
full-time board m embers and project managers.
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CHAPTER 6
ACCOUNTABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The final characteristics suggested by Chapter 2 as affecting the  
independence of regulatory agencies are structure and process. T he 
structure of an organisation may create accountability through the way in  
which the organisation is constituted. The particular significance of th is 
characteristic is that the term is often used synonym ously w ith  control 
(Baldwin and McCrudden, 1987). Accountability also implies tha t 
decisions and actions are made public to third parties, w hich can im pact 
upon the processes adopted by the agency (if not the decisions themselves).
Traditional concepts of accountability suffer from the problem  outlined in  
Chapter 1 which described 'constitutional awkwardness'. As a response to 
the m ore complex environm ent of governm ent departm ents, 
governm ent agencies and private sector agencies, new  concepts of 
accountability have been developed. This chapter commences w ith  an  
exam ination of these new concepts^ before testing their applicability to 
accounting standard setting bodies, in order to examine w hether lack of 
traditional accountability has been overcome by an alternative form  or 
forms.
Given the nature of accountability (explored later in this chapter), an  
exam ination of any organisation w ould appear to be capable only of 
identification rather than the m easurem ent^ of this characteristic. W ith in  
both the political and corporate settings in which the relevant theories
 ^These new concepts have been developed and tested mainly in the area of government. 
Other concepts arise from studies of companies. These are however relevant to this study in 
that both are examples of complex organisations with responsibilities to outside parties. 
Additionally, jointly they help create the arena in which accounting is practiced.
 ^For instance, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts has stated 'Accountability cannot be 
measured like the amount of water in a glass’ (see Parliament House 1989)
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have been developed, there exist a principal/agent relationship, 
underpinning  the need for accountability to be present, although th is 
relationship is used in a different way to the traditional econom ics 
approach as will be seen later in this chapter. Successive studies suggest 
that accounting information (and therefore it's regulation) is a public good 
produced for society at large^. Thus accounting regulators, situated w ith in  
a principal/agent relationship m ust be accountable to society on a periodic 
basis, for, as Shocker and Sethi (1973) conclude;
'In a dynamic society, neither the sources of institutional power 
nor the needs for it's services are permanent. Therefore an 
institution m ust constantly meet the twin tests of legitimacy and 
relevance by demonstrating that society requires it's services and 
that the groups benefiting from it's rewards have society's 
approval'. ( p. 105)
For accountability to exist w ithin the principal/agent relationship, four 
pre-requisites have been identified by Rose (1985). This chapter th en  
examines these pre-requisites, both on a theoretical basis, as well as 
relating them to accounting standard setting bodies.
NEW CONCEPTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Smith (1981) writing in a governm ent setting, recognises that the actions 
of agencies should reflect popular choices as interpreted by elected 
representatives, whose role is to m onitor actions as well as m ake 
decisions. However, state activity has become more diverse, w hilst 
developm ents have occurred in the machinery of governm ent and in  
adm inistrative processes, m eaning that the traditional concept of political 
accountability can no longer be applied^. The growth of w hat Smith (1981) 
describes as 'a bewildering array of executive, regulatory, investigatory, 
commercial, advisory and judicial bodies' (p 1164)^, has m eant that new  
and sometimes conflicting concepts of accountability have emerged to
 ^ Conceptual framework projects outlined in earlier chapters have recognised all members 
of society as users with rights to accounting information.
in the simple form described by Birch (1964).
 ^ See also Holland & Fallon (1979).
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supplem ent and som etim es replace the traditional constitutionally-based 
concept. He identifies these concepts of accountability as follows:
* C onstitu tional * Economic
* Judicial * Com m ercial
* Quasi-Judicial * Professional
* Procedural * Decentralised
* C onsultative
This chapter will next examine each of these concepts for their im pact o n  
the accountability of any non-governm ental body in order to test the ir 
possible application to private sector accounting standard setting (and 
other regulatory) bodies. Theories and concepts developed m ainly w ith in  
the area of political science are used because regulation (and enforcem ent) 
are functions which have traditionally been carried out by G overnm en t 
D epartm ents and Governm ent Agencies.
Constitutional Accountability
U nder constitutional accountability, the responsibility of M inisters or of 
the governm ent as a whole is to an elected assembly (Birch 1964). 
Traditionally in the UK, the head of any governm ent departm ent, the  
M inister or Secretary of State is a political appointm ent, and therefore 
answerable to the nation 's elected representatives for actions taken by 
him self or any of his officials, such officials being protected personally 
from political criticism or censure. Responsibilities of these political 
appointees include not only the proper spending of funds, bu t also 
efficiency considerations such as achieving value for money. Procedures 
have to be adhered to in order to ensure that the departm ent is defensible 
in terms of its activities. This may result in an impact upon  operations, 
causing delays and rigidity, sometimes leading to friction causing a trade­
off betw een efficiency and accountability being m ade. Sm ith (1981) 
describes how  the recruitm ent of senior governm ent employees th ro u g h  
open exam inations implies the impartiality of their appointm ents, w ith  
any praise or blam e for their actions being attributable to the political 
heads of departm ents rather than these officials. Their w ork is also 
characterised by anonym ity, which focuses even m ore responsibility for
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departm ental actions on the political heads, although these conventions 
are changing.
The implication of constitutional accountability for executive departm ents 
is that there is one identifiable individual who carries the responsibility 
for any actions taken by that department. Actions are strictly defined by 
function and carried out by an impartial and anonym ous staff. 
Responsibility of a government department is to the elected assembly and 
involves financial and decisional aspects, both of which are capable of 
being monitored. W here an agency is used, there may be a sponsoring 
departm ent as in the UK example of the Contributions Agency and the  
Benefits Agency and their relationship w ith the Departm ent of Social 
Security. Not only does the work of those agencies serve the departm ent 
directly, but there is a historical link in that their work was originally 
carried out by the department. In this type of situation, the responsibility 
of the Secretary of State for the work of the agency is not clear^. By contrast, 
some regulatory agencies do not have the same historical or practical 
connection w ith a government department, and this lack of sponso rsh ip ' 
may also distance them from constitutional accountability.
This is the case of the ASC which owes it's origins in part to a desire to 
avoid the involvem ent of the state in matters of accounting detail. By 
contrast, the US standard setting body derives its' authority from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Miller & Redding 1988), a federal 
regulatory agency with statutory authority for financial reporting by 
quoted companies. The fact that the five Com missioners are all appointed 
by the President, would tend to signify some level of constitu tional 
accountability, examples of which were illustrated in Chapter 1 th ro u g h  
political interference w ith proposed accounting standards. If accounting 
were regulated only by the state as is the case of some European countries 
(see Nobes & Parker 1995), then it would be easier to trace constitu tional 
accountability, as accounting could be viewed in the same way as any other 
policy area. The UK governm ent has always tended to distance itself 
publicly from accounting detail, as seen in the Parliam entary replies
 ^ The dismissal of the Director of the Prison Service in 1996 is an example of the denial of 
responsibility by the political head of a government department.
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quoted in Chapter 3. Although governm ent agencies m ay still be subject to 
powers of direction by a m inister or subject to the Parliam entary 
Commissioner for A dm inistration, this is no t the case for either the ASC 
or ASB. Thus standard setting bodies are seen to be outside of the political 
structure, both by governm ent as well as by  themselves.
Judicial Accountability
The principle generated under judicial accountability is that decisions and  
actions of officials in governm ent departm ents and agencies should be 
m ade in accordance w ith the law. A lthough non-departm ental bodies 
may exercise a legal type of power, nevertheless they them selves are 
subject to the law, which has implications for their actions.
T he duty to obey the law, enforceable by action in the courts at 
the instigation of those affected by the actions of public bodies, 
imposes an obligation on a public body to explain and justify its 
actions in legal terms if sued in the courts'
(Oliver 1991 p. 26)
A departm ent m ust not exceed its statutory responsibility but m ust do 
w hat it is obliged to do by statute, following prescribed procedures w here 
applicable and m ust act w ithout negligence, unreasonableness, bad faith o r 
ulterior motive. Judicial review  is one way in which this type of 
accountability can be achieved, and the departm ent forced to behave in a 
proper m anner. Oliver (1991) expands these responsibilities into the  
private sector.
'This duty (to ensure actions are lawful and that powers have  
been exercised fairly and rationally) extends to private bodies 
exercising public functions, such as professional 
organisations and regulatory bodies in  the City of London'
(p. 26, brackets added)
The significance of judicial accountability rests upon the fact that the law is 
the highest form of authority w ith new law s and am endm ents to existing 
laws having to be approved by a legislature w hich is itself accountable to 
society in the form of the electorate. Other bodies m ay make binding rules 
and decisions, but these cannot replace existing laws and in m any
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instances draw their regulatory powers directly from the law itself^. W here  
the legality' of a decision m ade by a non-parliam entary body is queried by 
appeal to the law, then judgem ent has to be m ade on the basis of w he ther 
this contravenes an existing law and w hether powers have been exercised 
reasonably following proscribed procedures.
Judicial accountability has the general criteria of the legality or illegality of 
actions. UK standard setters do not have statutory duties to perform ; 
therefore they cannot exceed or fall short of statutory responsibilities and 
the question of illegality has been overcome in several ways. The 
Companies Act (1981) allowed departure from accounting principles (sl5), 
as weU as the use of the true and fair override.
The Opinions obtained by the ASC in 1983* suggest a form of delegated 
authority by stating that compliance w ith accepted accounting principles 
was prim a facie evidence that the accounts were true and fair and the fact 
that 'The function of the ASC is to form ulate w hat it considers to be 
generally accepted accounting principles.' (Hoffman and Arden, 1983, para 
9,10), w ould imply such delegation. However, w here conflict has occurred 
between accounting standards and the law, adjustm ents, effectively of a 
cosmetic nature have been m ade to reconcile differences^. Future standards 
however may avoid conflicts because of the w ay that the ASB;
'...m ust also consider the environm ent in w hich its ' standards are to 
be applied. The legislation w ith which reporting entities m ust comply 
forms an im portant part of that environment. Accordingly, FRS's are 
drafted in the context of current legislation and European 
Community Directives w ith  the aim of ensuring consistency betw een 
accounting standards and the law.' (ASB 1993 para 34)
 ^ For example, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) was set up under the 
Telecommunications Act 1984 and grants to that rgulator "'extensive powers.... to determine 
the questions specified in a license, enforce the observance of license conditions or initiate 
modifications of license conditions' (OFTEL 1993).
® from L Hoffman QC and M Arden QC.
 ^ see for example SSAP 9 which allows profit to be recognised on long term contracts by 
changing balance sheet and profit and loss account descriptions and treatments.
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If this fails however, there is still the true and fair override!
In addition to this form of delegated authority enjoyed by the ASC, their 
successor has received w ithin the 1989 Companies Act a more form al 
recognition of accounting standards. The Financial Reporting Review  
Panel (FRRP) acts as a quasi-court in deciding w hether to attem pt to force 
restatem ent of financial statements or indeed invoke other action^® w here 
there are identified m aterial departures from accounting standards w hich 
affect the true and fair view^\
Quasi- Judicial Accountability
Quasi-judicial accountability does not have legality or illegality as one of 
its criteria. The law specifies certain statutory rights for individuals or 
groups, usually consisting of services, benefits or exemptions. Examples of 
these would be rights to receive pensions or social security payments. 
Decisions are not queried on the grounds that they are illegal, but rather 
that the individual has been dealt w ith under the wrong category. A 
feature of officials working w ithin broad and perhaps vague statutory 
frameworks is that their discretion has to be controlled by codes of practice, 
departm ental rules, guidelines and other instructions. Often in the UK, 
adm inistrative tribunals^^ w ith limited legislative backing, are used to 
review cases and guide the exercise of discretion; the existence of such 
tribunals being a further check on the decisions of officials. The 
implications of quasi-judicial accountability are that under a general legal 
framework, where discretionary decisions are made, these have to be 
formally defended in terms of either content or procedures.
Edwin Glasgow, chaiman of the Review Panel is quoted as saying 'resorting to litigation 
would be very much the last stand' (see Perrin, 1996)
" This does not necessarily include breaches of the Companies Act, although the policy of 
non-depreciation of certain properties by Forte Pic was contrary to both SSAP 12 and the 
Companies Act. This was accepted by the FRRP . The Panel has so far (to December 1996) 
examined 37 cases (see Accountancy, December 1996)
Examples of these are found generally in the area of fiscal liability, property and land, 
social welfare and regulation/licencing. Specific examples from each category include the 
Lands tribunal. Mental health tribunal and Gaming Board tribunal.
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Quasi-judicial accountability reflects delegated powers and the correct use of 
these powers. It could be argued that the pow er to make accounting 
standards is implicitly granted by the Companies Act to the ASB. H ow ever, 
no examples appear to have been recorded in the UK of objections to 
accounting standards on grounds of either m isuse of powers or of 
procedural defects.
Procedural Accountability
W here defects in official conduct or adm inistrative procedures cause 
hardship or injustice when applied to specific cases, then, although the  
decision m ade is legal, that decision may be thought of as unreasonable, 
due to the surrounding carelessness, inefficiency, incompetence, delay, 
ineptitude or arbitrariness. Procedural accountability is concerned w ith  the  
operation of internal rules which are draw n up  to control decision­
making. W ithin governm ent departm ents in the UK, these internal ru les 
are subject to scrutiny by the legislature through use of the Parliam entary  
Com m issioner (Ombudsman) whose recom m endations a lthough  
advisory, are generally taken very seriously by governm ent departm ents. 
Other organisations use the notion of due process as a way of en su ring  
good (and fair) decision-making, as well as in the m ore defensive role of 
justifying that care has been taken. The term  "due process' can be used in  
several different settings to describe the steps used to assure careful 
consideration being given to an adm inistrative process. Miller & R edding 
(1988) in the context of FASB, talk of due process embracing not only a 
systematic approach to problem-solving, but also the creation of an  
environm ent in which constituents and m em bers of the business 
com m unity can become involved. Thus in  the face of external criticism, it 
can be show n that matters have been dealt w ith  efficiently, fairly and 
w ithout prejudice.
The ASC did not appear to use the term  'due process', although elem ents 
may be seen in their actions which are described in the following section. 
Theirs was a systematic approach, but this was implicit rather than explicit 
in that the process appears to have been know n m ainly to those in v o lv ed  
w ith standard setting rather than to all their constituents.
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Consultative Accountability
It has become common for governm ent to consult on both a formal and 
inform al basis w ith interested parties and those likely to be affected by 
policies^^. The publication in the UK of 'Green Papers', discussion papers 
and consultative docum ents frequently precede the decisions of 
governm ent. Organised interests consider that they have the right to be 
consulted and the governm ent has acknowledged a duty to consult. Such 
functional links may serve to legitimise both these interest groups and 
the final decisions m ade by governm ent. W ithin non -governm en t 
organisations, consultation m ay be enshrined in statute^^ whereby 
advisory bodies, committees councils, boards or comm issions are 
consulted as of right. In a governmental context, consultation m ay be seen 
as satisfying dem ands for open governm ent and also for m ore 
participation in governm ent decisions. Better decisions m ay flow from  
greater participation, and cases of conflict betw een governm ental action 
and private rights may be mitigated by the introduction of form al 
m echanisms whereby private opinions could be expressed^^. This situation 
is typified by the use of public enquiries as a forum  for seeking the view s 
of interested parties. These enquiries provide the opportunity for 
objections to be raised and proposals to be modified.
The implications of consultative accountability is that rule-m aking bodies 
m ay in fact be avoiding ex post accountability through involving a w ider 
constituency in decision making. On occasions w here the views of those 
affected figure predom inantly in the subsequent regulation or judgem ent, 
then the rule m aking body rarely has to defend its' decision. The act of 
consultation m ay be interpreted as a form of consensus seeking. For 
assessing w hether consultative accountability is present, it is necessary to 
look at the consultative procedures and attem pt to assess w hether these 
are attem pts at collegiate decision making, inform ation gathering exercises 
or m erely w indow  dressing. The developm ent of the two standards
Smith (1981) describes this as almost a convention of the constitution.
The Electricity Act (1989) provided for the setting up 14 regional consumer committees 
and the Water Act (1989), 10 regional customer service committees.
This also encompasses some of the rationales for use of agencies by government described 
in Chapter 3.
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exam ined in the following Chapter demonstrate the effect of the 
consultation processes used by the ASC.
Consultative accountability examines w hether decisions have been 
legitim ised through wide participation. W here the developm ent of 
accounting standards reflect consensus-seeking, then it w ould appear that 
the standard setting body is behaving in a responsible m anner using the 
Birch (1964) interpretation of responsibility as incorporating responsiveness 
as well as accountability. Clearly, procedural arrangem ents for consultation  
to take place can be examined, but whether such consultation invo lves 
participation in decision-making, window-dressing or in fo rm ation  
gathering, requires a standard by standard analysis of the process. Previous 
chapters have already examined some of the interaction betw een 
accounting regulators and their constituents, through the in fo rm al 
m eetings w ith  interested parties and through the more form al m echan ism  
of replies to Exposure Drafts^^. Research carried out by Tonkin (1983) o n  
com m ent letters, suggested that some groups of participants in the standard 
setting process tended to have more systematic success in having their 
view s reflected in published standards than other groups. This research 
m ay not have addressed the issue of the members of the ASC (who w ould  
have m ade the final decision), coming from am ongst those groups 
enjoying this success. Additionally, by its' nature, this research could n o t 
take account of those stakeholder groups who were not involved in the 
process. Generally, it has been recognised that certain interests (m ainly 
those of users) are not well represented in the consultation process 
(Beresford, 1993).
Economic Accountability
The quest for efficiency w ithin governm ental departm ents and agencies 
has introduced the concept of economic efficiency. Because public funds 
are voted for a specific purpose, not only m ust there be a check that they 
have been properly spent, but also that waste has been elim inated. This 
has brought about m ore sophisticated forms of budgeting and financial
Discussion drafts are another way in which consultation is achieved and these usually 
suggest a range of possible solutions to an accounting problem, rather than proposing a single 
treatment.
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control techniques within government, of which Value For Money (VFM) 
auditing is an example^^. The creation of commercial type agencies 
provides a way in which managers are given 'clear-cut responsibilities and 
com m ensurate authority, and being held accountable for perform ance 
against budgets, standards of achievement and other tests' (Fulton 
Committee 1968 para 154). Economic accountability is already present in  
commercial organisations, whose annual accounts provide inform ation  
not only on stewardship, but also on the efficient use of resources, using  
profits as a measure of economic efficiency. W ithin other organisations 
who are unable to report in terms of profits or losses, income and 
expenditure is subject to the traditional type of audit, although in addition 
to this, VFM auditing examines economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
w ithin parts of the public sector. This encompasses w hat Robinson (1973) 
describes as program m e accountability which is concerned w ith the  
achievement of goals, and although he recognises difficulties in the  
definition of goals, especially at central government level, he nevertheless 
argues that goal setting may be possible for subordinate parts of 
governm ent.
A pre-requisite of economic efficiency is that organisational objectives 
m ust be clearly specified before any judgem ent can be made as to 
organisational success of failure. In the case of businesses operating w ith in  
a capitalist economy, these objectives i.e. profit m axim isation are in h eren t 
and involve efficiency considerations, but other organisations w hose 
objectives are not so easily specified, introduce difficulties in  
m easurem ent unless either subordinate goals can be laid down or 
performance m easurement standards set.
Applied to accounting regulatory bodies, economic efficiency suffers from  
the initial difficulty of the specification of objectives. The ASC operated 
under a m andate w ith the general objective of setting accounting 
standards in the public interest. No form of performance measurement or 
evaluation in economic terms appears to have taken place. The ASC m ade
The Local Government Finance Act 1982, requires the Audit Commission to carry out such 
an exercise and the National Audit Act 1983 gives statutory power to the National Audit 
Office in respect of VFM audits.
171
an annual budget submission to the CCAB, although the funding cam e 
from the professional associations themselves, as described in Chapter 5. 
Presumably, if the accounting profession required non-governm enta l 
standard setting and flexible standards, they would be prepared to continue 
to support the ASC who could satisfy these objectives.
The objectives of the ASB are incorporated in their M em orandum  and 
Articles of Association, but these once again provide a difficult standard 
against which to measure economic performance^®. The A nnual Review  
of the Financial Reporting Council includes a section on the work of the  
ASB, but this contains only a description of its' activities in the technical 
field.
Commercial Accountability
Commercial accountability applies only to those industries owned by the  
state and to certain special purpose agencies (usually set up on a 
commercial basis such as Her Majesty' Stationery Office^^). There exists a 
very indefinite line of accountability here and a very unclear relationship  
between governm ent and these bodies (described by Hanson and W alles, 
1975 as a 'blurring of the dividing line between Ministerial responsibility 
and board autonom y p 181). Such industries are expected to operate 
commercially w ithin a capitalist economy, although it is possible that 
there m ay be ideological as well as conceptual differences betw een 
governm ents and these agencies. In the case of state-owned industries it 
has consistently proved impossible to agree on a long term  criteria for 
control and accountability purposes, although various techniques based on 
Return on Investm ent or Cost of Capital have been used to m easure 
performance. The ambiguities of relationships between governm ent and 
agencies may however be advantageous to M inisters who m ay w ish to 
exert influence w ithout becoming personally accountable for the 
undertaking. As accounting regulation cannot be considered a com m ercial
The Memorandum and Articles of Association gives as an objective 'to devise and 
promulgate accounting standards; to promote, maintain and codify best practice....to define 
concepts...to narrow differences....' 3 (iii).
Privatised in 1996.
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activity, this type of accountability will not be examined further in this 
chapter.
Professional Accountability
Where professionals operate within the pubHc or the private sector, there 
is an unsolved question as to whom they should be answerable. In the 
public sector, they may be responsible for the exercise of their skills and 
judgem ent to elected political leaders, to their fellow professionals or to 
both. Such a conflict of loyalties is examined by Klein (1974) in the context 
of the public health service. Rose (1985) quotes the example of m edical 
malpractice being defined as failure to comply with medical standards 
rather than w ith bureaucratic procedures. Until recent changes in the 
public health service in the UK, 'the state had endorsed professional 
autonom y by handing judicial and other powers to a professional body 
w ithout creating any m ethod of checking the use of such power' (Sm ith 
1981 p. 1171). Accountability only manifested itself at the highest level i.e. 
through parliam entary questions on matters of health policy. There has 
however been a long-term tendency towards a reduction in the 
independence of medical professionals recognised by Klein (1973) w ho 
describes medical duties as being defined by the terms of a contract rather 
than in the traditional form in terms of dedication. Later Perks (1993) 
describes managerialism  curtailing professionals w ithin organisations, 
although it has been recognised that limited technical knowledge (by 
managers) of the work of such experts can curb the effect of any constraints 
placed upon them (Wirt 1981)^°.
The implication of professional accountability is that a lthough  
professionals, by virtue of those characteristics by which they are term ed 
professionals^^ are responsible to their professional associations, their 
positions w ithin organisations also imply some level of responsibility, 
unless they are allowed to act in a totally autonomous m anner w ithin that 
organisation. Occasionally, both in the public and private sectors, this can 
lead to a conflict of duty.
ie managers can be T>linded by science'.
see Perks (1993) Chapter 1 for a discussion of professional characteristics.
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Professional accountability is especially relevant to a body dom inated by 
professionals and whose pronouncem ents apply in the first instance to 
fellow professionals. The question of w hether professional regulatory body 
members are responsible to their professional associations at the expense of 
the regulatory body m ust be raised, unless both professionals and their 
regulators have objectives which are also shared w ith the rest of society. 
The studies quoted in Chapter 5 (Reagan, 1987) suggesting that professional 
norm s contain value elements as well as technical abilities give an 
importance to both the professional and societal interpretations of public 
interest. W hen accounting standards were introduced in the UK in 1970, 
the regulatory body was a committee of the largest professional association 
(ICAEW); later it was formed from representatives of all professional 
accounting bodies, and it was not until 1982 that the first non-accountants 
were included. Thus for the first twelve years of operation, the ASC was the 
dom ain of accountants only, and even after the changes occurring in 1982, 
this situation hardly changed. Additionally, standards had to be approved 
by the CCAB which involved the consent of the m ain professional 
accounting bodies.
The ASB is now independent of the accounting profession, being set up as 
an incorporated company with arrangem ents as to the appointm ent of 
m embers contained within it's M em orandum  and Articles of Association. 
The fact that the Chairman and Technical Director are now full-time offices 
has tended to introduce even more independence. Other Board m em bers 
how ever (unlike F ASB members) are neither full-time or required to 
sever their links w ith industry or the profession. Accounting standard 
setting is still dom inated on both sides of the Atlantic by qualified 
accountants and the inputs to the processes similarly tend to be dom inated 
by preparers (who are accountants) rather than users (who often are no t 
accountants). This has been noted by both Beresford (1993) in the US and 
Perks and Georgiou (1992) in the UK. W here professional accountability 
replaces conventional accountability in the area of accounting regulation, 
it is necessary for accountants and society in general to have shared values 
in order for public interest to be promoted and accountability to be present.
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Decentralised Accountability
Decentralised accountability involves the devolution of powers from  
central to regional and local governm ents, and the ensu ing  
responsibilities arising from the granting and the exercise of such powers. 
As this concept is based on a geographical rather than functional or 
operational considerations, it will not be explored further in this paper.
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PRINCIPAL AGENT MODEL
W ithin the principal/agent model, the basic relationships consist of the 
granting of power and rewards by the principal to the agent, who th en  
carries out actions on behalf of the principal. Such actions can only be 
m onitored through the supply of inform ation to the principals. The 
relationship is often referred to in accounting literature as agency theory, 
m uch of which is concerned w ith the provision of an incentive or rew ard 
system to ensure that the agent acts in accordance w ith the wishes of the 
principaP^. But, the model does not have to be examined from this 
perspective and in fact describes m any other environm ents. Agent and 
principal relationships exist throughout society w herever actions are 
undertaken by one or more actors on behalf of others. This m ay take place 
w ithin either a formal or an informal setting and could incorporate 
explicit or implied responsibilities.
The principal/agent model may be found w ithin a hierarchical structure  
as found in such examples as the military. It is present in  theories of 
governm ent (detailed later in this chapter), which describe the 
em pow erm ent of one group by another^^. W ithin a corporate setting, the 
existence of the firm has been attributed to an agency relationship (Coase, 
1937). Jensen and Meckling (1976) in describing the firm as "a nexus of 
contracts', point to the existence of more agency relationships than  the 
traditional director and shareholder relationship arising from the 
separation of corporate ownership and control. In w hatever context the
“ see, for example Scapens (1991).
^ Indeed the word responsible is often used in a political context to describe either action or 
inaction by governments (see Birch, 1964)
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principal/agent relationship is found, accountability concerns the way in  
which the relationship is monitored and therefore is a vital ingredient.
The model of the relationship is illustrated as follows:
1
Principal ^
o Reward 
o Power
Inform ation 
re. actions 
(accountability)
 TAgent
IActions
Figure 6.1 The principal-agent accountability contract (Adapted from Gray, Owen and 
Maunders (1987), p. 3)
In order to examine the nature of accountability. Rose (1985) asks four 
basic questions which address the relationships, functions and procedures 
shown in the preceeding diagram.
* Who is accountable?
* What are organisations accountable for?
* To whom are organisations accountable?
How are organisations accountable?
In many ways, these questions are inter-related, but initially will be 
examined individually.
Who Is Accountable?
The identity of the agent depends upon the relationship being examined. 
Generally, the agent can be defined as the person or body carrying out 
actions on behalf of the principal. Within a market context, identification 
of the agent is usually clear, in that it is the principal who either formally 
appoints or more informally chooses to use the agent. W ithin a political 
setting, the same conditions do not always apply. Knowing who is 
accountable relies upon knowledge of functions and responsibilities. Hood
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(1979) identified a lack of public knowledge about the division of 
responsibilities in areas of service provision^^. In the UK, the growth of 
the different types of agencies described in Chapter 1, has tended to 
exacerbate this situation. Holland and Fallons (1979) concern that ' The 
governed no longer know their governors', could dem onstrate in som e 
circumstances the problem of the identity of the agent. The indefin ite 
nature of lines of responsibility in the case of agencies, is not a recent 
developm ent (see Jennings 1930). This phenom ena has also been 
recognised in the United States (Bernstein, 1955; Reagan, 1987), in Canada 
(Centre for Policy Studies 1982) and Australia (Parliament House 1989). 
Individuals may not be aware of the existence of the agency carrying ou t 
actions on their behalf, and indeed may not be aware of either the 
existence of or the implication of those actions. In a societal fram ew ork, 
one sector of society may appoint an agent on behalf of one other sector of 
society, or even society as a whole. A lthough the identity of the agent is 
clearly stated, it is not universally known.
W ithin the area of accounting regulation, the identity of the agent e.g. in  
the UK formerly the ASC, now the ASB and in the US the F ASB, is clearly 
stated. However knowledge of the division of functional responsibilities 
may not be known. The UK system of accounting regulation relies on two 
sources in addition to accounting standards. Both company law and the 
London Stock Exchange regulations contain requirem ents relating to 
accounting. Many of their pronouncem ent are broadly sim ilar to 
accounting standards (especially in the area of disclosure^®), how ever som e 
disclosure is required by the Companies Act and the Stock Exchange only 
(e.g. analysis of loans), whereas deferred tax disclosure is covered by SSAP 
15 and the Companies Act (1985). Moreover, there are areas w here 
accounting standards clarify legal concepts such as the 'true and fair v iew '
In this work, he challenged readers to match specific tasks against different government 
departments, government agencies and private sector organisations. The results illustrated 
that similiar tasks were carried out by different performers and that any one 
organisational type often carried out diverse functions. Overall, he demonstrated a 
complete lack of symmetry between the service and the provider.
^ Segmental information is required by SSAP 25, the Stock Exchange and the Companies 
Act 1985.
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as well as providing technical instructions which underpin  other concepts 
contained in the law. The problem  of identifying responsibility in service 
provision described by Hood (1979), is illustrated clearly by the presence of 
three 'agents' regulating accounting.
W hat Are Agents Accountable For?
Rose (1985) answers this question in term s of outputs, which in the case of 
private sector organisations are private goods supplied to the m arket at a 
price. There is implicit in such transactions a form of contract betw een the 
supplier and the consumer (usually backed up by a form of legal protection 
for the consumer). In the case of the supply of collective or public goods, 
the absence of price and m arket m echanism s m eans that a lthough  
responsibility can be allocated for the supply of specific goods or services, 
accountability m ust take a different form. Public choice theory in policy 
m atters m eans that different (consumer-based) m echanism s of 
accountability in service provision have replaced political accountability 
(Oliver, 1991). Consumers of some public services such as healthcare m ay 
now  be able to choose their supplier of services in such a way that 
responsibility (achieved partly through the devolution of budgets) has 
shifted from central governm ent to the individual supplier (Mayston,
1993). Because of the exercise of choice by the consumer, it is the supplier 
who is now accountable for the provision or non-provision rather th an  
the governm ent.
W here a contract exists, then the question of what an agent is accountable 
for will norm ally be contained w ithin the terms of that contract, or w here 
not explicit, general duties exist, such as the duty to perform  the 
undertaking and the duty not to m ake a secret profit (Sealy and Hooley,
1994). In the case of governm ent as an agent of the people, no contract 
exists directly, bu t this relationship is covered by theories of governm en t 
based on the notion of a social contract. Such theories cover tw o types; 
firstly the Platonic version of a binding together of m en for self interest, 
and secondly the idea of a contract w ith a ruler as described by Hobbes as 
the subjection of individuals to the Leviathan for the purpose of self- 
preservation. Locke subsequently described legislative and executive 
powers as nothing except the natural pow er of each m an resigned into the 
hands of the community' (Sabine, 1937), the extreme version of w hich was
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espoused by Rousseau in 'The Social Contract', in which he saw the 
relationship of people to the ruler not as one of contract, bu t w here the  
governm ent was the servant of the will of the people. A lthough such 
contract theories have been criticised as being merely descriptive of the  
origins of society, nevertheless these ideas are embedded in  trad itional 
democratic theory in which 'power emanates from the people and is to be 
exercised in trust for the people' (Smith & Hague, 1973, p. 26). 
Sum m arising (and perhaps oversimplifying) the historical perspective of 
governm ent, its role would appear to consist of protecting the ind iv idua l 
and acting in the public interest, and although these objectives are difficult 
to quantify, they would appear to be sufficiently robust to apply to m odern  
democratic states.
W ithin a corporate setting, the traditional purpose of accountability was 
for stewardship purposes, whereby resources entrusted to an agent had to 
be accounted for on a periodic basis (Chatfield, 1977; Oschinsky, 1978; 
Beaver, 1981). From this, developed the audit as a check on the accuracy of 
inform ation and hence on the honesty of the steward. Over time, the  
notion of stewardship and therefore accountability came to be re-defined 
to reflect the more pro-active role of the agent. Porter (1989) uses the  
approxim ate time period of 1930-1960 to describe the extension of 
corporate accountability to the areas of the efficient and effective use of 
resources, although it is difficult to imagine that shareholders prior to 
1930, were not concerned with profit-maximisation^^. The Porter tim e 
period model of accountability^^ adds socially responsible behaviour to the  
post 1960 period. This extension is partly as a result of the growing in terest 
in environmental issues and green accounting (see Gray et al, 1987; Owen, 
1992; Perks, 1993).
In both the corporate and the political contexts, the agent is expected to act 
in the public interest because actions taken will impact upon  society as a 
whole. If accounting regulation (and subsequent enforcement of those
Even though, it was not until the 1929 Companies Act that there was a requirement to 
publish a profit and loss account, indicating an increased demand for this information.
Porter divides into three time periods, stakeholder groups to whom company managers 
are accountable, and also what such managers are responsible for.
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regulations) is im portant to society, then the regulators should be w orking 
in the public interest, a characteristic which contributes to the rationale for 
their existence (Lemak, 1985; Stigler, 1971; Noll, 1971). This aligns the  
responsibility of the regulators w ith  the type of responsibilities w hich 
m ight be found under a social contract. The basis for accounting regulations 
should therefore be not only explicit, bu t also generally acceptable. 
Conceptual framework projects are one way in which a social consensus 
m ay be identified, and this perhaps is the rationale for the resources w hich 
have been expended both in the US and the UK on such projects. W h eth er 
the results of such framework projects are acceptable m ust depend u p o n  
w hether they succeed in reflecting the views of society. Conflicting 
dem ands by users may cause problems both to a fram ework as well as to 
ind iv idual pronouncem ents. The resolution of such conflicts are w ith in  
the realm  of politics, with Carsberg (1977), suggesting that an in terpersonal 
com parison of utilities of user groups of accounting inform ation needs to 
be m ade, w ith the final responsibility for choice resting on Parliam ent or 
the professional accounting bodies subject to the control of Parliament.
To W hom Are A gents Accountable?
It w ould be too simplistic to attem pt to answer this question in term s of 
the principal, w ithout stating the criteria necessary for the identification of 
the principal. W ithin a liberal democratic setting, the governors are 
accountable to the governed. This is achieved through a system of 
responsibilities in the UK; local governm ents to central governm ent, civil 
servants to ministers, m inisters to the assembly and the entire  
governm ent as represented by the cabinet to the electorate. U ltim ately, 
therefore, the principals are citizens w ho are able both to legitimise the 
pow er given to governm ents as well as to rew ard and punish  (th rough  
either re-election or voting out). A problem  arises under social choice 
theory in that there may not exist a well-defined set of social preferences 
w hich can represent the views of the electorate as a whole. Thus the 
electorate cannot be classed as a single, well-defined principal (Mayston, 
1993), b u t w ould appear to be a range of individuals each w ith different 
values and aspirations who nevertheless become the principal of the 
governm ent of the day.
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In the case of business organisations, the traditional view was that the  
directors were accountable only to shareholders and this was effected 
m ainly through the issue of annual accounts^®. This view was effectively 
contained in law, and the latitude given in early UK Companies Acts, 
confirm ed the belief that accounting was a m atter of negotiation betw een 
shareholders and directors (Edey and Panitpakdi, 1956). Thé accounting 
professions' perspective until 1974, w hen accounting R ecom m endation  
N15 from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and W ales 
(ICAEW) was w ithdraw n, stated clearly that the prim ary purpose of 
annual accounts was that of presenting inform ation to the proprietors. 
The 1960's and 1970's saw the growth of the stakeholder view of the firm^^, 
whereby it was accepted that groups other than  shareholders were affected 
by the actions of firms and therefore these firms were expected to be 
accountable to a wider range of groups ( see Perks, 1993; Tower, 1993; 
ASSC, 1975). Conceptual framework projects since the 1970's ( ASB in the  
UK and F ASB in the US for example), have all tended to recognise a 
similar range of user groups. The role of the law w ithin this rela tionship  
has been described as providing the 'rules of the game in which the  
organisation chooses to play, (and) becomes the term s of the social contract 
between society and the organisation' (Gray et al 1988 p 13, brackets added). 
This view has been criticised on the grounds that the law reflects the role 
of the state and the distribution of power in society rather than the view of 
the stakeholders. However, these stakeholders, possibly not sharing a set 
of sim ilar preferences, are unlikely to present a single dem and for 
accountability and m ultiple demands confuse rather than increase the  
accountability of organisations (Stewart 1984)^°.
A uditing provides an example of the som etim es hidden rela tionsh ip  
between agent and  principal. The appointm ent of auditors is confirm ed by
Although certain voting rights and the ability to attend the Annual General Meeting 
were also traditional accountability mechanisms (and perhaps still are).
^ Expressed in an extreme form by Dahl (1972) in that "...every large corporation should be 
thought of as a social enterprise) that is an entity whose existence and decisions can be 
justified insofar as they serve public or social purposes' (p. 17).
In an accounting context for example, demands for environmental information may be 
required by some groups, whereas certain investors may not want this disclosed.
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shareholders at a statutory annual meeting. Furtherm ore, the report of the 
auditors is addressed to the members (shareholders) of the company. Yet 
despite this, the directors are able to act alm ost as principals in the 
shareho lder/aud ito r relationship, in that they have a decisive influence 
on the appointm ent of the auditors and there is also a perception of the 
directors as being the client of the auditors (W hittington, 1993)^\
If accounting regulators are the agents, then  the users of financial 
statements are the principals. As described earlier in this chapter, com pany 
law in the UK originally considered only investors and creditors w orthy of 
protection and therefore regulated accounting w ith  these two groups in  
mind. The stakeholder view of the firm has recognised a num ber of user 
groups and therefore the num ber of principals on whose behalf regulation 
is carried out. Different utilities and value systems of user groups w eaken 
accountability which is maximised w hen there is one clearly defined agent 
and one hom ogeneous group of principals. The stakeholders m oreover, 
tend not to act as principals in that in general they do not all articulate their 
dem ands to their agents. Neither are they a party to any process of 
accountability if they are not aware that actions are being perform ed in  
their name. The lack of involvem ent of groups other than  professional 
accountants is a recurrent theme. The regulators and those providing the 
inputs to the process appear not to be representative of society as a whole.
How Are Agents Accountable?
W ithin a political arena, the principal is held accountable th rough  
elections, although checks and balances introduce in term ediate forms of 
accountability in the adm inistrative m achinery. Sm ith & Hague (1973), 
describe the devices whereby a democratic governm ent m ay be held to 
account as ’External and. internal audit, scrutiny by m ass m edia, 
legislative oversight, party responsibility, the electoral process..' (p. 26). 
The UK system  of governm ent enables m inisterial accountability to take 
place on a continual as well as periodic basis. The level of scrutiny of 
governm ent w ould appear to have increased through the in troduction of 
audit techniques which examine qualitative as well as quantitative
The US model of auditing embraces this situation by the addressing of audit reports to 
both directors and shareholders.
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m atters, and also through the increase in investigative m edia journalism . 
W ith in  the framework of accountability, Stewart (1984) describes a 
spectrum  ranging from accountability by standards to accountability by 
judgem ent^^. Audit techniques could refer to standards in tha t 
perform ance m easurem ent may be compared to prescribed standards and  
m ass m edia and party responsibility could refer to m atters of judgem ent. 
W hereas 'the currency of accountability is inform ation' (Parliam ent 
H ouse, 1989, p. 8)^ ,^ the effectiveness of accountability systems rely u p o n  
freedom  of information (Oliver, 1991). Although the presence of an audit 
is a m eans of increasing accountability by verifying the reliability of 
inform ation, this is dependent to a degree on subjective judgem en t 
w here the verification of physical phenom ena does not take place. In  
addition  to being reliable, information must also be understandable to the  
principal. W here the task of the agent involves complex or technical 
areas, the m ere reporting of actions taken will not necessarily allow the 
principal to judge w hether the agent has acted properly. Perks (1993) 
recognises the necessity of matching information w ith needs;
'If accountability is going to be an emancipating concept th a t 
helps liberate those in society who are less powerful, it is 
im portant that inform ation is made available in accordance 
w ith  their needs w ithout being biased by intermediaries'
(p. 41)
A n additional problem  arising from accountability in the principal agent 
m odel is that unless the principal has power over the agent, accountability 
loses its basis of validity. A system of holding to account is a necessary 
condition (Stewart et al, 1992), bu t not a sufficient condition according to 
Jones (1977);
'Accountability cannot be discharged simply by an  
explanation and publication of actions - for accountability to
Accountability by standards requires comparison with something definite eg is it legal? 
whereas judgement requires a more qualitative approach such as asking if a certain policy 
is correct.
This was recognised in the 19th century by Bentham; 'Central to Bentham's 
understanding of the accountability process was the principle of publicity. This implied 
the rendering of an account to a public realm was integral to the process whereby 
accountability was discharged'. (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1993, p. 321)
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exist there m ust be the facility to evaluate actions and th en  
apportion praise or blame, the extreme version of w hich 
w ould be the ending of the principal agent form w ith its 
existing actors' (p. 14)
The principal therefore m ust have the ability to replace or at least im pose 
some sanction over the agent. From this arises a potential struggle (Perks 
1993 ), whereby both agents and principals try to control the accountability 
process, thereby increasing or decreasing their relative power.
W ithin firms, the traditional m ethod of accountability has been contained 
w ithin  company law. The availability of inform ation is essential to the 
m onitoring process which m ust take place w ithin the agent principal 
relationship .
'In general, the principal requires that the agent act tow ards a 
particular end and that these actions are rendered visible by some 
form of account(ing)' (Power, 1991 p. 32).
W atts and Z im m erm an (1986), give examples (p 196) of types of contracts 
using accounting num bers and note that actions are often restricted by 
reference to these num bers. Orm rod and Cleaver (1993) relate the 
inform ation content of company armual reports to certain types of 
contracts w ith in  the firm, quoting articles of association, loan contracts, 
listing requirem ents and director's rem uneration contracts as examples.
Keasey & W right (1993) in the context of the debate on corporate 
governance state;
'Accountability, which is a sub-set of governance, involves the 
m onitoring, evaluation and control of organisational agents to 
ensure they behave in the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders.' (p. 291)
At the heart of this process is accounting, described by Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) as institutionalising 'the right of some people to ho ld  
others to account for their actions' (p. 445). The production of financial 
inform ation is a key element in the success of an effective corporate 
governance system (W hittington, 1993). There is how ever in this 
connection the problem  of inform ation asym m etry discussed by M ayston 
(1993) w ho considers that imperfect inform ation could impinge u p o n
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accountability, because those with more inform ation may have an 
incentive to use this resource to shift risk to less informed participants^^. 
Certain of the concerns in the debate on corporate governance relate to 
creative accounting and business failure. The role of the auditor is clearly 
related closely to these areas^^.
Information would appear to be the way in which accountability is enacted 
and verified. Inform ation however m ay have a num ber of different 
dimensions. Stewart (1984) considers that each type of accountability has a 
different inform ation requirement. The Cadbury report on corporate 
governance appeared to recognise this in its recom m endations that 
strengthening accounting and audit procedures alone, would not solve 
current problem s relating to the m anagem ent of company.
Insofar as accounting regulation, is concerned, the two key principles of 
accountability described by Rose (1976) as elections and markets do no t 
exist. W ithin the setting of a democratic governm ent, accountability exists 
in this form, whereby governm ents have to present them selves 
periodically to their principals for re-election. Similarly in the UK, 
directors of companies have to be re-elected periodically at A nnua l
See also Bromwich,1992 and Brealey & Myers,1988.
The auditor's role in verifying data may not be independent because of possible influences 
on impartiality (Perks, 1993; Whittington, 1993; Sikka et al, 1992). Not only may the 
auditor be biassed, but may also be partly responsible for limiting accountability because 
the UK auditors' role is legally rather than economically defined (O'Sullivan 1993). This 
is evidenced by various legal judgements eg Chandler v Crane Christmas (1951) in which 
the Court of Appeal decided that there could be no liability in the absence of a contractual 
relationship. Although this was reversed by subsequent legal judgements, nevertheless, the 
opinion that accounts are prepared for stewardship purposes rather than investment 
purposes (Caparo Judgement 1990), effectively defined the identity of the principal, 
limiting any liability by the auditor to existing shareholders. Concerns about the 
'expectations gap' , originally investigated by the Cohen Commission in the US in 1974 , 
still exist and serve to undermine belief in an extremely important element of 
accountability.
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General Meetings which all shareholders have the right to attend. The fact 
that directors are rarely rem oved from office is probably m ore a function  
of shareholder ignorance arising from inform ation asym m etries or 
shareholder inertia rather than a favourable comm ent on the actions of all 
directors. Accounting regulators have in the past been appointed (in the 
case of the ASC, ASB and F ASB) for a fixed period of time. It is not the 
standard setting body which has to present itself generally for re-election, 
bu t the individual m em bers w ho seek re-appointm ent. In theory, the 
CCAB could have disbanded the ASC and there exist pow ers for the  
governm ent to remove from office any directors of the FRC^^ and appoin t 
others, thus replacing the entire ASB. This rather extreme action displays 
few of the characteristics of elections^^, and would suggest som ew hat overt 
political interference. There exists no m arket for accounting regulation  
and therefore m arket forms of accountability are not applicable.
The question m ust arise of w hether there exists inform ation w hich  
w ould enable any sanctions to be taken against the regulators. In fo rm ation  
does exist regarding the actions of regulators. Firstly the ir 
pronouncem ents, together w ith articles in the press and professional 
journals describe their actions. In addition, it has become com m on for 
regulatory bodies in general to produce an A nnual Review or Report, 
which sum m arises their activities over the course of a year. There w ould  
appear to have been little in the way of a regular or formal independen t 
evaluation of the w ork of accounting standard setters. The only exam ple 
found by the writer is a comprehensive study of F ASB (Louis H arris, 1985), 
based on questionnaires to user groups, bu t this was carried ou t in 1985, 
and no similar exercise has been carried out since.
The power is held jointly by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the 
Governor of the Bank of England in S 23(b)(ii) of the Memorandum and Articles of 
Association. The Appointments Committee of the ASB consists of the directors of the FRC 
plus three other members (who they appoint).
The question of who forms the electorate is crucial to this issue. Normally, those who are 
entitled to vote are those affected by the decisions of those for whom they vote.
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SUMMARY
It w ould appear that UK private sector accounting regulation appears to 
escape the degree of accountability that would be forthcoming if the activity 
were carried out by governm ent. This is not a criticism aim ed only at 
accounting regulators as they are but one example of pow er exercised 
outside of government. Avoidance of the traditional constitutional form of 
accountability has led to the new forms described in this Chapter. A lthough  
judicial accountability is always present, the law in the UK has effectively 
delegated powers to regulators, allowing the 'true and fair override' to 
reconcile some differences whilst enabling detailed practices to be specified 
w ithin a general legal framework. The interview  with W atts (1978) quoted 
in C hapter 1 dem onstrated that the ASC considered them selves as m aking  
a kind of law. Quasi-judicial accountability can only occur w here regulators 
are w orking under a form of delegated authority arising under legal 
guidelines. Procedural accountability requires some form of explicit system  
of internal organisation and processes, and in the absence of these it is 
difficult to see how this could take place. Consultative accountability again 
looks at processes, bu t lack of participation by some stakeholder groups 
may lead the consultation process to be little m ore than either a w indow - 
dressing exercise or the im position of the view of a pow erful in terest 
group. Economic accountability requires either a corporate body w hose 
objectives can be m easured in terms of profit-m axim isation or ano ther 
body w ith clear objectives who are subject to a more qualitative VFM type 
of audit. The ASC as an unincorporated committee escaped any form  of 
audit, w hereas the ASB as a registered company has a commercial type of 
audit, m ore suitable to an organisation operating under commercial (profit- 
maximising) objectives. Insofar as professional accountability is concerned, 
this m ay perhaps be term ed a 'conflicting concept', in that the process of 
accounting regulation is dom inated by mem bers of a single profession. 
Only if the m em bers of the accounting profession share the sam e n o rm s 
and values as the rest of society, will professional accountability bring about 
social accountability.
Using a principal agent perspective, identification of both the agent and the  
principal w ould seem straightforward, how ever m utual recognition m ay 
not exist. There may well be a lack of knowledge of the existence and the 
functions of the agent by certain of those stakeholder groups com prising 
the principal. Awareness of the needs of the principal even if
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acknowledged in regulatory pronouncements by the agents, m ay have been 
assum ed rather than received by way of instruction. The type of m andate  
given to other regulators especially in example of the utilities, specifically 
talk of the interest and protection of consumers. This could be reconciled 
w ith the original m ention of 'public interest' in the ASC constitu tion; 
how ever this term has now been replaced by the term  'best practice'. 
Traditionally in the UK prior to the quasi-legal backing to standards, little 
pow er appears to have been exercised over the agent except that the 
regulators had to practice a high degree of consensus-seeking^^ in order to 
secure acceptance of standards. This consensus was partial, in that it was 
achieved among preparers rather than users. Additionally, there w ould 
appear to be no systematic way in which inform ation for accountability 
purposes is passed to the principals where these are defined as stakeholders. 
Routine reports of the activities of the regulators are published by both ASB 
and F ASB, although there would not appear to be (in the UK at least), any 
formal methods of evaluating this information and acting upon it.
A lthough both political and corporate organisations have appropriate 
channels for the com m unication of inform ation to stakeholders, m any  
agencies do not supply useful inform ation for the purpose of perform ance 
analysis. Additionally, the use of an unsuitable form  of audit as described 
earlier in this Chapter does little to overcome this deficiency. Such 
inform ation as is produced may be difficult to understand , thus breaching 
another necessary condition for accountability to exist.
Detailed in the following Chapter
1.1R
CHAPTER 7
AGENCY OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
An exam ination of the operations of an agency should include both the 
in ternal m ethod of reaching decisions and the external influences on the 
process (although these two areas m ay be interconnected). In the case of 
accounting regulation, the external influences arise m ainly from the 
producers and users of accounting inform ation. The approach taken in  
this chapter is to enlarge upon  the developm ent of the two standards 
analysed in earlier chapters by studying the changes that occurred betw een 
the issue of ED 27 and SSAP 20 (Foreign Currency Translation) and 
betw een ED 30 and SSAP 22 (Accounting for Goodwill).
The analysis of ED 27 concentrates on the following four areas of the draft:
o W hether tem poral or closing rate should be the translation
m ethod used.
o W hether the profits of subsidiaries should be translated using
the closing or an  average rate.
o W hether the offset of borrowings against the net investm ent
should be restricted to those borrowings denom inated in the 
same currency as the foreign equity investment.
o W hether long-term  loans and inter-com pany balances
between a holding company and its subsidiary could be 
treated as an equity investm ent by the holding company.
The analysis of ED 30 concentrates on the following areas:
o W hether purchased goodwill should be written-off
imm ediately or capitalised w ith subsequent amortisation.
o The period over w hich capitalised goodwill could be
am ortised.
o W hether non-purchased goodwill could be included in the
accounts.
139
In both of these Exposure Drafts and Standards, only the areas applicable to 
consolidated financial statements will be examined rather than  those 
relating to the individual company treatm ent. The m ajority of 
respondents to both Exposure Drafts by way of comm ent letters tended to 
be large companies or those firms of accountants involved w ith large 
companies, who generally operated through a group structure. U nder s 230 
of the Companies Act (1985), there exists an exem ption available from the 
publication of the holding company profit and loss account and th is 
exem ption was generally utilised by companies at that time, w hich m ean t 
that the individual company treatm ent tended not to be relevant to them^. 
The analysis of profit and loss accounts and balance sheets are norm ally  
focused on the group rather than  the holding company, and therefore it 
w ould appear that the consolidation treatm ent of both foreign exchange 
and goodwill is more im portant than the individual (holding company) 
trea tm en t.
A further reason for lim iting the areas of the analysis is that an  
exam ination of the effects of external pressures, as dem onstrated by the  
com m ent letters may be more reliable by eliminating both am biguities and 
subjective interpretations that m ay be present where m ore complex or 
inter-related issues are analysed. Beaver (1981) talks of the practical 
problem  of the determ ination of preferences. For example, a classification 
or categorisation of comments relating to disclosure m ust by its na tu re  
often contain these inherent flaws. Analysis of Exposure Drafts or 
Standards through a physical count of the num ber of times a w ord  appears 
(Hudack & McAllister, 1994), or the m ulti-facetted type of analysis carried 
out by Tomkins (1983), would appear to be susceptible to subjective 
in terpretation and may ignore a situation where a respondent is 
a ttem pting to trade-off one aspect of a proposal against another^. Indeed, 
W atts & Z im m erm an (1979) consider that the reasons for supporting or 
opposing a particular regulation m ay not reveal the honest m otive of the  
ind iv idua l.
 ^ In the case of the goodwill standard, it was goodwill on consolidation which was referred 
to in most reply letters, as few large companies tend to take over unicorporated enterprises.
2 Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) consider that lobbying preferences are not unambiguously 
revealed, in that lobbyists may support parts of a proposal and oppose other parts.
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The areas selected for analysis in this chapter represent separate and 
identifiable accounting policy choices. For example, the preferred choice of 
m ethod of translatioii of foreign currency was clearly expressed in  
com m ent letters and could therefore be compared w ith both the Exposure 
Draft and the Standard. By concentrating on fundam ental issues, the 
'honest m otives' are revealed as, for example it would be unlikely that a 
com pany who wished to write-off goodwill imm ediately would advocate 
the opposite treatm ent (capitalisation) as a trade-off against ano ther 
proposal in the Exposure Draft.
THE REGULATORY PROCESS
In 1982, the ASC produced a paper entitled The Standard Setting Process 
(ASC 9 /50), breaking down the stages in the development of an accounting 
standard. The first of these was the initial research^ followed by a drafting 
sub-committee with three or more members nom inated by the ASC^. The 
initial draft was then reviewed by the ASC and sent to the Technical 
Com mittees of the CCAB members, following which, the draft could be 
am ended. Consultations were then held w ith interested parties i.e. 
financial directors and senior officials of companies whose financial 
statem ents would be affected significantly by the proposals. A dditionally 
consultations were held with the Companies Division of the D epartm ent 
of Trade. A lthough the document does not m ention any fu rther 
am endm ents before the publication for general comments, it m ight be 
reasonable to assume that these would be incorporated. It is claimed that 
more than 100,000 copies of exposure drafts were published for com m ent, 
but this appears to contradict the figures quoted in Chapter 3. Each 
m em ber-of the ASC received a copy of all com m ent letters and 'th e  
w orking party responsible for the particular subject will review in detail 
these com m ents' (letter dated 14.11.81 from K O Robinson, secretary of 
ASC {ASC 2/35/1}). The secretariat of the ASC prepared a sum m ary of the 
comm ents received for the use of Committee and sub-com m ittee
3 In the case of goodwill, there were studies from Arthur Andersen, Touche Ross and B A 
Rutherford of University of Kent.
 ^ It is interesting to note that the words 'working party' were not used in this document, 
even though it must be their activities which are being described.
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m em bers only. Finally, following any further am endm ents, the proposed 
standard was sent to the CCAB mem ber bodies w hose Councils if in  
agreem ent approved the standard for issue to its own members.^
There appears to be little evidence of the way in which the ASC dealt w ith  
the comment letters other than by the process outlined above. In a letter to 
a firm of accountants, K O Robinson, ASC secretary, states that;
'We have no system of weighting comments, nor do I think we 
should have one as (a) it w ould be extremely controversial and (b) it 
w ould perhaps cause us to overlook some good points raised by 
small groups or individuals.' (letter to Donald H eady & Co dated
20.1.1983, ASC 2 /49 /2 )
In the same letter, Robinson also admits that it seems 'anom alous that a 
small group gets, on the face of i t , the same rating as, say the w hole of the 
TAC.' (Technical Advisory Committee). An in terpretation  of these 
com m ents could be that the ASC assigned the same w eighting to all 
com m ent letters and therefore used some sim ple tally of preferences or 
objections.
STUDY 1 - SSAP 20 
Introduction
SSAP 20, Foreign Currency Translation was issued in April 1983. This 
followed the production of three Exposure Drafts by the ASC. The first of 
these in September 1975 was ED 16 'Supplem ent to Extraordinary Item s 
and Prior Year Adjustments', which covered realisations and revaluations 
of fixed assets as well as foreign currency translations. This section of the 
draft was brief, dealing only w ith simple translation and conversion  
m atters in some three paragraphs, and not differentiating betw een 
indiv idual companies and groups. During the exposure period, m any of 
those respondents addressing this part of the draft, pointed out that the 
subject was so im portant that it w arranted its ow n standard.
 ^It was usual for each council to approve a standard subject to it being approved by the 
other five Councils
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The perceived importance of a separate standard and the fact that little 
guidance had been given in respect of foreign exchange^, led the ASC to 
issue ED 21 (Accounting for Foreign Currency Transactions) which was 
published in September 1977. A lthough this lim ited the options available 
to the use of either the closing rate or tem poral method, it gave n o  
indication as to when either m ethod could be used^. Apart from this open 
choice, one of the main criticisms of the standard was that there was 'a  
lack of clarity in the distinction between the treatm ent of exchange 
differences in individual companies, and those arising on consolidation ' 
(Davies et al, 1994 p395). This deficiency was rem edied by the next 
exposure draft on the subject (ED 27, October 1980), which clearly 
sectionalised both the individual company stage and the consolidated 
financial statement stage. This distinction was carried through to the final 
standard SSAP 20 (Foreign Currency Translation), issued in April 1983.
The Draft A nd Standard Compared
A lthough changes did occur between the first two exposure drafts, these 
have not been included in the study as ED 16 had little substance relating 
to foreign exchange, and the lack of distinction between ind iv idual 
companies and groups in ED 21, does not constitute a sound basis for an  
analysis of the changes brought about following the exposure period and 
the possible role of the comment letters in this process.
The treatm ent of the four areas examined in this chapter in both the 
Exposure Draft and the Standard were as follows:
 ^ The Economist had already described exchange fluctuations as being the most important 
distorting influence in company accounts and had had criticised the accountmg profession 
for failing to provide a solution some five years after the decision to float sterling (reported 
in Accountancy, Nov 1977).
 ^ Additionally, it allowed profit to be translated at either the average or closing rate, and 
permitted the offset of deficits in foreign currency net borrowmg in the reserves against 
movements on fixed assets.
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Table 7.1 Comparison of ED 27 and SSAP 20.
AREA ED 27 SSAP 20
M ethod of Closing rate should norm ally Closing rate should
T ransla tion  be used (s 51), unless trade of norm ally be used
subsidiary is a direct extension (s 52). In circumstances
then tem poral m ethod should where the trade is more
be used (s 54). dependent on the economic
environm ent of the 
investing com pany's 
currency that that of its own
reporting currency, the
tem poral m ethod should be 
used (s 55)
T ransla tion  The profit and loss account The profit and loss account
of Profits of a foreign subsidiary should of a foreign enterprise
be translated at an average accounted for under the
rate for the period (s 53) closing ra te /n e t investm ent
m ethod should be translated 
at the closing rate or at an
average rate for the period
(s54)
Offset of W here the proceeds of foreign W here foreign currency
Borrow ings loans raised by a holding borrowings have been used
company have been used to to finance, or provide a
finance equity investments... hedge against group equity
differences may be offset.... investm ent in foreign
provided th a t .... foreign enterprises, exchange gains
equity investm ents (are) or losses on the borrowings
in the same currency.  m ay be offset as reserve
(s 57) brackets added. m ovem ents against
exchange differences arising
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on retranslation of net 
investm ent...(s 57)
Long Term Long term  loans and W here financing...is
Loans other inter-company intended to be.... as
balances between a holding perm anent as equity,
company and a subsidiary such loans and inter- 
.... which are in substance company balances
equity investm ents should should be treated as
be treated by the holding part of the investing
company as equity invest- com pany's net
m ents (s 58) investment... (s 20)
Comment Letters
There were a total of 107 comm ent letters received by the ASC and these 
have been analysed according to the categories used by the CCAB bodies at 
that time.
Table 7.2 Categorisation of comment letters received on ED 27.
C om panies 46
Professional Accounting Firms 20
Representative Bodies of Accountants 12 
O ther representative Bodies 13
Others 16
The representative bodies of accountants include one subm ission from the 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) of the ICAEW w hich had received 
21 submissions from District TAC's. The individual district subm issions 
were not available. 'O thers' consisted of fifteen individuals and one firm  
of consultants. Many of the respondents only com m ented on part of the  
draft, giving a low response rate to each of the four sections. The
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preferences expressed by respondents in each of the four areas exam ined 
w as as follows:
Table 7.3 Translation method preferences expressed in comment letters.
R espondent Closing Closing Rate Closing Rate w ith  Choice of
G roup Rate Only Limited T em poral M ethod
C om panies 
Accountants 
Rep Bodies 
O ther Rep 
Others 
Total
10
5
0
2
3
20 15
C olum n 1 represents the num ber of replies w hich stated that they 
considered the closing rate to be the most suitable m ethod of translation , 
whereas column 2 represents the views of those w ho considered that only 
the closing rate should be used on consolidation. The m ethod outlined in  
column three is that proposed by the Exposure Draft.
Table 7.4 Profit translation method preferences expressed in comment letters 
R espondent
Closing Rate 
20 
1 
1 
1
2_______
Group
C om panies
A ccountants
Rep Bodies
O ther Rep
Others
Total
Average Rate 
10 
7 
2 
1 
3
Either
10
2
6
4
 0
25 23 22
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Table 7.5 Offset preferences expressed in comment letters.
R espondent
G roup Offset in any currency Limited Offset
C om panies 23 4
A ccountants 4 4
Rep Bodies 5 0
Other Rep 6 0
O thers 1_____________________________ 0
Total 39____________________________ 8
Limited offset includes those who felt that the lim itation should apply to 
closely related currencies and not sim ply the sam e currency.
Table 7.6 Preferences for treatment of inter-company loans expressed in comment letters.
R espondent
G roup Treat as Equitv Do not Treat as Equitv
C om panies 4 0
A ccountants 5 0
Rep Bodies 1 0
Other Rep 1 0
Others 1 0
Total 12 0
Analysis of Results
There were broadly no changes betw een the draft and the standard  in  
respect of the m ethod to be used. The standard contained a little m ore  
detail of w hen the tem poral m ethod could be used. This was in line w ith  
certain com m ent letters e.g. Rank Organisation (20.2.81) who requested 
additional guidance and Touche Ross (2.3.81) w ho felt that the guidance 
given was not sufficiently specific and suggested alternatives. Those 
advocates of the exclusive use of the closing rate consisted of five 
companies, three firms of accountants and one representative body. T here
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were no supporters of the exclusive use of the tem poral m ethod. If it is 
assum ed that companies adopt a producer rather than a user o rien ta tion  
tow ards their view of best practice and that firms of accountants are n o t 
keen to have unpopular standards imposed upon their clients, then the  
preferences of these groups could have been satisfied by the  
pronouncem ent of the final standard. Those respondents expressing a 
preference for the closing rate could be satisfied by the standard as w ould  
those advocates of closing rate w ith limited use of temporal. Those w ho 
supported the exclusive use of the closing rate w ould also be satisfied by 
the outcom e, as they could always use that m ethod. The use of the  
tem poral m ethod for any subsidiaries was a m atter of subjective op in ion  
as to the relationship between the holding company and its subsidiaries 
and therefore either m ethod w ould probably have been available to th em  
on this basis. Insofar as those companies w ho wanted either w ere 
concerned, they, (Beecham, Coats Patons and Esso) all used the closing rate 
and so their needs were already met.
The treatm ent of the translation of the profit and loss account changed 
between the Draft and the Standard, from the use of the average rate only 
to a choice betw een the average and the closing rate. The analysis of the  
three possible options show that the respondents were alm ost equally 
divided betw een the three choices. Among companies, the m ajority stated 
a preference for the closing rate, and this indicated that this was general 
practice®. Again taking a producer view of the policy choices, the final 
standard satisfied all preferences through allowing either treatm ent. Those 
respondents favouring the average m ethod were concerned that either a 
simple average should not be used (Allied Breweries for exam ple 
suggesting a 4 weekly average) or that the standard should p rovide 
guidance on the m ethod of calculation (Peat Marwick, Deloitte H askins 
and Sells). Once again, the Standard steered a course betw een these 
preferences by stating T he average rate should be calculated by the  
m ethod considered m ost appropriate for the circumstances of the foreign 
enterprise.' (s 54) Surprisingly however, there was no m ention in the  
Standard of the disclosure of the averaging m ethod used.
® Beecham in their comment letter of 26.2.81, quoted the fact that 27 out of the top 30 companies used this 
method.
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The offset of borrowings was another area in which the draft changed 
significantly, but still m anaged to satisfy preferences. U nder the standard, 
the offset was no longer lim ited to foreign loans raised in the sam e 
currency as the foreign investm ent. This was the preference of som e 39 
respondents; the remaining looking for som e form of lim itation to the set 
off but not necessarily the same rigours of the procedures outlined in the  
draft. The only supporters of this lim itation were companies and firms of 
accountants. From a producer view point even those in the m inority could 
achieve their preferences as the set off was voluntary (s 57). Thus they 
could limit the offset of loans to the restricted situations w here loans w ere 
in the same currency as the investm ents and therefore continue using  
their chosen policies.
The proposed treatm ent of long term  loans and other in ter-com pany 
balances as equity, was only com m ented on by twelve respondents. Of 
these, all felt that such items should be treated as equity reflecting perhaps 
the doctrine of substance over form which would allow such treatm ent of 
long term items in this way.
Contem porary Practice
Contemporary practice would appear to concur w ith the replies to the  
exposure draft. Surveys of published accounts during the 1970's tended to 
reflect only the then current issues in foreign exchange translation and 
therefore only data relating to the m ethod of translation is available.
Table 7.7 Methods of translation used 1970/71 and 1978/79.
1978/79 1970/71
N os % N os %
Closing Rates 245 95 205 90
Tem poral 14 5 24 10
259 100 229 100
Source - Survey of Published Accounts 1980, ICAEW.
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A lthough the second m ethod is classified as tem poral, it covered the 
m ethod known as current/non-current, which has similar features to 
tem poral. Over the period of the survey, there appears to have been a 
m ovem ent towards the use of closing rates by companies, which is 
reflected in the expressed preferences.
International Practice
The International Accounting Standards Committee had produced a 
statem ent E 11 in 1977 which allowed the use of either the tem poral or the 
closing rate m ethod, this elem ent of choice being a feature of m any early 
international standards. In the US, the original au thorita tive  
pronouncem ent by the AICPA had advocated the use of the tem poral 
m ethod, which was endorsed by SEAS 8 (Accounting for the T ranslation 
of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial 
Statements) in 1975. Criticisms of the effects of this standard (see Chapter 
1) led to its replacement m 1981 by SFAS 52 (Foreign Currency Translation) 
w hich advocated the use of the closing rate for the balance sheet and the 
average rate for the profit and loss account.
Contem porary O pinions
The technical press tended to be critical of the fact that a choice of m ethods 
had been allowed by the previous Draft (ED21), and did not appear to be 
over-concerned w ith the questions of the translation of the profit and loss 
account, the offset of borrowings or the treatm ent of loans as equity 
investments. The Economist had originally been particularly critical about 
the lack of a single solution^, but the majority of other commentators were 
concerned that the solution should be harm onised w ith  the US standard 
FAS 52 which perm itted only the closing rate.
 ^ The title used in the Economist article of 1st October 1977 was "Rudderless in a floating 
world".
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STU D Y 2-SSA P22
Introduction
In October 1982, the Accounting Standards Committee produced Exposure 
Draft 30 'Accounting for Goodwill' Following the period allowed for 
comments to be m ade up to the 31st March 1983, the subsequent Standard 
(Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 22, Accounting for Goodwill), 
was issued in December 1984 as the first UK accounting standard on  
goodwill.
Table 7.8 Comparison of ED 20 and SSAF 22.
AREA ED 30
Consistency 'Purchased goodwill should be 
eliminated from the accounts by 
selecting one of the two following 
policies and following the selected 
policy for the goodwill arising on 
all acquisitions (para 56).
T reatm ent (a) 'amortising through the profit 
and loss account in arriving at 
profit or loss on ordinary activities 
on a systematic basis over its 
estim ated useful economic life
or
SSAP22
'N othing in this 
standard precludes a 
com pany from using 
both  the im m ediate 
write-off treatm ent 
and the am ortisation 
treatm ent in respect of 
goodwill which relates 
to different 
acquisitions' (para 35). 
'Purchased goodwill 
(other than negative 
goodwill) should nor­
mally be elim inated 
from the accounts 
im m ediately on acqu­
isition against 
reserves' (para 32).
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(b) w riting off immediately on 
acquisition directly against reserves
representing realised profits'
(para 56).
Period of 'The estim ated useful economic
A m ortis- life should not exceed 20 years'
a tion  (para 57(f)).
Purchased goodwill 
(other than negative
goodwill) may be
elim inated from the 
accounts by amort­
isation through the 
profit and loss 
account' (para 34).
(Italics added)
No upper limit 
specified.
N on- 'No am ount shall be attributed to non-purchased goodwill
Purchased in the balance sheets of companies or groups'.
Goodwill (para 53) (para 35)
Com m ent Letters
There were a total of 96 comm ent letters received by the ASC in reply to 
ED 30. This represents a lower level of response than that of ED 27, despite 
the fact that in this total the District Societies were counted individually , 
whereas in ED 27 they were included as a single reply. These have been 
analysed again according to the classifications used by CCAB m em bers 
(which varies slightly from that used for ED 27) as follows:
Table 7.9 Categorisation of comment letters received on ED 30.
Com panies 25
Professional Accounting Firms 24
Representative Bodies of Accountants 28 
O ther Representative Bodies 9
Ind iv iduals 7
M iscellaneous 3
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This final category included letters from the D epartm ent of Trade and  
Industry, the London Stock Exchange and the Greater London Council.
The following tables of replies show the expressed preferences in respect of 
the three areas under consideration. The num ber of respondents does n o t 
equal the totals under each of the three categories as some respondents did 
not com m ent on all items, w ith some com m enting only on an aspect of 
the draft e.g. disclosure, not covered by this study.
Table 7.10 Preferences expressed in comment letters for accounting treatment of g
R espondent Im m ediate A m ortise E ither Retain
Group write-off
Com panies 7 4 7 4
Accountants 4 6 8 2
Rep Bodies 6 2 14 0
Other Rep Bodies 1 0 4 0
Indiv iduals 4 1 1 0
M iscellaneous 0 0 1 0
Total 22 13 35 6
Table 7.11 Preferences expressed in comment letters for period for amortisation (years).
Respondent N o 40 20-40 >20 20 <20 10-20 10 5-10 5 3
Group Lim it
Com panies 0 8 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 0
A ccountants 2 2 0 2 3 1 0 2 2 4 0
Rep Bodies 1 0 1 0 7 0 1 1 4 5 0
Other Rep 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indiv iduals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
M iscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Total 3 10 1 2 16 3 1 3 7 11 1
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In addition to these preferences. Director's Opinion was selected by one 
company, one firm of accountants, one representative body and two other 
representative bodies. One firm of accountants (Touche Ross) suggested a 
m ethod whereby goodwill was w ritten off w ith the tangible assets 
acquired.
Table 7.12 Preferences expressed in comment letters for treatment of non-purchased 
goodwill.
R espondent N ot Included Included
G roup
C om panies 5 0
A ccountants 3 1
Rep Bodies 7 0
Other Rep 2 0
Ind iv iduals 0 0
M iscellaneous 0______________________ 0
Total _ n .______________________ 1
Analysis O f Results
The majority of all groups supported a choice of the accounting trea tm en t 
of goodwill. Of those expressing preference for a single m ethod, the  
m ajority favoured the im m ediate write-off. The overall results of th is 
section w ould appear to hide certain theoretical preferences beh ind  
solutions to practical problems. Several of those supporting a choice of 
m ethod for different acquisitions (which was not m entioned in the 
Exposure Draft), did so because of the problem  of large-scale writing-off of 
goodwill where the reserves were not sufficient or shareholders funds 
w ould be greatly reduced by such an action. There w as how ever an  
undercurrent of theoretical support for the im m ediate write-off, w hich  
followed current practice.
There was a wide divergence of opinion on the m axim um  period for 
am ortisation of capitalised goodwill. The highest num ber of expressed
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preferences was for twenty years, followed by five years and then forty 
years. These figures correspond respectively with the period suggested by 
the Exposure Draft, the period included in the EEC 4th Directive (although 
the UK had exercised its member state option in respect of this), and the  
norm al m axim um  write-off period of intangibles in the USA. Five 
respondents favoured the more subjective approach of the econom ic 
useful life of the Companies Act, termed Director's Opinion.
Insofar as the capitalisation of non-purchased goodwill was concerned, the  
majority of respondents (17 out of 18), agreed that this was not a desirable 
practice. Effectively, the support for this was even stronger in that those 
favouring the imm ediate write-off of purchased goodwill are hardly likely 
to support the capitalisation of non-purchased goodwill.
A com parison of the requirem ents of respondents w ith the treatm ents 
allowed by the standard shows that the majority of these w ould be 
perm itted to use their preferred practices under the standard. Out of 22 
companies com m enting on the accounting treatm ent of goodwill, only 
four expressed preferences outside of the permissible treatm ents. Two of 
these companies (both in the newsagent's business) ultim ately w on a 
special provision in the standard (para 15) effectively exem pting th em  
from applying the Standard^o. Of the rem aining two, their preferred 
treatm ent w as to amortise through reserves rather than through the profit 
and loss account, there being no immediate effect on shareholders funds 
by this action, (also escaping a charge to the current or future profit and  
loss accounts). Out of the twenty firms of accountants replying to th is 
aspect of the Draft, all of their preferences could be fully satisfied w ith  the  
exception of tw o small firms, one of whom  believed that goodwill shou ld  
always be carried at cost, and the other being against any standard at all o n  
goodwill. In the case of Representative Bodies of Accountants (22), O ther 
Representative Bodies (5), Other (1) and Individuals (6), all requ irem ents 
could be met by the standard.
The argument from NSS Newsagents was that goodwill was in fact included within 
'Retail Outlets’ and that from BPM Holdings that the goodwill element was capable of 
valuation and indeed could be sold separately from the business as a whole.
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Insofar as the period for amortisation was concerned, by using the estimate 
of economic useful life in the Standard, all preferences could again be 
satisfied in that the preparer could use any period w hich he felt w ould 
represent such life. There was one innovative approach to this from  
Touche Ross linking goodwill write-off periods to tangible fixed assets 
acquired, but this could still be accommodated under the terms of the 
Standard. From the eighteen comments received on the inclusion of non- 
purchased goodwill, only one small firm of accountants felt that this 
should be included, the rem ainder strongly believing that only purchased 
goodwill should be included in the accounts.
From 152 expressed preferences therefore, 147 could be satisfied under the 
terms of the goodwill Standard.
Contem porary Practice
A survey of the accounts of three hundred  UK companies again illustrates 
that the replies to Exposure Drafts tended to follow practice at that time.
Table 7.13 The accounting treatment of goodwill 1968/69,1975/76 and 1982/83.
1968/69 1975/76 1982/83
N os % N os % N os %
Goodwill w ritten off
on acquisition 84 40 135 56 192 84
Goodwill Capitalised
and Am ortised 124 60 95 44 36 16
208 100_________ 220 100_________ 228 100
Adapted from 1) Survey of Published Accounts 1976, ICAEW. and 
2) Financial Reporting 1992/93, ICAEW.
In adjusting the above table, goodwill show n as deducted from reserves 
(the 'dangling debit' method, now outlawed) has been included w ith  
goodwill w ritten off on acquisition as the effect on shareholder's funds is 
the same. Insofar as the period for am ortisation is concerned, earlier 
surveys did not cover this area. In 1982/83, of those com panies regularly
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am ortising goodwill, the maximum periods disclosed were as follows; 1 
company: 8 years, 1:10 years, 3: 20 years, 1: 30 years and 3:40 years.
International Practice
The international standard on goodwill, IAS 22, allowed the same options 
as ED 30. Nobes (1992a) describes how the lASC m oved from a position of 
favouring capitalisation and subsequent amortisation, to allowing a choice 
of two treatments. In the U S at the time of the issue of both the Exposure 
Draft and the Standard in the UK, the prom ulgated GAAP for the U nited 
States were the opinions issued by the APB (Accounting Practices Board). 
The status of these opinions was such that they should continue to be the 
authoritative pronouncem ents except to the extent that they m ight be 
altered by Statements of Financial Accounting Standards or Concepts. The 
relevant APB Opinions were as follows:
Opinion 16 (August 1970) Business Combinations - refers the question of 
goodwill to APB Opinion 17
Opinion 17 (August 1970) Accounting for Intangibles - Intangibles to be 
written off against income over estimated useful economic life w ith a 
m axim um  of 40 years. Intangibles must not be w ritten off to capital 
reserves or retained earnings.
The resurgence of interest in goodwill by the ASC is attributed by Elliot & 
Elliot (1996) to the EC^ ,^ especially the requirem ent under the F ourth  
Directive for movement towards the standardisation of armual accounts.
Contemporary Opinion
Press reports at the time of the Exposure Draft all appeared to recognise the 
difficulties of accounting for goodwill, w ithout either suggesting 
alternatives or favouring one treatment over another. The Investor's 
Chronicle (1982) talked of 'two unpalatable options', quoting the effect o n  
acquisitions on profits and reserves of Mercantile House and Stenhouse. 
Carty (1984), described how lenders discounted capitalised goodwill in  
their decision-making and also outlined the problem of the calculation of
Even though as already noted, the UK had exercised its' member-state option in respect 
of this.
157
return on capital employed following take-overs. The A ccountant's 
Magazine (1982) sum m arised the Draft w ithout offering an op in ion , 
merely telling its' readers to reply direct to the ASC. The Leader in  
Accountancy (1982) took a progressive view insofar as non-purchased 
goodwill was concerned, suggesting that, if it were possible to v a lu e  
internally-generated goodwill, then the choices under the Draft w ould n o t 
be necessary. Previously, the same article had recognised the lack of 
authority within the Draft by describing it as continuing the dialogue 'in  a 
way more commonly found in a discussion docum ent' p 1.
METHOD OF OPERATIONS
Both of the standards examined in this chapter illustrate one approach to 
standard setting. That approach appeared to be that of satisfying the  
preferences of respondents at the very expense of the basic concept of 
consistency as incorporated in SSAP 2. In the case of foreign exchange, 
consistency w ould im ply that all companies use the same m ethod of 
translation (as has been the case in the US even w hen the single perm itted  
method was changed). Additionally, consistency under the standard  
should imply the use of a single translation m ethod for the profit and  loss 
account. Goodwill provides even greater inconsistencies in that no t only 
may two m ethods be used, bu t that different m ethods can be used 
interchangeably, w hich again w ould not be allowed in the case of US 
standards.
The options given by both of these standards appear to reflect both cu rren t 
practice and opinion, but could also imply that the m embers of the  
Accounting Standards Committee were divided on the issue. The w orking  
party for goodwill was also divided upon the issue of capitalisation versu s 
imm ediate write-off and contributed to the comprom ise so lu tion , 
although, as appendix 1 suggests, the working party as a whole did n o t 
exercise significant power in the process of developm ent of the standard. 
However, the ASC did in fact change its attitude towards the basic 
accounting treatm ents in both these standards. A lthough it could be 
argued that the concepts of goodwill and foreign exchange are com plex 
and therefore there could be no single solution, there are m any o th er 
complex issues in accounting such as deferred tax and accounting for
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inflation, and yet at times, the ASC has seen fit to provide a single 
treatm ent by way of solution.
The ASC has been described as consensus-seeking in its approach to 
accounting regulation. Bromwich (1985) talks of the fact that A consensus 
may result in com prom ise standards lacking in intellectual rigour'(p. 87). 
The comm ent letter from Price W aterhouse in respect of ED 30 underlined 
this deficiency, stating;
'We believe that a decision (to adopt a single method) should have 
been reached based on a more rigorous examination of the 
opposing argum ents set out in ED 30'
(Comment letter dated 28.3.83, Brackets added)
Not only may the quality of standards be im paired by the search for 
consensus, bu t delays in the standard setting process m ay occur (Bromwich 
1992). Certainly both of these standards were delayed as m easured by the  
length of time between the Exposure Draft and the final Standardly.
The reason for the need for a private sector standard setting body to 
achieve a consensus may be driven by the problem  of the enforcem ent of 
standards. W ithout any enforcement powers, a regulatory body has to seek 
voluntary acceptance of its pronouncem ents. At the time of the ASC, the  
mechanism for ensuring compliance was extremely weak. S tandards 
therefore had to be acceptable to all. As Bromwich (1992) points out;
'W ithout sufficient enforcement powers, it is difficult to see how  a 
private sector standards body can avoid tem pering its suggested 
standards so that they can achieve acceptance by those influential 
sectors of the community who, by being non-co-operative, could pu t 
the future of the private sector standard setting body in doubt.'
( p. 270)
The necessity to produce standards which w ould gain support could be 
seen as an alm ost inevitable outcome.
ly In the case of goodwill, the original working party was set up in 1974 and the Standard 
issued in 1984; the initial report on foreign exchange was in 1976, with the standard 
appearing in 1983
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'We would have preferred the Exposure Draft to recom m end only 
one accounting treatment, but we accept that a choice has to be 
offered in order to gain the necessary support of users'
(Comment letter. Coopers and Lybrand, 28.3.83)
This sentim ent was endorsed by Touche Ross in their com m ent letter.
We recognise that there is no consensus w ithin the accounting 
profession as to the correct treatm ent of goodwill....and it is 
therefore very difficult if not impossible for the ASC to obtain 
adequate support for any single approach'
(Comment letter Touche Ross 14.4.83)
The necessity of achieving support would appear to have risen from w hat 
Bromwich sees as self-preservation: after all the alternative to the ASC 
w ould have been accounting regulation by the State which was som eth ing  
the accounting profession had traditionally felt itself threatened by (see 
Chapter 1).
It is possible that achievement of a consensus is felt to be desirable w ith in  
an agency or indeed any other rule-m aking bodyi^. M odem  theory 
considers consensus to imply broad agreement on fundam entals including 
the 'rules' of the game and may incorporate the m ore questionable 
'consensus about ends' (Smith, 1972 p. 4). Pure definitions of the w ord 
consensus tend to be contradictory, w ith the Oxford Dictionary (1982) using 
the terms 'agreem ent', unanim ous opinion' and 'm ajority v iew '. 
Unanim ity assumes that all preferences are satisfied, w hereas m ajority  
only maximises some preferences. Agreement (which, w hen achieved by 
deliberation. Smith (1972) describes as the traditional view of consensus), 
could incorporate some form of compromise in negotiation.
It is how ever debatable that the ASC could be view ed as consensus- 
seeking, as, in the case of the two standards examined in this chapter, there
Consensus is used to describe a state of social order or cohesion and explains why society 
is able to exist (see for example Compte, de Tocqueville, Durkheim quoted in Partridge, 
1971). This description could be applicable to a regulatory agency trying to maintain 
cohesion within its domain through accommodating the needs of its constituents,
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existed no unanim ous opinion as to how  the items should be included in  
the accounts. N either was there a majority view which excluded the 
requirem ents of the minority. Such agreement as flowed from the 
standards did not involve any elem ent of compromise by any party o ther 
than  the ASC themselves. A lthough consensus about m eans and thereby 
the legitimacy of the regulators m ight have existed, there was no  
consensus about ends. It could indeed be argued that regulation had n o t 
effectively taken place, but that the ASC had merely codified the existing 
diverse practices, through the satisfaction of its' constituents.
Some of the difficulties in achieving a single solution to both these 
problem s may have arisen from the fact that the ASC had no guidance 
from  an  agreed conceptual framework, which could have been used as a 
legitim ising device both for the Committee itself as well as its' 
pronouncem ents. The fact that the ASC was driven by external pressures 
and unable to be authoritative was recognised by respondents to Exposure 
Drafts.
'We therefore agree that the sacrifice of a conceptual ideal m ay for
the time being be an acceptable price to pay in order to achieve a
pragm atic solution'
(Comment letter A rthur Young McClelland Moores & Co, 25.2.81)
In addition, the agenda of the ASC tended to be driven by events. Even the  
m ost basic statem ent dealing w ith both the disclosure of accounting 
policies and accounting concepts was not the first to be issued. It was 
preceded by SSAP 1 (Accounting for the Results of Associated Com panies). 
How ever, the ASB's 'Statem ent of Principles' commenced in 1991, are still 
in draft form.
SUMMARY
In this chapter two standards were chosen to illustrate the way in w hich  
the ASC operated. The outcomes of both the standards exam ined satisfied 
the vast majority of those participants in the regulatory process by 
following current practice and opinion. A lthough the approach could 
have been described as consensus-seeking, it demonstrated lack of a single
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consensus and produced a choice of accounting solutions th ro u g h  
regulatory willingness to compromise. Of those involved in the process of 
consultation, the majority appeared to be producers rather than users. In  
the case of the Goodwill standard, the consultations reported to the  
planning sub-committee on 13.3.84 were w ith companies having m ade 
recent acquisitions and those indicating particular problem s as preparers 
in their com m ent letters (ASC 2/53/2). Nobes (1991) in his theory of the  
existence of cyclical patterns, suggests that managers will 'seek to m a in ta in  
flexibility of practices, and also oppose the in troduction of incom e- 
reducing standards' (p. 265). SSAP 22 certainly fulfils this criteria th ro u g h  
the lack of a consistent application of accounting policies and practice by 
the dom inance of the imm ediate write-off m ethod w hich m axim ises 
reported income. This standard is inconsistent w ith the 'political costs' 
theory of W atts and Z im m erm an (1978), which state that companies w ill 
seek accounting standards which m inim ise reported earnings to avoid  
political interference. SSAP 20 also, fails to comply w ith  the theory, in th a t 
the use of either m ethod of consolidation, and the choice of average or 
closing rate translation in the profit and loss account, cannot 
systematically increase or decrease profits as these will be determ ined by 
the relative exchange rates of the reporting entities.
Additionally, the ASC appeared to have been thw arted at tim es by one or 
two key players in the process. The issue of SSAP 20 was delayed from July 
1982 to April 1983 by the Technical and Research Com m ittee of the  
Association of Certified Accountants. The pow er of the Technical 
Committees of the CCAB members was recognised by the ASC^^. 
Following a meeting on 10.2.83, K O Robinson reported;
It seems that however elaborate we make the consultation period 
during which accounting standards are developed, ASC is not in a 
position at the moment to prevent a situation w hereby one or two
Nobes (1992) also saw the accountancy bodies as potential targets for lobbying. This is 
evidenced by a letter from Ebling, ASC under secretary to Renshall, ASC chairman stating 
'Michael Bromwich has suggested to me that, if the ASC is not prepared to Tead' on this 
matter, he may raise it at a CCAB meeting, presumably in order to try to apply pressure to 
the ASC' (ASC 1/11/1).
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voices on a Technical Committee of this kind could effectively 
overturn  an ASC recom m endation' (ASC 2/4/93)
This dem onstrates the problem s of a regulatory body w ith insufficient 
powers being forced to com prom ises by the v irtual endorsem ent of 
existing practice and opinion. Had a com prehensive or conceptual 
fram ework type of approach been taken, the ASC m ay have been able to 
produce more timely and rigorous standards.
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CHAPTER 8
THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN ACCOUNTING REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
The process of accounting standard setting described in previous chapters 
has illustrated the dominance of preparers^. This study of the process has 
also identified the government as being a significant actor in the setting of 
accounting standards. To discover the reason for that involvem ent, th is 
chapter firstly examines the uses made of published accounting 
inform ation by the government in order to ascertain the perspective of the 
governm ent in contributing to the accounting standard setting process^. 
The interest of the government in published accounting inform ation has, 
as a result of the research carried out in this Chapter, been identified as 
covering three separate roles, those of preparers, users and regulators. 
There m ay however be some overlap in that actions taken w h ile  
assum ing one role may be influenced by considerations of other roles.
Regulations and practices that apply to business organisations are n o t 
legally b inding on governm ent departm ents and agencies acting as 
preparers of accounting information. However the very fact that both are 
carrying out an activity called accounting, m ust presum e some degree of 
com m onality in operation. The presence of professionally tra ined  
accountants in departm ents and agencies ensures a degree of diffusion of 
ideas.
The second role is that of a user of accounting inform ation. Users of 
corporate reports are defined by the Corporate Report as;
'those having a reasonable right to information concerning the
reporting entity a reasonable right to such inform ation exists
w here the activities of an organisation impinge or m ay im pinge of a 
user group' (ASSC 1975 p. 17)
* Through the membership and financial structures described in previous 
chapters and through consultation procedures.
 ^ Previous studies of the involvement of the state with accounting have 
ranged from the general, e.g. Sombart’s Thesis in which accounting is 
considered a necessary pre-requisite of capitalism, to studies of conflict 
between standard-setters and government (Robson, 1988).
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Appendix 2 compares the findings of the research in this chapter w ith the  
governm ent's uses of corporate reports suggested by that document.
The final role is that of the state as a regulator of accounting in its ow n 
right. Since the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, the state has, th rough  
the Com panies Acts, assumed responsibility for regulating accounting 
rather than allowing it to be a m atter of private contract betw een 
com panies and users. Nevertheless, since 1970 its responsibilities h av e  
been 'shared ' w ith a private sector regulatory body while prescriptive rules 
have grow n w ithin legislation, although an acceptance of detailed ru les 
being m ade by the private sector appears to be held by the state. This 
regulatory role could be influenced by its' perception of best practice in  
respect of its' preparer role, by its' needs as a user or through the use of 
economic consequences to achieve a policy objective.
The chapter then draws on two other sources of interaction between the 
governm ent and the accounting standard setters. There are the com m ent 
letters w ritten  by government departm ents in response to Exposure Drafts 
which m ay indicate a policy perspective. These comment letters represent 
the published view of governm ent and their content is analysed and 
com pared w ith  the earlier findings in this Chapter in order to suggest 
m otives for the involvem ent of governm ent. Additionally, records of 
m eetings and correspondence between governm ent departm ents and the  
standard setters provide a useful insight into the relationship betw een the  
two bodies and may imply more input into the standard setting process 
than is publicly acknowledged.
THE STUDY
In order to discover the interest of the State in published accounting 
inform ation the writer carried out a series of interviews w ith officials 
from m ajor governm ent departm ents and agencies (the results of w hich  
are included in a later section^). During each interview  the governm en t 
official w as asked how they used published accounting information. From 
the results it was possible to ascertain and categorise some of the  
underlying relationships between agencies or departm ents and reporting
 ^ The research was carried out in 1990, and tends to reflect the structure, 
functions and operating environment of government and its agencies at 
that time. As the main focus of the study is the ASC, this aligns the research 
with the accounting regulatory agency then in existence.
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entities which determ ined the inform ation needs. Most of the examples 
given, represent activities which are still current, a lthough form er 
examples have also been included as illustrations. W here, in a decisional 
context additional information is used, this has also been specified, in that 
both non-published and non-accounting inform ation can act as a 
surrogate for published accounting information. The uses detailed are n o t 
an exhaustive list due to the complex structure and diverse 
responsibilities of major departm ents, but rather represent substantive 
examples, in order to provide a categorisation of the various uses rather 
than to examine decisional and informational aspects in depth.
The results of these interviews indicate the perceived interest that the 
state has in published accounts. An appreciation of the role as a preparer 
of financial information arose as a by-product of questions asked as to the 
user function. The results of this aspect have not been taken further in  
this Chapter as the adoption of those practices seen as desirable by the state 
is beyond the scope of this work"^. The role played by the D epartm ent of 
Trade and Industry^ in accounting rule-m aking ensures that there is an  
on-going mechanism in place for transferring accounting technology from  
the business to the governm ent sector, (although no evidence was found 
of technology transferring in the other direction).
The role of the state in the process of regulation has been exam ined in two 
further ways. Firstly through analysing the com m ent letters in reply to 
Exposure Drafts. Governm ent Departments, especially the D epartm ent of 
Trade and Industry, have been fairly active in responding w ith  com m ents. 
These replies have been analysed and categorised in order to discover the  
m otives of the State in attem pting to effect accounting change and to 
compare such m otives w ith its' user role. W here not seeking its ow n 
direct interest as a user, it may be assum ed that a D epartm ent is acting in  
another interest. This interest may be political, either following a 
proscribed policy objective or following a general notion of the public 
interest (which are not necessarily m utually exclusive goals). Secondly, 
since the archives of the ASC have been m ade available for research, it has 
been possible to examine further interaction by the D epartm ent of Trade
Generally the research indicated that the government adopted those 
practices and methods it saw as applicable, while rejecting those it saw as 
inapplicable or undesirable.
 ^ As an observer on both the ASC and ASB.
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(and Industry) with the ASC, although m any papers have been rem oved  
as being confidential^.
INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES^
The Bank Of England
The Bank has no formal responsibility for collecting or m aintaining data 
based on company accounts, but has in the past used data supplied by the 
DTI to study the influences on the profitability of companies, m aking 
adjustments for the effects of inflation^. More recently, the Bank has used 
a commercial database in order to m onitor the perform ance of certain 
large individual companies w ith a view to identifying cases w here 
companies m ight find them selves in financial difficulties^. This is not a 
statutory duty, but one that the Bank has taken on itself to help p reven t 
collapse of major industrial companies. For this it has developed a Z-score 
model from the evidence of company failures in the 1970's. This m odel, 
incorporating a small num ber of key financial ratios, is used to predict 
such failures. Additionally, the Bank has published a series of articles on  
the performance of large companies and a study of the differences betw een 
performance and other ratios w hen m easured using historical and curren t 
cost bases. Other studies carried out by the Bank have been on the 
behaviour of companies in such areas as debt and dividend decisions, and 
the co-existence of borrowing and increasing liquidity w ithin  ind iv idua l 
companies.
For several years, the Bank has constructed aggregate statistics on the 
profitability of industrial and commercial com panies on behalf of the 
Review Board for Government Contracts who use the data in constructing 
a profit form ula for non-com petitive contracts (see M inistry of Defence 
section). The Bank did not appear to have any direct input into the 
standard setting process, although the Governor of the Bank of England 
now has joint responsibility for appointm ent of the directors of the FRC.
 ^ No reason is given for the removal of these papers apart from the fact 
that they were deemed ‘confidential’. Unfortunately, due to the way in 
which the archive is kept, it is not possible to ascertain their subject 
m atter.
 ^ The background and operational details of these interviews may be seen 
in Appendix 3.
* This Work was continued by the DTI itself.
 ^ This function had developed since the oil crisis of the 1970’s.
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The Central Statistical Office
Since the 1940's, the Central Statistical O f f ic e h a s  compiled UK N ational 
Income Accounts (published annually as the "Blue Book") which include 
balance sheets, income and appropriation accounts and statements of 
sources and uses of funds for various sectors of the economy. These 
sectors consist of the public sector and the private sector which is divided 
into industrial and commercial companies, financial institutions and a 
residual category covering the activities of persons either as individuals or 
in certain other forms of association. For the most part, inform ation does 
not come only from published accounts, because national income accounts 
generally measure activities within the national boundary whereas UK 
parents of groups of companies may present consolidated statem ents 
which transcend these boundaries and therefore adjustm ents are 
necessary. National Income Accounts use gross profit as a reasonable 
surrogate figure for the net output of industrial and com m ercial 
companies, but further adjustments have to be made in the case of 
financial institutions which tend otherwise to give misleading results. 
National Income accounts are therefore compiled from a variety of 
sources, including banking statistics collected by the Bank of England and 
the Board of Inland Revenue's Corporation Tax assessments. Published 
accounts provide inform ation in such areas as trade credit and com pany 
investm ent in central and local governm ent securities, which is no t 
available from other sources The Central Statistical Office used 
inform ation from company accounts to check the National Incom e 
Accounts estimates it has received from other sources. This was done by 
use of the Business M onitor (MA3) produced formally by the D epartm ent 
of Trade and Industry^ .^
D epartm ent Of The Environm ent
Under Section 156 of the Housing Act 1985, local authorities could sell 
property to the private sector. Where the sale was subject to a mortgage, 
the Department of the Environment had to approve the lender where the 
sale was at a discount. Such approval depended upon the financial 
strength of the lender and conditions could be imposed to im prove any 
apparent deficiencies of the relationship between equity and debt. The 
practice of securitisation of mortgages caused problems in that these
Now named Office for National Statistics.
Information is now obtained from alternative sources.
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mortgages disappeared from the balance sheet, bu t were still m anaged by 
the original lender. The Departm ent at times therefore dem anded 
additional non-published data in order to grant approval to potential 
lenders^
Additionally, under Section 73 of the H ousing Act 1985 the D epartm ent 
makes grants to voluntary organisations e.g. Shelter. These grants are
targeted for specific areas and therefore the Departm ent verifies the
expenditure through internal non-published data, using the published 
data as an overall check.
There are, in addition, other ways in which the Departm ent is involved in  
housing operations. Funds for grant purposes are disbursed from  the 
Treasury to the Departm ent and then to the H ousing C orporation. 
H ousing Association accounts m ust be sent to the H ousing C orporation, 
for m onitoring purposes, whereby the viability of the association is 
assessed (usually by reference to the reserves). Similarly, grants m ade to 
the Com mission for New Towns, who in tu rn  pass them  on to the  
individual New Town Developm ent Corporations are subject to the  
viability of the receiving organisation as evidenced by their accounts.
Departm ent Of H ealth
The m ain use the Departm ent of Health has for published accounts is in  
connection w ith the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (1986), 
which is an agreement between the Association of the British
Pharmaceutical Industry and various governm ent departm ents
responsible for health matters. The purpose of the scheme is to secure the  
provision of medicines at reasonable prices, to encourage efficient and  
competitive developm ent and supply of medicines, and to encourage a 
strong and profitable pharmaceutical industry  in the UK capable of 
sustained research and development. The scheme is concerned w ith  the  
NHS medicines which are those brand-nam ed m edicines produced by a 
single supplier. In the case of generic pharm aceutical products (non brand 
names e.g. aspirin) it is felt that com petition will elim inate excessive 
profits.
FRS 5 has effectively overcome this problem by limiting the situations in 
which securitised mortgages can be de-recognised.
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Each pharm aceutical company supplying NHS medicine w ith  total hom e 
(UK) sales of over £4 million, has to supply an annual financial re tu rn  in  
a prescribed format to the Department of Health w ithin six m onths of the 
end of the accounting year. This return consists of disaggregated 
inform ation on revenue, costs and profits. It is accom panied by an 
independent accountant's report and is reconciled to the published 
financial statements. W here a pharm aceutical com pany is m arketing  
rather than producing, a separate return is completed, reconciling the 
audited  accounts w ith the annual financial return. A sim ilar breakdow n 
is m ade of the balance sheet in order to make a calculation of the re tu rn  
on assets. There is an acceptable range for this, some four percentage 
points wide. Im proved efficiency will increase the return , and this 
circumstance is acceptable to the Department. A djustm ents are m ade 
w here current costs are used, under the alternative accounting rules 
perm itted by the Companies Act, as returns are based strictly on historical 
cost. C urrent ratios are used for comparison purposes betw een NHS and 
non NHS products to ensure that companies are not attem pting to 'lo ad ' 
capital employed. Accounts of overseas holding com panies are also 
analysed to examine, for example, the ratio of research and developm ent 
expenditure to sales to ascertain a reasonable proportion of R & D expenses 
for the UK company.
M edium  sized companies (sales of NHS medicines of £400,000 to £4 
million), have to supply a certified breakdown of tu rnover w ith  the 
audited accounts, whereas small companies are exem pt from these 
requirem ents, although the Departm ent of Health retains the right of full 
inform ation disclosure. W ith small companies the D epartm ent m ay 
query excessive rem uneration/benefits for directors and reduce these for 
calculation purposes.
There are no rights of access to m anagem ent accounts or any in te rn a l 
inform ation, but companies have always adhered to the request for 
inform ation as laid down. There has been no involvem ent by the 
D epartm ent in standard setting as it feels that the A greem ent is 
sufficiently comprehensive for their needs.
170
The D epartm ent O f Trade A nd Industry
a) Statistics
The Departm ent of Trade and Industry formerly carried out a com pany 
accounts analysis published regularly by HMSG as Business M onitor MA3 
"Company Finance". This consisted of a set of standardised and aggregated 
balance sheets, income and appropriation accounts and statem ents of 
sources and uses of funds together w ith various accounting ratios^ 
Tables were presented for the Industrial and Commercial Sector as a 
whole, and also for some 30 constituent industry groups based on the UK 
standard industrial classification of 1980. In addition to data collected o n  
the top 2000 companies in the UK, rem aining inform ation was based on a 
sam ple of companies.
The contents of companies' profit and loss account had to be adapted to 
the format of the income and appropriation accounts recorded in MA3 
and additionally, the sources and uses of funds had to be compiled from a 
SSAP which allowed a great deal of latitude in content and presentation. 
Since the standardised formats of the 1981 Companies Act were fully 
adopted, the adaptations have been easier to effect, although the right for 
sm aller companies to file m odified accounts has m eant that there are 
fewer smaller companies on which to base any sample.
b) Grants
Formerly, the Departm ent was responsible for overseeing grants g iven 
under Section 7/8 of the Industry Act 1972. Such grants were m ade in  
support of the developm ent of new  technology. In order to check the  
overhead rate, internal data had  to be used; rights to such data being a 
condition imposed under the term s of the offer. Published accounts 
w ould be used as a final check, although this would only tend to be 
accurate in the case of a small company, which was involved in a single 
project.
The involvement of this Departm ent in the standard setting process is 
covered in a later section.
13 At the time of the original research, SSAP 10 was extant.
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Export Credit Guarantee Department^
Although m uch of the work of the Export Credit Guarantee Departm ent is 
concerned w ith  foreign buyers and therefore the assessment of risk based 
on  non-UK inform ation, there are situations w here the Departm ent uses 
the published financial inform ation from UK companies. This w ould 
occur where the D epartm ent has the right to claim money back from UK 
companies under a recourse clause of the ECGD facility.
Before assum ing any contingent liabilities, the Departm ent makes an  
assessment of the solvency of the UK exporter in order to judge his ability 
to meet a recourse demand. A simple form of ratio analysis is used to 
examine trends or adverse features to identify areas for fu rther 
investigation. This m ay lead to meetings w ith Finance Directors and, w ith 
the Company's approval, meetings with bankers. The right to carry o u t 
this course of action m ay be contained w ithin the guarantee docum ent. 
The acceptance of a contingent liability m ay be followed by the dem and for 
some form of guarantee, or in rare cases, the taking of security. In th is 
way, the D epartm ent acts in the same way as a banker w hen assessing a 
contingent liability based on a performance bond.
There has been no direct involvem ent by this D epartm ent w ith the  
standard-setting process.
D epartm ent Of Em ploym ent
a) Employee Involvem ent Section
U nder Section 1 of the Employment Act of 1982, employers are required to 
disclose (a) how  employees are informed and (b) w hat steps are being 
m ade towards financial participation in the firm for employees. This 
disclosure has to be m ade in the Director's Report. W here companies fail 
to comply, they are w arned to do so and the annual report is specifically 
checked the following year. W here disclosure is som ew hat vague and 
generalised, there are no powers to secure further information; only 
requests can be made. Companies are selected on a random  basis from the  
Times Top 1000 and analysed on the basis of num bers of employees ra ther 
than industry types. It is felt by this Section that the 'voluntary basis' of 
disclosure will be m aintained. The Section will also use financial reports
14 This is a non-ministerial government department.
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for the purpose of generally briefing the M inister in the area of em ployee 
inv o lv em en t.
b) Economic Policy Briefing Section
This section has a function of briefing the M inister on m atters relating to 
specific companies. They use the Annual Report rather than the accounts 
to obtain an overview of the inform ation about a target company, 
although there is a particular emphasis on both the sales and profit 
figures. General information disclosure on em ploym ent w ould tend to be 
ignored, only positive items would be relevant such as specific 
inform ation on employee participation or the involvem ent of the 
com pany w ith a local TEC (Training and Enterprise Council).
More inform ation where required may be obtained from other sources, 
such as the local Employment Departm ent office or other concerned 
governm ent departm ents e.g. DTI or Departm ent of the Environm ent, but 
this information would tend to be descriptive, rather than quantitative.
There is no direct involvement of this Departm ent in accounting standard 
setting.
The Home Office
a) Procurem ent Section
This un it deals w ith major areas of purchasing, and establishes a bidders 
list for major contracts. Potential bidders are selected, and if they are 
interested in proceeding, three years accounts are forwarded to the H om e 
Office to ensure their capability in financial term s of carrying out the  
contract. This is then subject to ratio analysis to ensure their suitability. If 
these results are not entirely satisfactory, a parent com pany guarantee 
could be requested. In situations where there is no parent com pany, 
internal data can be requested to ensure that companies do not agree term s 
which are optimistic in such areas as future cash flows. Payments o n  
account of supplies are fairly rare, but where used are norm ally covered by 
bank guarantees.
W here a trading relationship already exists, and suspicion about the 
supplier exists, the Home Office would use a commercial agency (Dun and 
Bradstreet) to check and report on the status of the com pany in order to
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secure the m ost up to date inform ation. Certain supplies are considered 
vital to some Home Office establishm ents such as prisons w here 
in terruptions to delivery of m aterial to prison workshops or food could be 
critical. As an adjunct to using commercial agencies, a bank reference m ay 
also be sought in these circumstances. At the time of the interview , the  
H om e Office was setting up a m anagem ent inform ation system to give a 
profile of supplying companies so that a more systematic check could be 
carried out.
External commercial agencies are also used for interpretation of E uropean 
Com panies' accounts where, under E C rules for compulsory advertising 
for tender, the Home Office has difficulties formulating opinions.
b) V oluntary  Services U n it
This un it of the Home Office deals w ith issues relating to m atters 
concerning the governm ent and the voluntary sector. The governm en t 
perspective arises from their role as grant givers or managers of contracts 
w ith  voluntary  organisations for the provision of services. Direct grants 
m ay be given from central or local governm ent or from other bodies such 
as the NHS. Additionally, they m ay be involved in paym ent for either 
projects or services such as the provision of residential places.
Because of this, they feel that both they (and the public) should have a 
com prehensive picture of the various sources of income of the recipient 
organisations and stress the im portance of distinguishing (and identifying) 
public sources of funding, in order to give an indication of the financial 
viability and future prospects of individual charities.
This is in line with current governm ent thinking on organisational 
accountability, and w ould also fall generally in the area of public interest, 
in that direct funding and the tax relief granted on fund-raising activities 
can be seen as the grant of a public benefit.
The only direct subm ission to the Accounting Standards Com m ittee, 
during  the period was m ade by this section in response to an exposure 
draft on one SORP (Statement of Recommended Practice).
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The In land  Revenue
There was, prior to 1993, no obligation for the corporate taxpayer to subm it 
published accounts to the Inland Revenue. W here these were supplied 
they were forwarded to the Inland Revenue w ith tax com putations 
(a n d /o r  return of profits). In the absence of this, the Revenue had powers 
to raise an  estimated assessment. W here an appeal was m ade against this, 
published accounts were norm ally subm itted as part of the appeal 
procedure. Cases were som etim es referred by the Revenue to the 
Conunissioners for appeal in  order to secure accounts and com putations. 
Failing this, there were formal inform ation powers available under the 
Taxes M anagement Act s 51 and s 20. However, under the 'Pay and File' 
system, a company is obliged to send a copy of its accounts to the Inland 
Revenue w ith its return w ithin a specified time from the year end
The preference expressed by the Inland Revenue not unnaturally , was for 
accounting standards to be tax-driven. In this connection, any com m ents 
on standards are made to the D epartm ent of Trade and Industry; and 
therefore cannot be separately attributed to the Inland Revenue, a lthough  
one direct comm ent was m ade on ED 40 of a highly technical na tu re  
concerning one specific legal case.
M inistry Of Agriculture Fisheries A nd Food
This D epartm ent is not presently a user of published accounts as grants 
m ade to third parties are on a quantitative basis, and thus concerned w ith  
physical production rather than being based on financial information. 
How ever, the M inistry was previously involved in two schemes w hich 
depended upon the published accounts of the recipients. The first of these 
was an EEC scheme for m odernising agricultural infrastructure facilities 
such as grain storage at docks. As part of the application procedure, 
accounts had to be subm itted for scrutiny to ensure the viability of the 
recipient company and subsequent checks were carried out to ensure that 
m oneys had been properly spent. The second scheme was the Farm and 
H orticultural Scheme (later nam ed the Agricultural Im provem en t 
Scheme) under which a grant was m ade to assist in increasing labour 
productivity. Accounts were used in an  attem pt to use income figures to 
check on the increase in labour productivity. In m any cases, these grants 
were m ade to non-incorporated businesses and there was au thorisa tion
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for the production of accounts contained w ithin the Statutory Instrum ent 
setting up the scheme.
N o direct submissions have been made to the Accounting Standards 
Com mittee for the period in question.
M onopolies A nd Mergers Com m ission
The Commission has no pow er to instigate its ow n investigations. These 
usually  arise from issues referred by the Secretary of State for Industry or 
the Director-General of the Office of Fair Trading. Once an enquiry has 
been pu t in hand, the Com mission has powers to require any person to 
attend  to give evidence or produce any relevant docum ents and to require 
inform ation from any person carrying on any business. Initially, the 
Com m ission asks for m anagem ent accounts and basic data including 
in ternal performance m easures, intragroup trading and transfer pricing 
(Brown, 1992). The work of the Commission m ight be best illustrated by 
reference to three specific cases during the period covered by the research 
in this chapter.
Blue Circle Industries/A rm itage Shanks (Cmmd 8039 1980). Because of 
Blue Circle Industries' policy of creating operating units rather th an  
subsidiaries, the Commission recognised that there w ould be a post­
m erger information loss. They recommended that for some years after the 
m erger, disclosure of the results of the acquired com pany (turnover, 
profits and return  on capital), should be required. U nder the then extant 
1967 Companies Act, any analysis of types of business was to be based on a 
classification decided by the Directors. The report suggested that the  
classification should be that used by the Board of Trade (Standard 
Industrial Classification), and extended to include inform ation on re tu rn  
on capital.
Ford M otor Company (Cmnd 9437 1985). The com pany w as referred under 
S. 310 of the Competition Act 1980, forcing Ford to justify its' pricing 
policy for spare parts. For this exercise, product developm ent costs were 
used from the published accounts, and an attem pt by Ford was made to 
allocate these costs to that part of the business dealing w ith replacem ent 
parts.
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The Supply of Petrol (Cm 972 1990). The major petrol wholesalers w ere 
asked to identify all sources of income from site operations and all types of 
costs directly arising from ownership of retail sites. In order to report, the  
Com mission used published accounts, questionnaires on financial m atters 
and  other information supplied by individual firms and their consultants.
No direct subm issions to the Accounting Standards Committee w ere 
m ade by the Commission during this period.
M inistry of Defence
a) D irectorate of Procurement
This departm ent uses published accounts, brokers reports and MOD 
internal records in order to monitor defence contractors. The Directorate 
deals only w ith m acro issues, such as advising the Office of Fair Trading 
and the M onopolies and Mergers C o m m iss io n ^ T h e re  is also a role in  
briefing the M inister of Defence on specific companies and projects, in  
which context the published accounts are used to provide an overview  of 
activities.
b) Accounting. Estim ating and Pricing Services
This division consists of both accountants and engineers. For n o n ­
com petitive contracts, engineers are involved w ith prim e cost and  
accountants w ith overheads and profit rates. The rate of return  o n  
contracts is based on an agreed formula using capital employed and cost of 
production. These rates are agreed by the Review Board for G overnm en t 
Contracts which was established following agreem ent between the  
Governm ent and the CBI, in order to ensure a rate of return  equal to the  
overall average earned by British Industry. This requires a detailed 
definition of capital employed which is given by the Review Board and is 
com puted partly using current cost information as a basis.
U nder their standard conditions of contract, the M inistry of Defence m ay 
examine overheads of contractors and indeed carry out post-costing 
exercises on selected contracts. Published accounts are used as a guide to 
the financial health of an existing contractor or a first tim e bidder for 
governm ent contracts. W ith smaller companies, published accounts m ay
For an example, see the GEC/Siemens proposed take-over of Plessey (Cm 
676, April 1989).
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be useful where the company is involved in one un it of production, but 
only as a device for checking costs. In the case of larger com panies, 
segm ental results w ould not be of use because the data w ould not be 
presented for the production unit. For the purpose of pricing, the u n it 
m ay be very small in comparison to the firm as a whole. Internal data 
supplied under the standard conditions is reconciled, w here possible w ith  
the published accounts as a check on accuracy, and any consolidation 
adjustm ents are carefully examined.
This departm ent has not m ade any direct subm issions to the Accounting 
Standards Committee in the period under examination.
Office of Fair Trading
The Office of Fair Trading is a non-ministerial departm ent w ith close links 
(through personnel) w ith the DTI. The m ain areas of responsibility are 
investigation into restrictive trade practices, anti-com petitive practices, 
m onopolies and mergers. W ork in the area of restrictive trade practices 
involves the examination of such areas as cartels e.g. p roduct pricing, w ith  
the view of detection of super-norm al profits.
In the case of anti-com petitive practices, investigations are carried out in  
such areas as predatory pricing (the short-term reduction in prices to drive 
out competition). The Office examines internal data to see if, for example 
price is less than m arginal cost. If requested inform ation is n o t 
forthcoming, the Office may commence a formal investigation. Statutory 
powers for securing the necessary inform ation are held under the 
Com petition Act (1980). In the case of mergers, the Office examines the 
prior profitability of the target company and also the consideration paid for 
the company. As a prelim inary test, this is com pared w ith the  
replacement costs of the assets (if known) to ascertain the reason for the 
purchase i.e. is it a purchase of assets or purchase of m arket share? Powers 
to secure information are held rather vaguely under the term s of the Fair 
Trading Act of 1973, w ith S 22 giving the rights to collect information'.
The Office makes its ow n submissions to the ASC and com m ents were 
subm itted on SSAP 25 (Segmental Accounting) w hich they felt w ould 
highlight super-norm al profits and thus attract new  entrants to the 
market. The Office has indicated that it w ould support the disclosure of
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replacem ent cost accounting inform ation in a reply to any exposure draft 
on fixed asset accounting. This would assist it to carry ou t its functions in  
the areas of anti-competitive practices and mergers.
The Treasury
The role of the Treasury is that of management of the UK economy, and as 
such, they do not appear to have an interest in the accounting statem ents 
of any one firm. Their representation on the ASC and the ASB is that of 
an observer, although in this role, they are also invited to comment.
They view their role in two ways; firstly to look at commercial standards 
and their applicability to governm ent agency accounting and  governm en t 
commercial enterprises e.g. HMSO. Secondly they look at the w ider 
economic implications of standards, although it is not possible to ascertain 
w hether they passively identify such implications or attem pt to control, or 
if necessary, recom mend action to overcome those effects w hich they 
consider undesirable or incompatible with current policy. Any com m ents 
m ade on accounting regulation would go through the D epartm ent of 
Trade and Industry, or if m ade direct would have already been discussed 
w ith  that Departm ent, although in the ten years exam ined no exposure 
draft replies have been made direct by the Treasury.
H M Customs and Excise - VAT Section
The general use of published accounts is as a 'range check' of values p u t 
into VAT returns. In perform ing this function, accounts are m ore 
valuable in the context of output (sales) than input (purchases), as the 
latter will include wages and other items not subject to taxation. 
Additionally, tax on the purchase of fixed assets w ould not show up  in the 
profit and loss account*^.
Rights to inspect documents, records and inform ation generally, are held  
under the VAT Act 1983, which reduces the im portance of using  
published accounts as a prim e source of information. How ever, due to 
lim ited investigative resources, published accounts do, in fact give an  
overview  of where such resources are best employed. W here group
Although Customs and Excise did admit that detailed profit and loss 
accounts submitted by smaller enterprises were of greater assistance.
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accounts are being examined, these can be supplem ented by the inclusion  
of consolidation working papers.
In the case of insurance companies, the financial accounts are not used so 
m uch as the statutory audited report forwarded to the DTI This report, by 
giving a breakdow n of risks and type of business, allows a better range 
check and  information on the nature of activities.
No replies have been made to Exposure drafts directly by this departm ent.
GOVERNMENT AS A USER
From the results of these interviews, many governm ent departm ents and 
agencies appear to use published accounting information. W ithin a 
departm ent, different sections may have different requirem ents based on  
their indiv idual roles. The inform ation requirem ents of these 
departm ents or sections depend upon the relationship betw een the 
reporting entity and the governm ent departm ent. These relationships 
m ay be categorised into five distinct areas.
* There is the trading type of relationship w here the 
Departm ent is a purchaser of goods or services.
* There is the grant relationship where public funds are
m ade available to organisations usually under a 
Statutory Instrum ent set up under Act of Parliament.
* In order to ensure compliance w ith the law, the 
Government may use published accounting 
information as a w ay of m onitoring actions.
* W here departm ents are not necessarily interested in
specifics, accounting data may be used to gain an 
overview of the organisation.
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* There is the relationship based on taxation of the
organisation either from the point of view of direct 
taxes levied e.g. Corporation Tax or from the point of 
view of the organisation as a collection agent for taxes 
e.g. Value Added Tax.
In m any cases, published inform ation is not sufficient to satisfy 
requirem ents, and other non-published inform ation has to be supplied. 
The basis for the supply of inform ation not norm ally in the public 
dom ain, lies in the nature of the relationship. This additional inform ation 
m ay be secured by legal enforcement, as a condition of the relationship, or 
through an industry agreement, entered into voluntarily, but binding o n  
all parties.
W herever a trading relationship exists, then additional inform ation is 
either supplied voluntarily or through a collective industry agreem ent 
(which in m any ways is an extension of voluntary supply). W hen giving 
grants. Departm ents are able to exact the price of additional inform ation as 
a condition for the grant, either before it is m ade or afterwards to ensure it 
has been properly used. In most cases of relationships based on legal 
compliance, powers exist to secure any additional inform ation. Taxation, 
not surprisingly, is backed up by specific powers granted under the law to 
enable sufficient information to be supplied for the correct tax charge to be 
made. The exception in the area of legal compliance is in respect of 
employee involvem ent, which m ight indicate a lack of com m itm ent to 
this area of social policy. W here a general overview is required there are 
no additional powers to secure information.
The chart in appendix 4, illustrates the types of relationship m en tioned  
above and links these to governm ent departments. It also specifies w hich  
departm ents use other inform ation and classifies the grounds u n d e r 
which that inform ation is supplied
Overall it w ould appear that user needs of Governm ent Departm ents are 
satisfied by published accounts, albeit supplem ented by other in fo rm ation , 
supplied through the relationship of the Departm ent w ith the reporting  
entity. D uring the course of the interviews, only one Departm ent (Office
181
of Fair Trading) expressed a need for more information than was presently 
available. The Office in fact were one of the few D epartm ents apart from  
the DTI, making its own comments to the ASC.
If, therefore the majority of Departments are already satisfied as far as 
inform ation needs are concerned, the role of the DTI in replying to 
Exposure Drafts would not appear to be that of securing decision-useful 
inform ation on behalf of those Departments. Their ow n perception of 
their role is detailed later in this chapter and compared w ith their ’public 
face' in m aking replies to Exposure Drafts as well as their actions in the 
regulatory process, as evidenced by the ASC archives.
GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO EXPOSURE DRAFTS
The replies to Exposure Drafts made by governm ent departm ents and 
agencies from 1980 to 1990 have been analysed. The starting point has 
been chosen for two reasons. Following the change of governm ent in  
1979, any new policy effects should have been im pounded into Exposure 
Draft replies by that time. 1980 also marks the year before the EC 4th 
Directive was incorporated into UK law through the Com panies Act of 
1981. Thus any effects of anticipating provisions of the Act should h av e  
been incorporated into both the Exposure Drafts and the replies. The final 
year m arks the end of the ASC and the form ation of the ASB. The period 
in question also covers most of the developm ent period of the two 
standards used as specific examples in this study.
Between 1980 and 1990 twenty Exposure Drafts were issued, on w hich  
com m ent letters are available. Of these, governm ent departm ents h av e  
commented publicly on all but three (ED 27, 39 and 47). Of the rem ainder, 
the Departm ent of Trade and Industry have com m ented on all bu t one 
(ED 38). Other Departm ents involved in com m ent letters are the H om e 
Office (ED 38). The Inland Revenue (ED 40) and the Office of Fair Trading 
and the Central Statistical Office (both ED 45). A lthough the latter office is 
responsible to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, nevertheless, 
their subm ission was m ade independently. A sum m ary of the com m ents 
m ade is included in Appendix 5.
The general pattern of replies w ith the predom inance of the DTI w ould  
confirm the views expressed by the departm ents interview ed that they
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w ould  norm ally subm it their views, if any, through the DTI. T he 
exceptions to this appear to have occurred where m atters of extrem e 
relevance to the departm ent in question are under discussion, or possibly 
w here the views of the departm ent were different from the DTI.
An analysis of replies suggests five main categories:
economic policy 
technical
compliance with law 
compliance w ith international standards 
additional disclosure
W here a reply relates to any of these areas, the substance of such a reply 
m ay be either to endorse the Draft or suggest a change. No differentiation 
has been m ade in the analysis betw een these two approaches since they are 
both  indicative of the governm ent's m otives in concerning itself w ith  
accounting regulation. Exposure Drafts leading to Statem ents of 
Recom m ended Practice (SORPs) have been included as well as those 
leading to SSAPs since the same consideration will apply to both the  
lim ited sphere of the former as well as the fundam ental issues raised by 
the latter.
Few Exposure Drafts appear to have draw n any comments directly^^ 
referring to areas of economic policy. Those which have, include the  
leasing standard (ED 29) where the concern of the DTI centred on the  
possible effects of the standard on the 'w illingness or ability of com panies 
to invest in productive assets' (DTI, 4.5.82) and segmental reporting (ED 
45) w here it was felt that due to the consequence of disclosure of results by 
separate economic activities 'm arkets will function more efficiently and  
com petition will be encouraged' (OFT 2.5.89). There is an em phasis o n  
exem pting small companies from compliance on four separate occasions, 
ED's 29, 32, 45 and 46. This presum ably w ould be in accordance w ith  
governm ent policy concerning the encouragem ent of small businesses'^.
The economic consequences would imply that all accounting proposals 
will have some effect. Robson’s (1988) research identified in the context of 
the Sandilands Committee, four ‘arenas’, Industrial Relations, Counter- 
Inflation Policy, Industrial Policy and Taxation, in which accounting and 
the econom ic environment were intertwined.
See for example the Conservative Party Manifestos of 1979 and 1983.
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However, on ten occasions, the appeal by the governm ent has been for 
m ore disclosure. This has been separately categorised, even though such 
disclosure may generally be felt to increase the decision-usefulness of 
accounting reports. Part of the m otivation for this request could be from  
the perspective of the state as a user in its ow n right, but as seen 
previously, this is not necessarily the case as governm ent appears ly  
nature of its external relationships w ith enterprises to receive its ow n set 
of decision-useful information. A possible reason could be the state 
prom otion of economic efficiency (and welfare of the user groups) 
through allowing optimal decisions to be m ade w ith the help of increased 
disclosure*^.
The m ajority of replies have included com m ents of a technical nature . 
This is not surprising given the technical content of Drafts and the fact 
that the com m unication is in m any cases between accountant and  
accountant. A lthough all comments tend to be in the realms of the  
technical, this specific categorisation covers such areas as clarification, 
explanation, minor drafting changes, expansion of detail or suggestions as 
to alternative treatments.
Compliance w ith UK law (including clarification and suggested a lignm ent 
of term s used) refers not only to UK Com pany Law, but also to com pany 
law practice as opposed to proscribed detail. This is an area where the D T I  
appear to be extremely active (commenting on 12 occasions), even th o u g h  
w hen interviewed they claim this as being a fairly m inor role. H ow ever, 
major conflicts between standards and the law in the past e.g. SSAP 4 and 
SSAP 9 have led to revisions to the standards.
Compliance w ith International Standards have been m entioned on th ree  
occasions (ED's 32, 43 and 45). It may appear som ewhat paradoxical tha t 
the governm ent is rem inding the standard setters (who are largely d raw n 
from the accounting profession) to incorporate regulations developed by 
the profession on an international basis. A lthough this aspect has n o t 
been explored further in this paper, this m ight be an acknowledgem ent of 
the possible role of international standards in the process of 
harm onisation of European Law.
Stocks and Harrell (1995) equate increase in accounting information 
level with a better quality of judgement, although they conclude that 
groups benefit more than individuals.
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THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ROLE OF THE DTI
The D epartm ent of Trade and Industry is one of tw o G o v ern m en t 
D epartm ents w ith representation on the ASC (and subsequent ASB). T he 
C om panies Division of the Departm ent has observer status, w hich w ou ld  
appear initially to involve a passive role. W ithin the process of standard  
setting, the Division sees its role as two-fold^ The first of these is to 
com m unicate and sound out the views of other departm ents. This is 
carried out by way of forwarding exposure drafts to most departm ents for 
com m ents. A lthough departm ents are invited to reply, the process 
appears in practice to be one of com m unicating inform ation rather th a n  
securing replies. In addition the DTI looks at all replies to Exposure Drafts 
(subject to time) and may seek advice from other departm ents or the B ank 
of England on specialist matters.
The D epartm ent's second involvem ent w ith standard setting is concerned 
w ith  compliance w ith the law, but the perception of the DTI is that this is a 
m inor role. They ensure by their involvement in the process of standard- 
setting, that standards comply with the Companies Act. They m ay be 
represented and operate within any working group of the standard-setting 
body involved w ith legal matters^*. The Companies Division claim s, 
how ever, that it devotes most of its resources to m atters of develop ing  
Com pany Law, rather than involving itself w ith accounting standards.
M uch of the involvement of the DTI w ith the ASC took place at m eetings 
w here the m inutes do not appear in the ASC archives; nevertheless there  
are m any references to the involvem ent of the Com panies Division at 
various m eetings of sub-groups. During the developm ent of the foreign 
exchange standard, Jenkins, of the Companies Division attended the  
discussion meeting held on 14.11.79 w ith some 42 representatives of m ajor 
com panies (ASC 2/8/6). Influence by the DTI does seem to occur in th a t 
they were allowed to agree elements of the standard. It is recorded in  the  
m inutes of a meeting on 21.1.83, that:
Source - interview with Jenkins of DTI on 19.10.90.
Where changes in company law are to be made, the DTI produces 
consultative documents on which it invites comments by specific dates in 
much the same way as exposure drafts. These documents are forwarded to 
those parties considered by the Department to have an interest in the topic.
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'The ASC representatives explained how they had dealt with the 
individual comments made by the DOT^^ in the attachment to their 
letter (dated 10.1.83) and this treatm ent was accepted by the 
DOT subject to the following m inor amendments...'
(ASC 1/9 /1)
U nfortunately no record of the letter of 10.1.83 has been retained, but the 
elem ent of negotiation is confirmed in a letter from Pauline W allace, 
(under secretary to the ASC) to J Bowman of Price W aterhouse dated 
28.1.83 'In addition to the changes agreed w ith the DOT...' (ASC 2/11/2, 
italics added). The importance of alignm ent of standards w ith com pany 
law does appear to have been accepted some three years earlier in a letter 
from Jenkins (DOT) to Carty (ASC secretary) dated 7.5.80 - already quoted 
in Chapter 3, but also relevant in this context.
'At the very least, it will be assum ed that compliance w ith an 
SSAP w ould not involve any risk of infringing the statutory
requirem ents we think it im portant that the ASC should
consider the treatm ent advocated in the proposed exposure 
draft in the light of the imminent and prospective statutory 
position in the UK' (ASC 2/30/2)
The developm ent of the standard on goodwill, also shows the 
involvem ent of the Department. A panel was set up  as a sub-com m ittee 
of the ASC to discuss m atters relating to goodwill w ith Knox and Leeson 
of the DOT as members. A lthough m inutes only exist in respect of one 
meeting, m ention is m ade of 8 meetings of this panel between N ovem ber 
1978 and June 1979 (ASC 2 /10/2). Evidence of negotiations on the terms of 
the proposed standard exist. In a letter dated 10.9.79 from Knox to W ild of 
the ASC he states;
' ... I suggest that in order to m aintain comparability where 
goodwill is carried as a perm anent asset, the effect of the 
treatm ent we now recommend should be disclosed in the 
n o tes ' (ASC 2/10/2)
Comment letters on the exposure draft were sent to Knox, which confirm s 
the statem ent m ade by the DTI during an interview  w ith the writer that 
these are examined whenever time permits. Knox was also asked to check 
details of the legality of the proposed treatm ents w ith his legal staff
Department of Trade, now DTI.
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(m inutes of meeting of panel ASC 2 /24 /1 ), a function which the DOT later 
repeated through a letter from Jenkins (DOT) to Renshall (ASC) dated
26.5.82 com m enting on the reconciliation of the proposed standard w ith  
the law  and additionally commenting on m atters of drafting (ASC 2 /89 /1 ).
The extent of governm ental involvem ent can also be seen th ro u g h  
records of Parliam entary answers. In 1976 in the context of infla tion  
accounting, Dell, Minister at the Treasury stated th a t ,
'Governm ent have been consulted by the accounting 
profession in course of preparation of the exposure draft, and 
endorse the approach taken by the profession.'
(Hansard Vol. 921)
The DTI not only m onitored developm ents in the area of accounting 
regulation^^, bu t also were pro-active on occasions as Redwood also stated; 
'My Departm ent has draw n the attention of the ASB to several 
points which will need to be considered w hen SSAP 21 is reviewed.'
( H ansard Vol. 194 9.7.91)
How ever, the DTI had stated that their role w ith regard to accounting 
standards is one of com m unication of inform ation to other departm ents 
and receiving their comments w ith a secondary role of ensuring  
compliance w ith  company law. The incidences of other departm ents 
responding to exposure drafts is very rare, and it is therefore difficult in  
the absence of the availability of inter-departm ental correspondence to 
ascertain the am ount of communication that m ay take place or the orig in  
of governm ental (DOT/DTI) replies to exposure drafts. In interviews w ith  
other departm ents, no recollection was forthcom ing of comments o n  
exposure drafts being given to the DTI. This m ight im ply that it is the DTI 
them selves w ho are concerned w ith accounting standards a lthough  
during  an interview  w ith the w riter they tended to marginalise the ir 
involvem ent. This 'official' attitude is confirm ed in  a letter w ritten by 
Miss E Llewellyn-Smith, Under Secretary of the Com panies Division o n
10.8.82 to M W alsh, Head of Technical Services at the Association of 
Certified and Corporate Accountants (ACCA) stating 'Still less would I feel
This may be illustrated by a reply made by Redwood of the DTI to Austen 
Mitchell MP, on the subject of accounting for financial futures, in which 
he stated that the issue was being considered by the profession and that the 
DTI was watching developments closely (Hansard Vol. 194).
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it the D epartm ent's role to say w hether a standard should or should n o t 
apply to banks' (ASC 2/28/2). The title of 'observer 'on the ASC w ould  
im ply a passive role if it were not for the fact that evidence exists that o n  
one occasion they voted on a draft standard^ (Letter from K Sharp to K 
Robinson of ASC dated 21.4.82, ASC 2/29/3). It is not possible to say 
w hether they voted on other occasions as the ballot results were norm ally  
disclosed only on a numerical basis.
Consultation by the ASC with the DOT was a norm al part of their process 
of developing draft standards. This is accounted for in an internal paper 
produced by the ASC in 1982, which stated;
' Because of the growing impact of company law on accounting, it 
has become necessary to consult frequently w ith the Companies 
Division of the Department of Trade w hen exposure drafts of new  
standards or revisions of existing standards have reached an 
appropriate stage'
(ASC 1982)
Despite the role described above which w ould appear to be one of 
reconciling standards w ith the law, there were how ever concerns voiced at 
the involvem ent of the DTI. In an internal ASC m em o from  Rawlins to 
Davison, excess governm ent interference from their representatives was 
m entioned (ASC 5 /3 /5 ).
SUMMARY
The m otivation for state involvement in standard setting w ould appear to 
exclude their own role as a user. W here representatives of user groups are 
m em bers of or attem pt to influence standard setting bodies, their actions 
will generally be dictated by the requirem ents of inform ation as inputs to 
decision models. In the case of governm ent departm ents and agencies, 
their needs appear to be satisfied either by existing reporting practices o r 
through their powers both formal and inform al to secure additional 
in form ation .
This was explained by a former assistant secretary of the ASC as purely a 
way in which the ASC could confirm the agreement of government to the 
draft standard, although presumably implies that ASC were concerned 
about official opinion. In any case it does elevate the position of 'observer' 
and give government a higher profile than other groups (Interview with J 
Winters, 1995).
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Involvem ent in the standard setting process, if not carried out from the 
user perspective, m ust have other reasons. One might be the p rom otion  
of specific policy objectives; another might be the 'public interest' aspect of 
m axim ising social welfare (although there m ust be a degree of overlap 
between these two objectives). In the case of the former, some specific 
policies are recognisable e.g. the concern w ith exempting small com panies 
from some reporting requirements and the effect of reporting leased item s 
as fixed assets with corresponding liabilities. In the case of 'public in terest' 
the link is more tenuous. More disclosure may be associated w ith  
im proving the allocative process through superior decision-making. 
Clarification of technical matters might also assist w ith this. The interest 
of the state in accounting would not appear to be a passive role of allowing 
reports to influence their decision making behaviour. It seems that the 
role is far more one of ensuring desirable results from accounting (from 
the point of view of the government).
It is difficult to imagine the state allowing the form ulation of regulations 
w ith economic effects taking place outside the norm al policy-making 
arena unless they can exert a degree of influence. The em phasis on  
compliance of standards with UK law is one area in which the state is 
exercising an overall control. The lack of detailed accounting rules m ade 
by the state would appear to indicate the acceptance of a fram ework under 
which the accounting profession makes these detailed rules, w hilst 
rem aining w ithin the boundaries set by the Companies Acts. How ever, 
detailed rules have economic effects, and it is these that the state m ay 
attem pt to control. Certainly the observer status of the governm ent 
representatives on the Accounting Standards Committee appears to h ide 
the influence they were able to wield. Not only does the state have the 
ability to institutionalise the process of standard-setting totally, but is able 
to influence individual issues. In the context of the revision to the 
Research and Development standard; '
 the DTI observer commented that the government was keen to
see the disclosure of Research and Development expenditure in the 
standard, but was considering the use of a statutory instrum ent to 
require disclosure, if the ASC could not agree on a suitable standard'
(Robson, 1988 p. 64)
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The covert side of state pressure does not appear w ith in  the replies to 
Exposure Drafts which tend to state a view rather than  threaten action.
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CHAPTER 9
COMPARISONS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have identified and examined those factors w hich 
w ould  im ply the m axim isation of independence for regulatory agencies. 
These factors were considered primarily in the context of the structure and 
operations of the Accounting Standards Com mittee bu t were also 
extended to the Accounting Standards Board and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board for the purposes of comparison. This chapter 
sets ou t to review some extant theories of regulatory behaviour and 
indicate their relevance in the area of accounting regulation, follow ing 
which, the factors identified are then sum m arised and placed w ithin  the 
context of these overall theories of behaviour. Finally, suggestions for 
further research are m ade both as an extension to the w ork carried out in  
this thesis, and as areas to explore the subject m atter further.
AGENCY CAPTURE
There are two m ain competing models of regulation. Firstly, there is the 
public interest m odel (Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971), w hich as its nam e 
suggests, assum es that regulators represent and advance the interests of 
the public. Secondly, the political economy m odel 'argues that regulation  
responds prim arily to the interests of the most pow erful constituencies in  
the regulatory context' (Miles & Bhambri, 1983 plS). Agency capture 
represents the extreme form of this model. Capture theories are based o n  
the fact that there is an inevitable interaction betw een the regulators and 
the regulated^, which leads ' to the dom ination of the agency by the 
regulated so that policy making is biased in their favour (Lemak, 1985). 
Noll and  Owen (1983) talk of the regulatory environm ent being populated 
by advocates of particular economic interests. A lthough this is partly due 
to the incentives that the regulated firms have in achieving beneficial
 ^ This occurs at various points in the process of regulation e.g. formal consultation or less 
formally, through lobbying.
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outcomes (such incentives are discussed later in the context of costs and  
benefits), there are also structural reasons identified by Thom pson and 
Jones (1982). They argue that regulated firms tend to have a m onopoly of 
supply of inform ation, although they also accept that that there m ay be 
other pow erful voices to be heard in the process^. The fact that there m ay 
exist a shared perception of problems (discussed in Chapter 5) could be a 
result of the supply of information to the regulators (Mitnick 1980).
If, how ever regulatory policy is m ade in an environm ent of pow erful 
competing interests then clearly it is difficult to predict a systematic 
successful outcome for the regulated industries. On the other hand, the  
absence of differing interests from such an arena for policy-making m ay 
imply that regulators only receive an input from the regulated industry. 
Additionally, a weak system of accountability is identified as a po ten tial 
cause of capture (Reagan 1987). Carey (in Bernstein, 1955), in the US 
political context, talks of a vacuum  caused by the lack of presidential 
leadership of regulatory agencies, into which the regulated interests m ove, 
soon overcom ing weak regulatory defences. Political sponsorship w ould  
appear to be one way in which agencies may w ithstand capture perhaps 
implying that regulation should become a democratic process. B ernstein  
(1955), on the other hand attributes regulatory bodies w ith strong an ti­
democratic implications^, because experts dom inate the process. Certainly, 
where these experts are also mem bers of a single profesion, these 
implications may be well founded, since there exists evidence of the  
shared value elements in professional norm s (Wilson, 1980). Such v a lue  
elements which Jones (1995) attributes to gender, race, family and 
educational background, could account for perspectives shared by both  the  
regulators and the regulated.
 ^ The presence of such powerful voices may depend upon the incidence of costs and benefits, 
discussed later in this chapter.
 ^ As long ago as 1886 in the United States concerns were raised about the creation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in that it was felt that the railroad companies would be 
able to combine their power to control the appointment of the Commissioner through their 
use of the best legal and business talent.
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An extreme form of capture theory has emerged which stated that 
regulatory agencies were created for the interests of private enterprise 
through some form of implicit compact between governm ent and 
business to support the notions of private enterprise against consum ers 
(Lowi 1969)4. the context of accounting regulation, this would im ply 
that the governm ent and producers of accounting information control the 
process at the expense of the stakeholders or users of accounting 
inform ation. Edelman (1964) describes the activities of regulators in these 
circumstances, as generally being little more than 'symbolic gestures'. 
Such claims are refuted by Thompson & Jones (1982) and by W ilson (1980) 
on the grounds that there is little empirical evidence of this occuring and 
that there would be no evidence of anti-industry pronouncem ents if this 
were the case.
Stigler's (1971) economic theory of regulation posited that agencies were 
controlled by the regulated and operated in their interests. This was 
refined by Peltzm an (1976) in the context of coalition seeking, whereby 
industries, in order to avoid the rigours of the m arket place dem anded 
regulation as a form of protection. The regulated firms could provide 
incentives to those political parties able to harness the power of the State, 
by the provision of resources in return for the use of this legitimate power. 
The exchange of favours under such a coalition as this could only take 
place how ever where regulation emanated from the state, rather th an  
from an independent agency. Lemak (1985) describes the economic theory 
of regulation as being a form of interest group theory and although such 
theory is criticised on the grounds that it fails to explain or predict 
regulatory behaviour, Posner (1974) has suggested that any form of in terest 
group theory could be consistent with empirical evidence at least up to the 
m id 1970's. Other critics have pointed to the moves during the 1980's to 
de-regulation and the fact that the practice of politics may in v o lv e  
attempts to shape the preferences of participants. It has also been suggested 
that the rise in m em bership and resources of consum er, en v iro n m en ta l 
and other interest groups are a cause of regulatory agencies m ov ing  
towards decisions that do not favour the regulated industries.
4 See also section in this chapter headed Iron Triangle.
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Miles and Bhambri (1983) describe a m odel of regulation incorporating a 
drift towards agency capture rather than  assum ing this as hav ing  
happened. Their rather intuitive perspective is based on the fact that they 
claim that neither the public interest model or the political econom y 
m odel (and by inference, the economic model) 'have not been subjected to 
rigorous comparative study or empirical verification' (p. 19).
ARE ACCOUNTING REGULATORS CAPTURED?
There w ould appear to be no actual tests to see w hether an agency has been 
captured and hence none of the theories discussed in the previous section 
incorporate empirical studies. Clearly, the use of agencies invo lves 
interaction between the regulators and the regulated. The latter group as 
discussed in Chapter 2 have every incentive to seek beneficial outcom es 
w hich flow from the economic consequences of accounting regulation. 
Accounting regulation has tended to be carried out w ithin a closed arena. 
Previous chapters have identified that dialogues involve accountants in  
the regulatory body and accountants in industry and practice. The 
preparers of accounts have been active in supplying inform ation to the  
regulators through producing reports and detailed analysis of accounting 
phenom ena, often contained in replies to Exposure Drafts. A ccountants 
have always been involved directly m the process and decision-m aking as 
m em bers of the ASC and ASB, or of working parties, while still practising 
as preparers (or auditors effectively appointed by the preparers). 
Additionally, accounting theory has been utilised to justify practices in  
accordance w ith Watts and Zim m erm ans (1979) prognosis in 'The M arket 
for E x cu ses'5 . The weak accountability structure of the ASC, described in  
Chapter 7 and exacerbated by m ultiple dem ands from diffuse stakeholders 
w ould imply that the conditions existed for agency capture. A dditionally, 
the dom ination of the process by the accountancy profession, w hose 
values m ay not reflect those of society, makes the lack of a clear separation 
of regulators and regulated even more significant.
 ^ Indeed an examination of the comment letters especially in the case of the proposed 
goodwill standard (ED 30) illustrates the theoretical arguments used by respondents to 
justify (existing) practices.
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The extreme form of capture would appear to apply if it is assum ed that 
governm ents support private enterprise rather than consumers. The 
conditions for this to occur, i.e. an implicit compact between governm en t 
and business could relate to the beginnings of the ASSC which owed its 
origins in part to lack of governm ental involvem ent in the detailed 
regulation of accounting. This lack of involvem ent also spanned the  
setting up  of the ASC and the ASB and is re-examined later in this chapter 
as the 'iron  triangle' theories. One of the main argum ents used against the 
the control of the regulatory process by industry, has been the evidence of 
anti-industry regulatory pronouncem ents. In the case of the ASC, there 
does not appear to be any 'unpopular' pronouncem ents, and even w here 
such standards were im plim ented w ith less than full support, the 
individual professional bodies did not seek to discipline their members for 
non-com pliance^.
The issue of w hether the industry wanted to avoid the rigours of the 
m arket place is som ewhat m ore problematic to place in the realm  of 
accounting. The motives for the setting up of the ASSC had more to do 
w ith  the accounting profession m aintaining control of regulation ra ther 
than  allowing the governm ent to take over that role (as described in  
Chapter 1). The actions of the ICAEW in its series of R ecom m endations 
w ould appear to dem onstrate the need for guidance on m atters of 
accounting.
Interest group theory m ust be relevant to a regulatory environm ent, but 
in the cases examined it was not a case of the existence of com peting 
groups, bu t rather one where a single group appeared to dom inate the  
regulatory process.
IRON TRIANGLE
A variance on the capture them e, term ed the 'Iron Triangle', has been 
suggested which links regulatory agencies, the governm ent and in terest 
groups (normally the regulated industry). In the context of the older US 
regulatory agencies, M achan and Johnson (1983), talk of such a coalition
 ^ See Capter 1.
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exercising a 'domination of policy' (p. 3), but W ilson (1980) discounts this 
theory on the grounds that any such 'tight and predictable pattern of 
action' (p. 391) has not been evidenced in US agencies. Additionally, he  
considers that some relationships are bilateral (consisting of only two of 
the players), rather than triangular, whereas others are quadrilatéral^, 
involving both pro and anti industry groups as well as the governm ent 
and the regulatory agency. Nevertheless, it is apparent that som e 
relationships exist between the regulators, the governm ent and the 
regulated by virtue of the factors identified in the previous chapters. 
Thom pson and Jones (1982) whilst denying the existence of the iron  
triangle, nevertheless admit that regulatory decisions (again in the US) 
tend to reflect the opinions of the congressional overseeing com m ittees 
and favour the interests of well organised advocacy groups.
Insofar as the UK government is concerned as the possible third party in  
the triangle, their role is harder to define. If the ASC was captured by the 
accounting profession in its role as preparer/auditor, and the governm ent 
actively participated in the operations and subsequent decisions of the 
ASC, then this would imply the existence of an iron triangle. Additionally, 
the governm ent has from time to time been asked to support the 
accounting profession by a form of legal backing for standards. In 1984, 
w hen ED35 was issued, a meeting was held between CCAB members, the  
DTI and the Treasury, at which Peter Godfrey, an ASC member stated:
'We need to ask whether a statutory instrum ent would give general 
backing to standards or whether it w ould be just for this one. I d o n 't 
think it should be the latter. It should be seen as a general statutory 
backing. This is against the background of detailed statutory rules. 
That is, the work of the ASC w ould get greater statutory backing'
(Meeting 6.11.84 ASC 1/48/4)
In the event, the regulators had to wait until the form ation of the ASB 
before any type of formal backing of standards or recognition of the  
standard setters was achieved.
 ^Wilson also points to the fact that White House efforts to bring regulatory agencies under 
tighter control is a 'history of dashed hopes and wasted energies' (p. 391).
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Even the existence of statutory backing for standards does not necessarily 
im ply the agreem ent of governm ent w ith each pronouncem ent, w ithou t 
evidence being available as to their co-operation or even collusion w ith  
the standard setters during the process of form ation of the regulations. 
From  replies to exposure drafts, it w ould appear that governm ent was at 
times at odds w ith industry in its views on accounting standards, 
especially where it was seeking to pursue those economic policy ends 
described in Chapter 8. Additionally, instances of conflict between the 
governm ent and ASC (for example PSSAP 7) or occasions on which the 
threat of including matters w ithin the Companies Acts was used, im ply 
that the iron triangle theory does not apply in the UK. The theory w ould 
perhaps tend to apply more to situations w here the agency had a 
sponsoring governm ent departm ent on which it w as dependant.
LIFE CYCLE THEORIES
The life cycle theory of agencies was first p u t forward by Bernstein in 1955 
(pp. 74-102). This states that the formation of a new agency m arks a period 
of vigorous activity by highly m otivated defenders of the public interest. 
This follows a gestation period during which some problem  in society is 
recognised and corrective legislation is dem anded by reformers. W here 
the solution lies in the formation of an agency, there is often a lack of 
clarity in the agency's mandate. During the 'youthful phase' of its' life, 
although regulated groups are well organised to protect their interests, 
such pressures will be met by the 'aggressive crusading spirit' of the 
regulators. As the regulatory body m atures it m ay find that it has n o  
political support for its actions. The original crisis w hich brought about its 
form ation has passed, the groups supporting regulation have faded away 
and its political supporters have progressed to other issues. Eventually, the 
regulatory body becomes a part of the industrial system and 'becomes 
m ore concerned w ith the general health  of the industry, and w ith  
enjoying good relationships w ith the regulated groups'. Finally, in its 
period of old age, decline sets in w ith the agency '...ignored or abandoned 
by an unorganised public, commissions tend to play for safety in policy 
decisions. Passivity deepens into debility' (p. 92). Reagan (1987) interprets 
this as a logical flow towards capture which derives from a lack of political 
support accompanied by organised pressure from the regulated industry. A
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sim ilar approach is used by Luehlfing (1995)® in describing a (hypothetical) 
cyclical situation involving three players, the public, the governm ent and 
the accounting establishment. From this emerges the following theoretical 
constructs; crisis, public outcry, governm ent response, accounting 
intervention and probation. The crisis involves an event which provokes 
a public outcry often calling for governm ental action^. Either a stop-gap 
m easure is then introduced or the promise of legislation. This is followed 
by a private sector action designed to pacify governm ent officials and  
voters until its' own recom m endations are im plem ented. The 
governm ent then is provided with an alternative to legislation and places 
the accounting establishment 'on probation', assuring the public that the 
accounting establishm ent will be closely m onitored. The go v ern m en t 
then has no need to take further action until the next crisis occurs and the 
cycle starts again.
The idea of cycles has also been used in the context of specific issues by 
Nobes (1991) in his paper 'Cycles in UK Standard Setting', in w hich he  
looks at five examples of accounting practice which have been the focus of 
'dow nw ard  force ' (against standardisation) and 'upw ard force (in favour 
of standardisation). Each example commences w ith a fairly high level of 
standardisation proposed by 'som e independent m inded senior 
professionals', before the opposing forces w ith their self interest m o v e  
tow ards less standardisation. This could be equated w ith  the 'you th fu l 
crusading spirit' described by Bernstein (1955), but applied to in d iv id u a l 
acts of regulation rather than the regulatory body itself.
If the above cyclical ideas are applied to accounting standard setting in the  
UK, each one w ould appear to describe some part of history since 1970. The 
problem  which m arked the formation of the ASSC existed in the UK w ith  
the calls for action in the late 1960's. Initially, there was implicit support
® Although Luehlfing is writing of self-regulation in the accounting profession, his ideas 
would seem to apply to the early days of UK standard setting in which the involvement of 
the accounting establishment only, mimicked a form of self-regulation.
 ^ Even though accounting regulation may not be in the government domain, the public would 
not always be aware of this. See Hood (1979) in Chapter 6 about confusion as to 
responsibilities in service provision.
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in that the governm ent was quite content to leave the question of 
regulation to the profession as evidenced by Parliamentary answers quoted 
in earlier chapters. During the late 1970's and 1980's it could be claim ed 
that the ASC had become part of the industrial system and its decisions 
appeared to be pro-industry, before m oving into the decline stage w ith  
safety decisions being made on the grounds of satisfying the preferences of 
the regulated^o, as illustrated in Chapter 7. Further crises in the late 1980's 
w ith  the failure of several major com panies could perhaps be credited 
w ith  the re-com mencem ent of the cycle through the form ation of the  
ASB. The early years of the new  regulatory body have indicated a 
crusading spirit with a willingness to take decisions less than popular w ith  
those being regulated^i. Bernstein's theories by their nature can only be 
descriptive rather than capable of em pirical verification, but nevertheless, 
they do appear to indicate trends in regulation which can be noted.
The Nobes' cycle can be considered indicative of one of the problem s 
facing the ASC. In both the examples of standards used in p rev ious 
chapter, each has started off by suggesting a high level of standardisation 
before being forced to adopt alternative treatm ents by the 'dow nw ard 
forces'.
Luehlfing's (1995) description of events could be related to the life of the  
ASC, being formed out of a crisis, to w hich the governm ent w ould h av e  
had  to respond if the profession had not acted, as decribed in Chapter 1. 
The threat of legislative action by the governm ent receded during the life 
of the ASC, and indeed previous chapters have quoted frequently from  
official responses endorsing the actions and legitimacy of the regulatory 
body. The next crisis arose w hen it became apparent that the then cu rren t 
regulatory regime was unable to prevent the further crises of the late 
1980's.
It is interesting to note in this connection that of the last four standards issued, one has 
been withdrawn and the others are under review by the ASB.
FRS's have both tackled areas of creative accounting e.g. FRS 2,4,5,6 and 7 as well as 
providing more information for users e.g. FRS 1,2 and 3.
200
THEORIES OF LOBBYING
The m ajority of theories of lobbying have tended to share one com m on  
perspective, that certain economic groups control a d isproportionate 
am ount of the political resources that influence the actions of regulatory 
agencies. This is in accordance w ith the political economy m odel described 
by Miles and Bhambri (1983) which stated that regulation 'responds 
prim arily  to the interests of the most powerful constituencies in the 
regulatory context' (p. 18). These groups by definition behave in their ow n 
self-interest. The economics approach to a political process such as 
accounting regulation, is also term ed 'public choice theory ' (see M ueller 
1979) w hich views the outcomes of the process as being related to the  
relative strengths of the groups involved. From this theory m ay be 
developed various hypotheses related to accounting, such as that of Sutton 
(1984) w ho posited that preparers of financial statem ents w ere m ore likely 
to lobby than  users. He based this on the fact that preparers w ould obtain 
greater income benefits from regulation than w ould users w ho in m ost 
cases were able to diversify their portfolios. Additionally, as regulation is a 
public good (with no exclusion of non-participants in the lobbying 
process), large firms would be more likely to lobby than  sm all firms, w ho 
could enjoy the benefits w ithout incurring the costs. Both of these 
propositions are certainly testable and indeed illustrated by such visible 
signs of lobbying as the submission of comm ent letters or presentations at 
public hearings. However, as has already been stated, lobbying m ay take 
place at m any different stages and one research report suggests that the 
m ost successful type of lobbying takes place at the very inception of the 
item being regulated^^.
Economic theories of lobbying are not w ithout their critics. W ilson (1980) 
gives examples of the failure of economic theories of regulation in  
accounting for regulatory b e h a v i o u r ^ ^  based on the fact that economists do
Van Lent's (1996) study into the case of financial conglomerates in the Netherlands, 
identified non-public lobbying occurring very early in the regulatory process. This would be 
in accordance with the ideas of both Sutton (1984) and Lindahl (1987).
For example where price reductions have been ordered or where competition is allowed 
to enter the market.
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not consider motives in non-m arket relationships, neither do they 
consider the formation of heterogeneous coalitions. Preferences are 
assum ed in economics to be given, whereas politics often focuses o n  
efforts being made to shape preferences. W ithin a political context, the 
shaping of preferences is one way in which coalitions are formed. 
Decisions are made often on the basis of the distribution of costs and 
benefits: however these are often non-m onetary and the values assigned 
to them  depend upon the beliefs of the participants and these beliefs m ay 
change over time.
W ilson (1980) has identified four types of political scenarios w hich  
describe lobbying behaviour in situations where costs and benefits occur. 
The first of these he terms majoritarian politics in which all or m ost of 
society expects to gain and all or most of society expects to pay. In this 
situation, because no small segment of society can expect to gain (or lose), 
there is little incentive to form an interest group. W ithin an accounting 
context, this could apply to a new regulation which brings in fo rm ation  
into the public dom ain which is non-prejudicial to those com panies 
reporting and where the costs of production m ight involve passing a 
small cost to the product or service being produced.
The second type occurs where both costs and benefits are narrow ly 
concentrated and is known as interest group politics. Each side has a strong 
incentive to organise in order to influence the regulation. W here  
preparers of accounting information are concerned, they may be 
considered in themselves as a narrow group for w hom  certain accounting 
rules could produce either costs or benefits. In the case studies contained 
in earlier chapters it was seen that companies preferred flexibility in  
accounting rules (probably from the point of view of producing beneficial 
consequences for themselves). Sutton (1984), using the w ork of Olson 
(1965), suggests that because of homogenous economic interests, producers 
can create a temporary form of organisation for lobbying purpose and that 
this cost-sharing exercise ensures that the cost of lobbying is outweighed by 
the benefits. The lack of apparent user involvem ent in the process of 
standard setting would imply that there is no narrow  grouping on w h o m  
the opposing costs or benefits would accrue, for if such a group existed 
among users, it would be seen to be lobbying for its' preferences.
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The th ird  type, client politics, would appear to be the m ost likely in  
accounting terms. Under this, 'some small easily organised group w ill 
benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organise and lobby' (W ilson, 
1980, p. 369)1^. The costs are spread over a large num ber of people w ho  
have little incentive to organise in opposition. As the participants in the  
lobbying process are in most cases m em bers of the CCAB bodies (see 
Chapter 7), and m oreover in nearly all cases include the 'big six' firm s, 
they m ight be term ed in general an organised group even though they 
m ay be fragm ented by their involvem ent w ith firms, district societies or 
technical advisory committees. Sutton (1984) considers that lobbying w ill 
be concentrated on those producers on w hom  the effects of a standard are 
likely to be the most significant, since unlike (investors) users, they draw  
their incom e from only a few sources and are therefore unable to 
diversify. This m ay account for the dearth of users in the process.
W ilson's final category of entrepreneurial politics, involves general 
benefits at a cost to be bom  by a small segm ent of society. In accounting 
terms, this could be a disclosure of an unpopular nature (e.g. external costs 
im posed by  the organisation). The incentive to organise against the m atter 
is strong for opponents and weak for beneficiaries, which m ight im ply that 
disclosure proposals of this sort are rarely successful for users. To succeed, 
they need a skilled entrepreneur who is able to mobilise public sen tim en t 
and associate the policy m atter w ith widely shared values^^. Often such  
en trepreneurs use allies inside the governm ent or regulatory bodies and  
m ay be aided by a scandal or crisis. The creation of the ASSC could a lm ost 
be considered an example of entrepreneurial politics in which the public 
w as persuaded of the need for more regulation. This depended 'heavily o n  
the attitudes of third parties' W ilson (p. 371) and the press attacks o n  
accounting described in Chapter 1 m ight have acted in this way to help  
create an attitude of m istrust in the public. Perhaps the m ain examples in  
the UK are those of the various attacks on the audit profession in the
The costs of regulation are likely to fall on the producers (Francis, 1987); therefore they 
will benefit from opposing the regulation.
Perhaps, the best known example of such an entrepreneur was Ralph Nader, in his 
instigation of the Auto Safety Act of 1966 in the US.
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sixties by Professor Stamp and more recently the alliance betw een 
academics and an opposition politicians^, but it w ould be difficult to claim  
that these incidents mobilised public sentiment.
W ilson sum m arises theses types of politics by stating that in client and 
interest group politics, the economic interests of the key actors are both  
clear and decisive, whereas with majoritarian and entrepreneurial politics 
such interests are not decisive. He therefore considers that a com plete 
theory of regulatory politics would require a study, not just of interests, but 
also of beliefs. This reflects one of the deficiencies of research in to  
accounting regulation, which appears to have concentrated on the  
economic interest (expressed or assumed) of the various actors, ra ther 
than their beliefs.
The dearth of empirical research on lobbying is reflected by the fact tha t 
theories tend to be descriptive rather than analytical or predictive. 
According to Grant (1989)^^ this is explained by m ethodological problem s 
which prevent a clear answer to the evaluation of interest group 
effectiveness. This uncertainty he com pounds by describing the difficulty 
in identifying w hether lobbying action or some other behaviour b rought 
about success. Claims of effectiveness of lobbying have often been m ade 
post hoc and are based on self interest, (Rush, 1990; Jordan, 1991; 
Grantham , 19891®).
INDEPENDENCE REVISITED
Throughout this work, the accounting regulatory body has been the centre 
of the focus. An independent body is a necessary condition for 
independent decisions. The importance of this is underlined  by the  
Chairm an of F ASB, Beresford (1995);
1® Sikka, Puxty and Wülmot, and Austen Mitchell M P.
1^  Grant's work, although in the field of public policy, can be equally applied to accounting 
regulation which, through economic consequences allies itself to public policy.
1® The motives for these claims could be attributed to the growth in commercial lobbyists, 
see for example Moloney (1996).
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'The independence of the standard setter and the neutrality of the 
standards are critical to the credibility and reliability of reported 
information. W ithout independence and neutrality, financial 
reporting can become propaganda' (p. 61)
The subtitle of this thesis i.e. structure, process and inputs, describes those 
characteristics as the most im portant elements impacting on  
independence. The threats to independence come from those groups w ho 
wish to gain some advantage from the results of regulation, but w ho 
nevertheless m ust be included in the regulatory process. The very role of 
accounting in society makes it vulnerable, because as Robson (1994) claims;
'...accounting is called upon to legitimise, respond or change in 
accordance w ith the policy, discourses and rationales of a variety of 
state, industrial and labour institutions.' (p. 78)
Belkaoui (1985) considers that in the US, the activities of these in terest 
groups has led to more politicisation of the standard setting process. 
Indeed, this has been recognised by FASB in the following statement:
T he process of setting accounting standards can be described as 
democratic because like all rule-making bodies the boards' right to 
make rules depends ultimately on the consent of the ruled. But 
because standard setting requires some perspective, it w ould not be 
appropriate to establish a standard based solely on a canvas of the 
constituents. Similarly, the process can be described as legislative 
because it m ust be deliberative and because all views m ust be 
heard. But the standard setters are expected to represent the entire 
constituency as a whole and not be representatives of a specific 
constituent group. The process can be described as political because 
there is an educational effort involved in getting a new standard 
accepted. But it is not political in the sense that an accommodation 
is required to get a standard issued.'
(FASB, 1977, quoted in Belkaoui, 1985 p. 11)
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It is the representation of the community as a whole in conjunction w ith  
some perspective^^ that may be the key to regulatory independence. But 
accounting regulation takes place in an arena of competing interests. The 
regulators m ust somehow consider the views of all groups w hether 
participant or not in the process, especially as Fogarty et al (1994) point out, 
incentives and victories of specially interested parties, runs counter to the 
public interest. The threats to independence were seen in the earlier 
chapters to arise from two separate sources. The producers of in fo rm ation  
and the government. Adding to, and also underlying this threat is the  
absence of users in the process to balance other more powerful interests.
The larger corporate producers of information are normally those w ho are 
expected to lobby. In part this may be due to the type of individual cost- 
benefit analysis described by Olson (1965) or because lobbying is 
'concentrated among those producers on whom  the "real" effects of a 
standard are likely to bear most heavily' (Sutton, 1984, p. 86). Additionally, 
lobbying efforts are thought to be dependent upon the resources at the 
lobbyists' disposal (Becker 1983, Blake 1973). The research into SSAP20 and 
SSAF22 showed that it was the large firms which submitted com m ent 
letters and made presentations (possibly because both standards concerned 
the activities of large-scale operations). Nobes's (1992(a)) com m ent 'A s 
usual users were hard to detect' (p. 156) could apply to both of these 
standards. Beresford (1993) noted not only the dearth of users, bu t the fact 
that m any producers presented themselves as users. Sutton's (1984) 
analysis of ED 18 also found preparers 'hidden' amongst 'individuals' and 
'representative bodies' thus creating the false impression of a m ore 
rounded input into the standard.
The impact of governm ent on the process of regulation is best illustrated 
perhaps by an examination of certain regulatory incidents. Traditionally in  
the UK, the governm ent has publicly supported the idea of private sector 
accounting regulation and parliam entary answers quoted earlier affirm  
this principle. As seen in previous chapters, consideration has been given 
at times to the legal endorsem ent of accounting standards. On the o ther
Perhaps the perspective might be based on some form of social consensus and found 
within an agreed conceptual framework of accounting.
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hand, threats of the use of company law to overcome shortfalls in  
disclosure requirem ents revealed in Robson’s study of SSAP 13, im ply 
willingness by the governm ent to interfere in the process w ith the  
justification of acting in the national interest. The setting up of the  
Sandilands Committee following assurances some eighteen m o n th s  
earlier from the DTI that inflation accounting policy should be left to the  
accounting profession, is another well docum ented example of such 
interference (Robson 1994). In the US there are examples of com panies 
approaching governm ent in order to achieve their own objectives. 
Beresford (1995) quotes the case of accounting for stock options w hich  
resulted in FASB receiving ’dozens of letters from individual Senators 
and Representatives asking us to explain and defend our proposal....and 
even our existence” p. 56^°. It hardly seems likely that politicians shou ld  
suddenly become interested in accounting principles w ithout some form  
of outside pressure being applied. The decision by FASB not to require 
expense recognition for stock options m ay well have been based on the  
Board's self-preservation rather than accounting theory^i. It is difficult to 
say w hether similar pressures were felt by the ASC during its lifetime, but 
the rem oval of m any of the governm ent papers from the ASC archives 
could imply attem pts to hide the am ount of influence that was exerted, 
possibly by the threat of sanctions.
W ithin this scenario of producer and governm ent pressure on regulators 
developed throughout the earlier chapters, the characteristics of the 
independence model all point to diverse influences on accounting 
regulators. A governm ent has every incentive to allow regulation to 
rem ain in the private sector for the reasons examined in Chapter 3. Som e 
of their motives were seen to apply to efficiency considerations, w hereas 
others were based on political considerations. If the former m otives are
Even President Clinton was involved stating “'that it would be better to avoid legislation 
on this issue' and 'it would be unfortunate if FASB's proposal inadvertently undermined the 
competitiveness of some of America's most promising high-tec companies'.
This represented a clear theoretical climb down on behalf of FASB who admitted that 
'...the Board acknowledged that there simply isn't enough support for the basic notion of 
requiring expense recognition, even though it remains convinced that options have value 
and are compensation' Beresford (1995) p. 60.
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the strong reasons for private regulation, then it could be assum ed that 
interference from governm ent will be minimised. On the other hand , 
where sensitive issues are concerned, or unpopular decisions are to be 
made, then the governm ent may wish to use the regulatory agency to 
prom ote it's preferred policy. Nevertheless governm ent has the 
opportunity to influence the process not only in the same way as any other 
user or preparer, but also by the threat of legislation, which, a lthough  
rarely used, could in any case act as a deterrent to the regulators.
The nature of the tasks undertaken by regulators can also be seen as a 
cause of possible interference, because the regulatory tasks overlap w ith  
those carried out by governm ent, causing interaction and possible conflict 
between the two parties. Both in governm ent replies to Exposure Drafts 
and in m inutes of meetings between the ASC and the Departm ent of 
Trade and Industry, company law considerations were used as argum ents 
for influencing ASC members.
Funding structures are significant in that an industry funded organisation 
m ust inevitably be seen as little more than a m outhpiece for the industry, 
charged w ith publicising and legitimising its' activities. Similarly, if 
funding had come from governm ent, then the regulatory body m ight be 
seen as little more than the extension of a governm ent departm ent. The 
move away from CCAB funding since 1990, may be seen as an attem pt to 
overcome this problem, and it could be suggested that the supply of 
funding from a variety of sources ensures that no individual contributor 
is able to influence the regulators. Additionally, the fact that formerly in  
the case* of the ASC, the same individuals were involved as both 
producers and regulators of accounting inform ation, implied that no  
standards w ould be issued which were harm ful to industry, a fact 
endorsed by the limited study in chapter 7. The 'insulation ' of at least a 
significant part of the personneP^ of the ASB could be seen as a conscious 
move to avoid this situation.
Through the appointment of a full-time chairman and technical director of the ASB.
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D uring the lifetime of the ASC, accountability was internalised, in that the  
issue of standards and subsequent enforcement rem ained w ithin the  
profession. Dependence on the CCAB for agreem ent on standards m ean t 
that the ASC had no authority of its' own, a situation exacerbated by the  
fact that the funding also came from the CCAB. The ability of the ASB to 
issue standards in its' own right, removes the form er dependence o n  
outside bodies. An acknowledgem ent of various stakeholders am ong 
users w ould suggest less accountability and more independence for the  
regulators, in that as Chapter 6 explained, m ultiple dem ands tend to 
w eaken accountability^^.
In looking at the process of standard setting in the cases of SSAP 20 and  
SSAP 22, the changes m ade to the standards undoubtedly weakened the ir 
effect and allowed preparers to choose accounting solutions of their choice. 
The dom ination of the process by preparers, both w ith in  and w ithout the  
regulatory body was identified and would account for the 'weakness' of the  
standards. A lthough lobbying would always tend to be dom inated by 
producers of inform ation for reasons outlined earlier in the chapter, 
nevertheless, the tendency may have been counter-balanced by more users 
w ithin the regulatory body. The governm ent was identified in Chapter 8 
as m ore of a major player than it would admit, claiming a very m in o r 
role in the process while apparently having a policy-orientated concern for 
accounting standards and in the case of the two standards studied, being 
involved in m any of the stages of development.
FURTHER RESEARCH
W ithin the area of accounting regulation, the am ount of research still to 
be done appears infinite. The role of accounting in society means tha t 
regulation may have a widespread behavioural and allocational effect o n  
both producers and users of accounting inform ation. Each single act of 
regulation should have some consequence, otherwise, as Gellein (1978) 
points out, there w ould be little point in prom ulgating the item. If it is the  
regulatory body that is being studied rather than their p ronouncem ents, 
then it is the interaction w ith their constituents and other stakeholders 
which assum es importance.
^  This assumes that stakeholders are not a homogeneous group.
209
In the case of lobbying, studies have tended to rely on analysis based on  
comment letters. It is not that this is the best media to study; in most cases 
it is the only available media. As Lindhahl (1987) points out, com m ent 
letters are a low cost form of lobbying, but are unlikely to capture the  
extent of the total lobbying. Indeed, Fogarty et al (1994) go even further by 
stating that the research carried out to date in '...conducting p rim itive  
counts and classifications, raises more questions than it answers and has 
not even exhausted the capabilities of what m ust be the first step in  
content analysis' (pp. 40, 41). In order to guage the extent of lobbying, 
detailed interviews would have to be carried out w ith all mem bers of the  
regulatory body. Documentation (if it existed) which w ould detail all 
w ritten submissions and m inutes of meetings with interested parties 
w ould have to be examined. Such detail would furnish the researcher 
w ith the extent of both formal and informal lobbying and the possible 
revealed preferences of those carrying out the activity. These preferences 
could then be compared with regulatory pronouncem ents in order to see 
w hether there was any form of systematic matching. This type of research 
w ould need to rely on the supply of w ritten docum entation as well as the  
willingness of the interviewees to supply honest answers. A lthough a 
form of m atching was carried out by Tonkin (1983), this relied 
substantially on comment letters. Thus results might have been obscured 
by any form of interaction carried out in another arena.
A more focused approach which is com plem entary rather than an  
alternative to the above, is the use of case studies centred on specific acts 
of accounting regulation. Such studies could be used as a vehicle for 
testing certain hypotheses e.g. the Sutton types of hypothesis concerning 
size and identity of the lobbyist; the role of the auditors' preferences for 
accounting complexity (Watts and Zim m erm an, 1986), and the Becker 
(1983) hypothesis which suggests a positive correlation betw een resources 
used in lobbying and success in terms of regulatory outcome. The case 
study suggested would need a qualitative approach consisting of the use of 
archival material, other published inform ation and interviews w ith  
regulators and interested parties amongst the regulated^^. Thus a history of
This is the approach used by Van Lent (1996) in his study of financial conglomerates in 
the Netherlands.
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the developm ent of a standard could be produced against w hich  
hypotheses could be tested and an explanation of the regulatory outcom e 
obtained.
Such a study as this could also be carried out using m odels of political 
systems, which analyse the inputs to political dem ands and then exam ine 
the conversion of such dem ands into outputs. The m odels developed by 
such w riters as Easton (1965), are somewhat complex and are often applied 
to a m ulti-dem and environm ent and incorporate the effect of political 
ou tputs on subsequent behaviour. These m odels comm ence w ith the  
shaping of wants into dem ands and progress through to the final o u tpu t 
(incorporating behavioural responses over time). As a m ulti-stage system, 
it is capable of being broken dow n into indiv idual stages for research 
purposes. For example, the focus might be on how  firms form ulate  
responses to Exposure Drafts and the basis of their dem ands e.g. ideology, 
expectations, m otivation. The political system itself then converts inpu ts 
to issues and selects certain of these issues to outputs. This action m igh t 
describe the way in which an agenda for regulatory pronouncem ents is 
decided u p o n ^ . Alternatively, the latter stages of the m odel could be 
examined by research into how the behaviour of regulators is shaped over 
tim e and the way in which outputs feed back into further regulatory 
demands26.
A nother area which focuses research on the regulatory agency has been 
suggested by Sutton (1984) in w hat he describes as a political econom ic 
approach. Drawing on the ideas of Noll (1974), he considers that the way in 
which the accounting rule-making body m easures its success qua standard 
setter w ould offer promise as the basis for a theory of accounting 
regulation. This m ight be achieved by com paring the regulatory 
pronouncem ents w ith the original m andate given to, or assum ed by the  
regulators. Unfortunately, such m andates often include non-specific term s 
such as 'public interest' and therefore may be unable to provide a standard 
against which outcomes can be measured. If a conceptual fram ew ork is
^  Daley and Tranter (1990) suggest that the order in which accounting issues are tackled by 
a regulatory body is an important political decision.
Two examples of the Easton model are included in Appendix 5.
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considered to be representative of the public interest, then it m ay be 
possible to compare standards with such a framework, although this m ay 
suffer from  subjective interpretation of certain of the terms used^^.
Fogarty et al (1994) suggest an approach based on the role of pow er in  
standard setting, not only in the contexts already m entioned in th is 
section, b u t also in the context of conflicts between the role of the large 
public accounting firms as the enforcers of accounting standards and the ir 
client service to the preparers com m unity' (p. 40). They also suggest that 
given the available written m aterial i.e. com m ent letters, statem ents of 
position and final drafts, these should be subject to 'greater exam inations 
in the traditions of rhetorical analysis' (p. 40), although once again th is 
m ay suffer from subjective interpretation.
Inherent in m ost of these studies are the beliefs of the various participants 
in the regulatory process. Further research could concentrate on the 
indiv iduals involved and include a study of their beliefs^s. During the 
recent (1996) public hearing on the subject of goodwill. Professor Tweedie 
of the ASB asked one presenter w hether his proposals on a certain 
accounting treatm ent were based on conviction or convenience^^. If the 
lobbyists could be persuaded to give an honest answer to this question, 
then this w ould reveal the motives behind actions and explain the reason 
for the pressure being exerted on the regulatory body. Similarly, research 
which is centred on the regulators them selves and their beliefs may well 
assist in the explanation or prediction of actions. Perhaps this could be 
expanded into the area of non-participants in the process, w hich w ould  
involve identification of those having some potential interest in the topic 
under discussion to discover the reasons for non-participation^o.
For example 'relevance', 'reliability' or 'materiality',
Wilson (1980) identified the lack of studies into beliefs as a research deficiency.
See the Times of 28th September 1995: 'So Many Brands of Opinion on Goodwill', R Bruce 
p 32.
In the early days of this research, the writer interviewed an official from the TUC who 
stated that the reason that no replies were made to Exposure Drafts was a shortage of 
resources which they felt were better utilised in lobbying the EU.
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A w ider perspective on research into regulation could be a com parative 
study. The accounting regulation 'independence* m odel developed in this 
study could be utilised in two different ways. Firstly, it could be tested on  
an international basis in those countries where private sector accounting 
regulators operate. A lthough the US has been widely quoted (due m ainly  
to the availability of inform ation, the quantity of research and the 
tradition of regulatory agencies), few of the elements of the m odel appear 
to have been used to apply to FASB. In other countries, such as A ustralia 
and Canada, although accounting standards have legal backing, they 
nevertheless are developed in the private sector and therefore could 
become the focus of this type of analysis.
Secondly, the work having been developed from  general theories of 
regulation and examples of other regulatory agencies, should be capable of 
being transported beyond the boundaries of accounting. Regulatory 
agencies created by the privatisation of UK utility com panies and also set 
up by the Financial Services Act, as well as being used for com parison 
purposes in earlier chapters, w ould provide fertile research topics. 
Matching the elements of the model developed in earlier chapters against 
other agencies should not be difficult. Motives for incorporation require a 
historical perspective while tasks, funding and personnel require 
observational techniques. Process which included the inputs can also be 
observed by using one or more of the approaches used in these earlier 
chapters. The w idening of the research paradigm  in this way could lead to 
the form ulation of a more robust model.
If, as has been suggested by m any accounting com m entators, accounting 
regulation is a political activity, then it w ould seem reasonable that it 
could be subjected to the same analysis as political activity w ithin  a 
governm ent setting. Self (1985) defines four major theories of governm ent 
which could be used as a construct for further research. Public choice 
theories have already been m entioned under 'lobbying' and there is a 
fairly clear m echanism  for exam ining public choice in  this particular 
context. Pluralism  'analyses the growth and influence of groups and 
organisations, both public and private' Self p. 163. Research based on  
pluralism  m ust examine those involved in the regulatory process both 
w ithin and w ithout the regulatory body and suggests the decline in
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im portance of bodies which m ight speak for more general interests. This 
w ould  appear to be true in the area of this study. Corporatism  possibly 
provides a fertile ground for future studies and its' relevance is illustrated 
in  the w ay in which professional organisations and governm ent appear to 
be significant players in the regulatory scene. Self's final area, that of 
bureaucratic theories tend to be more problematic in application to 
accounting regulation, but m ight be applied more if a study was being 
m ade of, for example, company law am endm ent, in that its' subject area 
concerns inefficiencies deriving from the growth in governm ent and the  
reduced role of political leadership^!.
REFLECTIONS
The originality of this study arises from several sources. In the first 
instance, the research has been based on a branch of political theory, the  
literature of which is mainly from the US, which could preclude m any  
potential researchers from easily being able to discover and utilise the  
theories and concepts, since the typical background of the accounting 
researcher m ay not be w ithin this field. The 'new ness' of private sector 
accounting regulation, commencing in 1970, means there is no t a trad ition  
of study of accounting regulation, with research m ethods w hich could be 
applied to this area. Additionally, there is also the problem  of the  
availability of inform ation. It is only in the last three years that the ASC 
archives have been opened for research. The early days of the ASC w ere 
som ew hat clouded in secrecy, in that even lists of ASC m em bers were n o t 
publicly available at the time. Such due process as there was could not be 
said to be general knowledge^?.
Even given the availability of the ASC archives, research w ork is not easy. 
The archive consists of approximately 950 files and microfiche records. 
These have not been stored in any rational order. Originally w hen the  
ASC was adm inistered by the ICAEW, they used the standard Institu te
It might also be considered somewhat outdated in view of the increase in privatisation 
and the use of agencies by governments in the 1980's and 1990's.
My research of the archives failed to find evidence of what could be termed 'due process' 
in the true sense of the expression.
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m ethod of filing at that time. There were several changes in m ethods over 
time. A lthough some files are dedicated to just one subject, m any files 
contain a mixture of topics, some adm inistrative and some technical. The 
index to the archive was not compiled by anyone w ith  a technical 
accounting background or detailed knowledge of the ASC. Therefore there 
is often very little logic or indeed sequential date order in the files. The 
difficulties in following through a particular item is com pounded by the 
fact that the host institution of the archive. The John Rylands Library of 
M anchester does not allow m ore than one file to be accessed at a tim e. 
Thus any attem pt to follow a particular issue tends to be painfully tim e- 
consum ing and often fruitless in view of the inaccurate indexing as 
already m entioned. These difficulties m ay be seen by reference to 
A ppendix 6 which contains a report written by J W inters, a form er u n d e r 
secretary of the ASC.
The identification of so many topics for further research tends to typify m y 
achievem ent in the work for this thesis. A personal evaluation of m y 
contribution to the study of accounting regulation could be that it 
represents only a pilot study or a starting point for further research in to  
the regulatory process. The 'independence m odel' is not capable of 
indicating regulatory dependence or independence w hether applied 
w ithin an accounting or alternative context. W hat it is able to do is to 
indicate which factors should or should not be present if regulatory 
independence is to be achieved. Therefore the factors are indicative of a 
m ovem ent along a scale, m oving the agency towards or away from  
independence.
As a pilot study, this thesis w ould m ark not the end of research on the 
subject, bu t a signpost to the beginning of m ore detailed research. The 
choice of where to progress this study is therefore som ew hat difficult, but 
could be guided by my knowledge of the availability of data. One area 
which I w ould be interested in  progressing, w ould be a study of the 
particular m ethods of lobbying on an accounting standard. As prev iously  
identified, m uch of the lobbying effort is invisible and therefore it w ould  
be necessary to interview those members of the regulatory board to 
identify these hidden forms of lobbying and subsequently those w ho are 
carrying out the lobbying. This would be m ore applicable to a new
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proposed standard than an existing standard as it w ould be difficult to 
unearth  the hidden lobbying on a standard that had already been issued. 
This w ould require the co-operation of the ASB, who although n o t 
allowing access to any files for research purposes, have during m y dealings 
with them, always been prepared to answer queries. From a study such as 
this a further understanding of the process of regulation could be gained.
Another 'next step' in research could be to test the various life cycle 
theories of agencies, looking at the 'tightness' of standards developed 
during the life of the ASC and recommencing the process w ith the  
formation of the ASB. The technique to be used w ould be similar to Nobes 
(1991), utilising exposure drafts and published standards to dem onstrate  
(tentatively) that industry orientation occurred during the life of the 
agency.
Overall, during the years I have spent on this thesis, I have become 
familiar w ith the regulatory process and knowledge of the actors and the 
actions of the ASC. Attem pting to match this w ith the extant regulatory 
theories has enabled me to develop the background (and confidence) for 
carrying out the further research detailed in this chapter. Despite the fact 
that the thesis does little more than explain the factors which may relate to 
regulatory independence, nevertheless this provides an essential basis for 
furthering m y research work in this field.
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APPENDIX 1
WORKING PARTY FOR ED 30 (ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL)
The goodwill working party set up in 1978 consisted originally of R enshall 
(Peat Marwick), as chairman appointed by Watts, the ASC chairman. Black 
(Thomas Tilling) and Leeson (Whinney Murray), none of w hom  w ere 
ASC mem bers at the time (although Renshall subsequently became 
Chairman. Subsequently, the panel (as the working party was known) was 
expanded to include Knox (DTI) and Westwick (Arthur Anderson).
Their views changed over time in that the original suggestion m ade by 
w ay of a discussion paper was that all goodwill should be treated as a fixed 
asset and amortised. W ithin one year they had realised that there was n o  
consensus for this treatment and recommended an im m ediate write-off 
against distributable reserves. In July 1981, the panel met to make fu rth er 
recom m endations, but of the 4 members present, 2 favoured a choice of 
either m ethod, one favoured capitalisation and the other im m edia te  
write-off. The minutes to that meeting ended w ith the words 'In  the ligh t 
of the uncertainty described above, no date was fixed for the next m eeting ' 
(ASC 2/9/4). The subsequent meeting in September 1981 reflected th e  
final approach taken by the standard ' The panel seeks ASC's authority  to 
w ork towards a compromise solution which falls between the tw o 
alternatives' (ASC 2/9/4). The ASC agreed to this solution in a letter to 
panel members dated 18.9.81 (ASC 2/47/1).
Following this, it appears that the tasks of members of the working party 
was m ainly that of drafting and later, following the issue of ED 30, th e  
consideration of comments received. A suggestion was m ade at the tim e  
(ASC 2 /61 /2 ) that working party members could be used for meetings w ith  
companies, but there is no record of whether this was progressed.
Holgate, as under secretary to the ASC, also served as secretary to th e  
working party, and it appears that he was very m uch at the centre of 
decision-making. There are examples of his taking a leading role in certain  
matters. On 21.1.82, he wrote to the working party members:
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"Although our discussion at the last m eeting was inconclusive, I 
have amended the material on negative goodwill. I have suggested 
that../ ASC 2/39/1
In a further memo to the working party mem bers dated 30.7.82, he  
suggests:
"sending out the ballot draft today enables it to be voted upon by the 
old ASC membership. I am sure you will appreciate that this has 
advantages'^ ASC 2/61 /1
It is also possible that his input into drafts was considerable. The m inu tes 
of a meeting on 28.6.83, states that :
"No decision was taken on the question of w hether a com pany 
could use both immediate write-off and amortisation at the same time"
ASC 2 /61 /2
and yet three days later, he writes to working party members, inform ing 
them :
"I have deleted reference to whether a single policy should be 
selected and followed" ASC 2 /61 /2
This appears to have been endorsed by the working party at a meeting of 
10.1.84 when the question of wording was left to Renshall and Holgate. 
The same two members appear to have agreed on other points. In reply to 
a letter from Findlater (a newly appointed working party member) dated 
16.3.84, Holgate writes
"We discussed this point, but decided not to make any change"
ASC 2/61/3.
The "we" refers also to himself and Renshall. A similar letter was w ritten  
to Leeson regarding another point on the standard.
 ^ This was significant in that 18 ASC members had terms of office termination on 31.8.82.
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It w ould appear that not only were the working party m em bers 
representatives of preparers rather than users, bu t they were over-ruled by 
the m ain ASC committee members.
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APPENDIX 2
GOVERNMENT AS A USER AND THE CORPORATE REPORT
The Corporate Report m entions specifically that the interest of 
Government in published accounts of companies is as follows;
' information to estimate the effects of existing and
proposed levies and other financial and economic 
measures......
to estimate economic trends including likely balance of 
payments figures.
....to promote economic efficiency.
... as a potential or existing customer or finance creditor'
(para 2.33)
The findings of this paper are consistent w ith some of the above 
statements in that the work of the Central Statistical Office provides 
a basis for economic estimates. Certainly the Treasury has expressed 
an interest in the economic implications of accounting standards 
while the Department of Trade and Industry has dem onstrated this 
by their replies to Exposure Drafts under the heading of economic 
policy in the analysis (which may be assum ed to include the 
prom otion of efficiency). G overnm ent's role as a potential 
customer or finance creditor is illustrated in the sections on the 
Departm ent of the Environment, Departm ent of Health, H om e 
Office, Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and the M inistry 
of Defence. This supplier/  customer role, it may be assumed, w ould 
also apply to the majority of Departm ents as well as those 
individually interviewed.
The Corporate Report continues with the uses of information as;
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(a) Assessing the effectiveness of the entity in achieving 
objectives established previously by society.
(b)Assessing the capacity of the entity to make future re­
allocations of its resources for social purposes.
(c) Evaluating the economic function and performance of the 
entity in relation to society and the national interest and the 
social costs and benefits attributable to the entity.
(d) Attesting to compliance with taxation regulations, 
company law, contractual and other legal obligations 
and requirements'
(para 2.35)
W ith regard to section (a), the activities of the Office of Fair Trading 
and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, w ould appear to 
agree w ith this in respect of economic policies and additionally the  
Employee Involvem ent section of the Departm ent of E m ploym ent 
w ould apply to an area of social policy. Sections (b) and (c) are 
extremely general and it may be assumed that this use occurs 
through the overview of companies carried out by the D epartm ent 
of Trade and Industry and the Treasury. Section (d) underlines the  
function of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, w hilst the  
monitoring of obligations would appear to be a function carried o u t 
by all Departments entering into contracts involving performance.
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APPENDIX 3
INTERVIEWS WITH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
These interviews were carried out at an early stage in the period of 
registration for a research degree. At that time no particular focus for the 
thesis had been established and the writer was looking generally into the 
needs of users of financial reports and accounts. Ultimately, from the 
results, it became apparent that the government's interest in such publicly 
available information might be different from that of other users. A rising 
from the research carried out here, it became apparent that the 
governm ent had an economic policy orientation in com m enting o n  
proposed accounting standards. This led eventually to the idea of an  
examination into the independence of accounting regulators.
A difficulty arising from the stage at which this research was carried out, 
was the inexperience of the writer, who was not aware of the existence of 
The Civil Service Year Book, which could have been used for securing 
contacts w ithin governm ent departments. Instead a general letter was 
written to the Information Office at each departm ent explaining the  
background to the research and requesting an interview w ith a mem ber of 
the department. Twenty two departments and agencies were contacted, 
which resulted in 14 personal interviews. In addition, 2 interviews were 
by telephone and in writing. In some instances, individuals were able to 
discuss the work of other departments, either because they worked closely 
with them, or alternatively because they had been transferred from that 
departm ent.
The departm ents interviewed personally, w ith details of the interview ees 
were as follows:
• Department of the Environm ent, Finance Departm ental Service 
Division. C Khosla. 23.5.90
• Department of Health, Finance Branch. K Card. 8.8.90
• Departm ent of Trade and Industry, Export Credit G uarantee 
Department, Finance Division. B Wright. 24.5.90
• Department of Employment, IRA 3. Miss S Guscott. 28.9.90
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• Departm ent of Employment, Economic Policy Briefing Section. Miss 
M East. 16.11.90
• Home Office, Procurement Section. D Diamond. 26.10.90
• Inland Revenue, Compliance and Collection Division, Mrs J Barmer
• Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Financial M anagem ent 
Division. C J Lawson. 25.5.90
• Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Procurement Policies. S Clark.
8.6.90
• Ministry of Defence, Accounting, Estimating and Pricing Services. J V 
A Crawford, 27.6.90
• Office of Fair Trading, Competition Policy Division. M Graham .
4.5.90
• The Treasury, Accountancy Advice Division. D Jamieson. 25.5.90 and 
K Bradley. 8.6.90
• Department of Trade and Industry, Companies Division. F Jenkins.
19.10.90
In addition, telephone and written information was secured from H M 
Customs and Excise, VAT Control Division A (A Collard, 15.10.90) and 
Central Statistical Office, Business Statistics Office (J Knight, 9.8.90). F rom  
the rem aining departm ents contacted, one (Oftel), did not reply, and the  
Serious Fraud Office were not prepared to assist. The rem ain ing  
departments claimed that the research did not apply to them  (although 
this might be that they were not sure who would deal w ith such matters).
The officials who were interviewed, tended to be fairly senior w ithin the ir 
organisations but often did not have job titles that w ould be recognisable 
or comparable w ith each other. Those whose grades are identifiable from  
the Civil service Year Book were between grades 4 and 6 (Grade 1 being 
Perm anent Secretary level).
The interviews were largely unstructured and consisted of firstly asking 
the way in which the departm ent used published accounts. This first 
question was followed up by enquiries into what further inform ation was
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either already secured or needed by the departm ent for decision-m aking 
purposes. This then led into the second question which asked w hether the 
departm ent had any input into proposed accounting standards.
Although other points arose during the interviews, which are m entioned  
at the beginning of Chapter 8, in retrospect, some of these aspects could 
have been examined in more detail w ith a view to further research. 
Additionally, contacts to other potential interviewees in the sam e 
departm ent could have been requested at the time (although the Treasury 
was extremely helpful in suggesting further contacts).
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department
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APPENDIX 5
EXTRACTS FROM GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS COMMENT
LETTERS 1980 to 1990
Department of Industry and Trade, Accountancy Services Division, 4th 
May 1982, Accounting for Leases and Hire Purchase Contracts.
'It would indeed be undesirable if the introduction of an accounting  
standard adventitiously reduced the willingness or ability of companies to 
invest in productive assets'
'YJe would also welcome the proposal in the exposure draft that sm all 
companies would at least be permitted to adopt a simplified form o f  
accounting... '
'It may therefore be considered preferable if separate captions were used, 
with the caption for leased assets making it clear that the asset represented 
did not constitute ownership rights but rights to the future benefits fro m  
use of the assets for the greater part of their useful economic lives'
Department of Trade, 7th April 1983, Accounting for Goodwill
'Departure from this provision is required if following it would not give a 
true and fair view (1948 Act, Section 149)
'Indeed, paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 to the 1948 Companies Act w ou ld  
seem to require the write-down of shares only if there has been a 
diminuation in value.'
'Neither of these paragraphs reflect adequately the legal requirem ent 
which is stated in Schedule 8, Note 3 to the balance sheet formats. '
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'Under section 39(4) of the 1980 Com-panies Act any provision must be 
treated as a realised loss and distributable profits would thereby be 
restricted. '
'It does not adequately reflect the position in law, that the ho ld ing  
company's investment should be stated at purchase price, may only be 
written down if it is diminished in value and must be written down if  the  
diminuation is permanent (Schedule 8, paragraphs 17-19).'
Department of Trade, 7th April 1983, Acquisitions and Mergers.
'We would suggest that paragraphs 6 and 25 might be expanded to make it 
clear that acquisition accounting is applied to pre-acquisition profits in  
respect of shares acquired for non-equity consideration.'
'Neither covers all the disclosure requirements of the 1982 (Accounts and  
Audit) Regulations...'.
Department of Trade, 5th December 1983, Disclosure of Pension 
Information, ED 32,
'...this adds useful clarification and should be re-instated'
'It would seem useful, if the date of the most recent actuarial valuation is 
to be disclosed, to have also the date of the next valuation or the frequency  
of the valuations.'
'...we remain unconvinced that the disclosure recommended w ou ld  
comply with the legal requirements in all circumstances.'
...it is far from certain that compliance with the proposed standard w ou ld  
ensure compliance with paragraph 50(4) of schedule 8. '
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\..but nevertheless feel that it might be useful if ED. 32 were to contain a 
note on how far compliance with it is compatible with IAS 19.'
' "Small" companies which file modified accounts are not required to f i le  
the information required to be given by paragraphs 50 and 56 of Schedule  
8. It is not clear what the position of the standard is, in relation to such  
companies: presumably it is not intended to require them to disclose w hat 
the law permits them to withold.'
Department of Trade and Industry, November 1983, ED 33, Accounting for 
Deferred Tax.
'YJe can see no justification for an exemption from the standard fo r  
wholly owned subsidiaries, which are subject, as are all companies, to the  
requirements of Schedule 8 to the Companies Act 1948 as regards deferred  
tax. '
'We consider discounting of deferred tax liabilities should only be 
considered, if at all, as part of a proposal in relation to all deferred 
liabilities and assets.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 8th November 1984, ED 34 Pension  
Scheme Accounts
'To disclose only the net movement would show the net effect on the  
funds but to disclose both gross figures would additionally give m em bers
an idea of investment activity which at either extreme could be
important. '
'We agree that all assets should be accounted for at market value but 
would suggest that consideration should also be given to drawing  
attention in the SORP to material change in the market value of assets
between the year end and the date of approval by the trustees as required
by SSAP 17, Accounting for Post Balance Sheet Events.
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Department of Trade and Industry, 5th July 1985, ED 36 Extraordinary
Items and Prior Year Adjustments.
'There is nothing in company law to prevent this but equally there is 
nothing to prevent the alternative treatment whereby the profit or loss o n 
disposal would be calculated by reference to the carrying amount of the  
asset in the balance sheet.'
'Paragraph 34 (1) of Schedule 4 provides that these deficits must be debited 
to revaluation reserve, even if that reserve stands at zero.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 2nd October 1985, ED 37 Accounting for 
Depreciation.
'We have no problems with the reference to the situation described in  
paragraph 25 (a), but would like to see an additional reference to the true 
and fair requirement inserted here.'
Home Office, Voluntary Services Unit, 17th April 1986. Accounting by 
Charities.
'We should have liked to see a little more guidance in your 
recommendations on sources and application of funds on the importance  
of distinguishing (and identifying) public sources of funding.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 29th April 1987, ED 40 Stock and Long 
Term Contracts.
'However in many cases we would expect that there would be a sufficient 
element of uncertainty about the amount to make it a provision, as 
defined by Schedule 4 of the Companies Act 1985 (CA 1985). '
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Inland Revenue, Policy Division, 3rd April 1987, ED 40, Stock and Work in 
Progress
'...we believe that paragraphs 1 to 5 of the statement will need som e  
modification, and I hope to write to the accountancy bodies in m ore  
detail...' (Note. This concerns the proposed omission from the new  
standard of the Board of Inland revenue's statement on the tax treatment 
of changes in the basis of the valuation of stocks and work in progress.)
Department of Trade and Industry, 19th November 1987, ED 41, 
Accounting for Research and Development.
'In particular, we support the proposal to require disclosure of R & D 
charged as an expense in the current year. It should make for greater 
awareness of R & D and of its importance in assessing com pany  
performance. '
'As you know, our view of the law is that paragraph 20 of Schedule 4 to 
the Companies Act is permissive and would allow companies to fo llo w  
this policy.
Department of Trade and Industry, 2nd August 1988, ED 42, Accounting 
for Special Purpose Transactions.
'We think that the ASC should give further consideration to the need to  
make it clear in the proposed SSAP where it is simply elaborating on the  
statutory requirements of the Companies Act 1985, and where the  
treatment it recommends is based on the use of the true and fair override.
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Department of Trade and Industry, 13th September 1988, ED 43, The
Accounting Treatment of Government Grants.
'It contravenes the fundamental accruals accounting concept on w hich  
paragraph 27 is based, without the justification of being required by the  
prudence concept. '
Department of Trade and Industry, November 1988, ED 44, Accounting for 
Goodwill.
'This proposal, by providing for the disclosure of earnings per share (EPS), 
before and after the amortisation charge, might reduce the disincentive to 
amortise and might therefore increase the number of companies w hich  
amortise goodwill. Since international accounting opinion is moving in  
favour of amortisation, this would encourage UK accounting standards 
and practice to move in line with this trend.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 4th May 1989, ED 45, Segmental
Reporting.
'Its implementation into a standard should help to improve the  
usefulness of company accounts to users.'
'Many users of accounts would prefer to see segmentation by source but 
we are constrained by the Fourth Directive and disclosure on both bases 
seems the appropriate response.'
'In particular, we have in mind the inclusion of
- treatment of the domestic market as a geographical segment (that
is, the UK or, perhaps, the British Isles),
- disclosure of depreciation taken into account in arriving at 
segment results
- disclosure of capital expenditure by segment.'
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'However, there are also other considerations which ought to be taken  
into account. Government Departments make use of company accounts 
for statistical purposes. You will no doubt be aware that some of the  
statistics dealing with the economy produced by the Government has been 
criticised over the last few years and that action has recently been 
announced by the Prime Minister to improve their quality. The  
publication of the ED and the issue of a SSAP in due course could prove to 
be timely in this context.
The use of company accounts information in the preparation of U nited  
Kingdom national accounts suffers at present because of the absence o f  
adequate segmental data, in particular, a UK segment. Incorporation o f  
sufficient information requirements into the eventual SSAP w ou ld  
therefore be helpful in reducing other reporting demands placed upon  
companies by Government. '
Cabinet Office, Central Statistical Office, 26th April 1989, ED 45, Segmental 
Reporting.
'If ED 45 is implemented in a suitable form, it should enable us to cut the  
number of statistical forms sent to companies by Government and thereby 
greatly reduce the burden of form-filling on businesses whilst im p ro v in g  
the overall efficiency of data compilation and the quality of macro- 
economic aggregates. '
'We would also like to see the addition of a requirement for geographical 
segmentation (with the UK as a specified segment) of capital expenditure  
and depreciation. '
Office of Fair Trading, 2nd May 1989, ED 45 Segmental Reporting
'...we feel that the primary requirement is to meet the information needs 
of shareholders in assessing performance. Large conglomerate firms, in
particular, have the ability to conceal the performance of ind iv idua l
sectors from shareholders.'
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' We believe that segmental reporting should be aligned, as far as possible, 
with a company's activities in separate economic markets. In this way,
markets will function more efficiently and competition will be
encouraged. '
Department of Trade and Industry, 18th September 1989, ED 46, related 
Party Transactions
'We are concerned that no undue burdens should be placed u p on  
companies and think that the application of the proposed standard to
small companies could impose a reporting burden which is not f u l l y
justified....Therefore disclosure...by large companies is more justifiable  
than in respect of small companies when such information may be 
commercially damaging. '
'As a result of the support expressed by the UK for the objective of the  
lASC, any non-compliance by the UK with lASC standards is likely to be 
given a higher profile than hitherto.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 31st July 1990, ED 48, Accounting for 
Acquisitions and Mergers.
'..we think it would be preferable for the standard to use the same term as 
the Act.'
'...we think it would be useful if the section dealing with the legal 
requirements in Great Britain were to be expanded to describe the  
requirements of paragraphs 9,11 and 12 of the new Schedule 4A to the  
Companies Act 1985.'
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APPENDIX 6 
EASTON'S MODELS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS
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APPENDIX 7 
LETTERS FROM J WINTERS
23, D'URBERVILLE DRIVE, SWANAGE, DORSET. BH19 IQN. 
Swanage (01929) 424126 (Answerphone)
16 January 1997
Dear Robert,
As requested, I have looked for the correspondence that 
you require.
Naturally, the original is with Skerratt and my 
contemporary copy was thrown away when I left the ACCA's 
Research Committee.
However, thanks to the wonders of word processors, I still 
have the text on disk and I enclose a copy - complete with
my permission to reproduce/publish it.
Unfortunately, I do not have a copy of Skerratt's reply, 
but it said, in general terms, that the requirement (or it 
might have been "advice") was to preserve the papers in 
the format in which they had been retained by the ICAEW. 
The fact that no committee member or committee secretary 
would have dreamed of using that format for their own 
purposes was thus ignored.
I do hope that this is what you want; but if not, please
do not hesitate to get in touch again.
Yours,
Jerry
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23,D'URBERVILLE DRIVE, SWANAGE, DORSET. BH19 IQN. 
Swanage (0929) 424126 
18 January 1994
Dear Professor Skerratt,
In July 1993, you kindly arranged for me to have access to 
the archive of ASC papers held in the John Rylands 
University Library. In September I attended the Library 
and was received with exemplary kindness and consideration 
by the staff.
Unfortunately, I have come to the reluctant conclusion 
that I will be unable to write the book (or collection of 
papers) dealing with the early years and early products of 
the ASC which I had intended.
In the covering booklet to the catalogue, indication is 
given of the unsatisfactory nature of the English 
Institute's policies relating to the collection and 
storage of important material. As former Deputy Technical 
Director and, inter alia. Secretary of the Accounting 
Standards Committee, I can confirm that these policies 
were frequently applied without benefit of a sense of 
proportion by the Institute's then archivist and often 
followed with grudging reluctance by hard pressed staff. 
The policy was based on the view that an Agenda recited 
"Things to be done" and that the resulting minutes 
described the decisions taken in respect thereof. 
Supporting papers were of no account.
As a researcher, I found that this rendered the papers, in 
their existing presentation, unusable. The disk catalogue 
itself reveals a confused collection of unconnected 
oddments.
In particular, the Institute's early policy (not followed 
through in all of the later years) of detaching the 
attachments from the related agendas and only filing the 
latter, makes reconstructing the flow of the ASC's affairs 
impossible. Furthermore, the lack of any sequential 
record by topic, renders that approach to research also 
unavailable.
May I suggest that, if funds can ever be found, a new 
approach to this unique archive should be explored. What, 
I suggest, is needed, is that the files should be 
dismembered and completely reconstructed. The mess created 
by the Institute is not, of itself, worthy of retention; 
the material contained therein is what matters.
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One set of files should be built up on the basis of 
time. This set would have as its starting point the 
minutes of each ASSC or ASC meeting. These should be 
reconstructed by adding, wherever possible, the related 
topic texts, many of which exist in different files on a 
rather random basis.
The second set would be by topic and would, again, be 
reconstructed on a calendar basis. Naturally, some of 
this material would be a duplicate of material in the 
above ASSC/ASC files, but this would be a valuable 
duplication enabling either aspect to be considered in its 
own right.
To each of these sets of files would be appended a subset 
dealing with the routine correspondence appropriate 
thereto. To the topic based files would be appended a 
further subset dealing with comments received on exposure, 
to the extent that these are available.
Once the above had been completed, it might be possible 
for the person undertaking the work to fill in some of the 
gaps by appealing to the firms whose partners served on 
the ASC and on its subcommittees to examine their own 
archives for stored material.
Considerable expense would be involved. The archivist's 
costs, transport and storage of the files and office 
accommodation (on the assumption that the worker was not 
prepared to take up residence in Manchester for the one or 
two years the work would take) and extensive photocopying 
to complete the two sets of papers.
Unfortunately, the work needs to be done by someone with 
some knowledge of the technical side of the ASC'c work and 
also of the way in which it operated. However, the end 
product would, I suggest, be a valuable and valued source 
of material truly worthy of study.
I trust that the above thoughts will be of some interest.
I would, of course, be happy to discuss the ideas merely 
outlined above should you wish.
Yours sincerely.
Jerry Winters
263
